Well now, Florian, there you lead me into deep water. I am inclined to say that that circumstance would fall into the category of "things you might have a valid reason to want to do, but which the regulations might prevent you from doing even if they are drawn thoughtfully."
Myself, I am inclined to think that you have a right to try to protect your users of your ESSID network from people pretending to be it, but that you probably don't have a right to try to protect people who are too stupid to be attaching to the right thing. And yes, I realize that if a Windows machine for example tries to attach to a network and gets knocked off it might move down its list and the user might not notice. If your network is this much of an attack target, make sure your building is a Faraday cage, and then you can knock off anything you like. In the final analysis, what will really happen in a business environment, is likely just that your warning system will warn you, and you will walk around with an AirCheck and find the rogue AP and unplug it and beat over the head with it whomever set it up. :-) On October 5, 2014 3:57:05 PM EDT, Florian Weimer <f...@deneb.enyo.de> wrote: >* Jay Ashworth: > >> It is OK for an enterprise wifi system to make this sort of attack >> *on rogue APs which are trying to pretend to be part of it (same >> ESSID). > >What if the ESSID is "Free Internet", or if the network is completely >open? Does it change things if you have data that shows your >customers can be duped even by networks with a non-colliding ESSID? -- Sent from my Android phone with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity.
