On Oct 2, 2014, at 7:16 PM, Alain Hebert <[email protected]> wrote:

>    BCP38 compliance is the exception not the norm.

I'm not sure that's actually the case, practically-speaking.

NAT is an awful thing for many reasons, and it's negative in terms of its 
overall impact on security, but there's one actual benefit from it; it is 
effectively a form of anti-spoofing.

The prevalence of NAT on consumer broadband access networks means that those 
networks do not generally emit spoofed packets.  The same goes for many SME 
networks, even though they oughtn't to be running NAT in front of their servers.

My guess is that the majority, if not all, of the reflection/amplification 
attacks we see are actually initiated from servers under the control of 
attackers and residing on hosting/co-location IDC networks which don't enforce 
anti-spoofing at the access, distribution, or peering/transit portions of their 
topologies.  Some of these servers are tied into so-called 'booter' systems, 
whereas others are linked into more conventional C&C under the direct control 
of attackers, while still others are utilized to launch attacks 'by hand', as 
it were.

Those networks are unmanaged and are likely to remain so (or are so-called 
'bulletproof' networks catering to criminals).  Their peers/upstream transits 
likewise are not enforcing anti-spoofing on ingress, nor are they monitoring 
traffic originating from these networks as it ingresses their own networks (and 
in any event, the traffic volume of the spoofed packets on the attack source - 
reflector/amplifier leg is relatively small).

So, the problem is that those networks which are likely to implement the 
various topologically-appropriate at the various edges of their network are 
likely to have done so.  And by definition, the endpoint networks where the 
spoofed traffic originates aren't likely to do so, nor are their immediate 
peers/upstream transits - or they would've done so long ago. 

----------------------------------------------------------------------
Roland Dobbins <[email protected]> // <http://www.arbornetworks.com>

                   Equo ne credite, Teucri.

                          -- Laocoön

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