On Tuesday, September 13, 2016, Bryant Townsend <bry...@backconnect.com> wrote:
> @ca & Matt - No, we do not plan to ever intentionally perform a > non-authorized BGP hijack in the future. > > Great answer. Thanks. Committing to pursuing a policy of weaponizing BGP would have triggered a serious "terms of service" violations that would have effectively ended your business swiftly and permanently. Tip to the RIR policy folks, you may want to make this point very crisp. A BGP ASN is the fundamental accountability control in a inter-domain routing. Organizations with repeated offensense need to have their ASN revoked, and further there should be controls in places so bad actors cannot acquire "burner" ASNs. @Steve - Correct, the attack had already been mitigated. The decision to > hijack the attackers IP space was to deal with their threats, which if > carried through could have potentially lead to physical harm. Although the > hijack gave us a unique insight into the attackers services, it was not a > factor that influenced my decision. > > @Blake & Mel - We will likely cover some of these questions in a future > blog post. >