Thanks for this note -- I couldn't ask for a better explanation of why
blockchains don't solve any actual real world problems.
Trust problems are difficult, and waving hands and saying decentralize!
solves nothing. For the nanog-related example of validating AS origin,
the problem isn't keeping the database, it's figuring out who can make
authoritative statements about each block of IP addresses. That is an
inherently hierarchical question since all IP blocks originally trace back
to allocations from IANA.
We can have arguments about the best way to document the chain of
ownership, and conspiracy theories about how the evil RIRs are planning
to steal our precious bodily flu^W^WIPs, but "put it in a blockchain!"
Puhleeze.
R's,
John
On Tue, 23 Jan 2018, Jimmy Hess wrote:
On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 10:22 AM, William Herrin <b...@herrin.us> wrote:
On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 1:07 AM, John R. Levine <jo...@iecc.com> wrote:
The promise of blockchain is fraud-resistant recordkeeping, database
management, AND
resource management maintained by a distributed decentralized network which
eliminates or reduces the extent to which there are central points of trust
involved in the recordkeeping,
AND can implement resource-management rules or policies programmatically
and in an unbiased way (E.G. "Smart Contracts").
For example: A decentralized internet number registry could use a blockchain
as the means of making the public records showing the transferrence of the
ownership of a particular internet number from the originator to the
registrant.
The potential is there to go a step beyond replacing RPKI, as a blockchain
could be the AS number authority itself, thus eliminating the need to
have any centralized organizations for tracking and managing
number resource assignments.
How about validating whether a given AS is an acceptable origin for a set
of prefixes?
That's a job for ordinary PKI. Any time you have a trusted central
authority to serve as an anchor, ordinary PKI works fine. The RIRs serve as
See: That's the problem. Ordinary PKI DEPENDS on centralized trust --
that is, with PKI there are corruptible or potentially corruptible or
compromisable entities in your system that you assign an unwarranted or
unnecessary level of trust to.
That would include organizations such AS Number and IP Address registries.
Under the current system, they retain an Unwarranted level of trust, for
example: ARIN Could Delete an IP address allocation or an AS number
allocation after it was assigned, because someone else told them to,
or maybe someone didn't like the content on your website and
coerced/tricked
someone who manipulated or legally forced the central figure to do so.
This would include whatever entities can be signing authorities of your PKI.
This includes any organization with unsecured resource management
capabilities,
such as the DNS Root server, TLD Server operators, and Domain registrars.
Which includes the risks:
(1) The signing authority could be breached by an outsider or insider
attack
(2) The signing authority could prove untrustworthy or later change
the rules.
(3) The signing authority could be covertly corrupted by a government
authority
or foreign power: to support nefarious goals or surveilance or
censorship.
For example: A DNS Registrar or TLD Registry could make a change to the DS
Key or remove
the DS Key and confiscate a domain to intercept traffic, without even the
permission
of the original registrant.
Regards,
John Levine, jo...@iecc.com, Primary Perpetrator of "The Internet for Dummies",
Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail. https://jl.ly
