What you are describing is uRPF VRF mode. This was phase 3 of the uRPF work.
Russ White and I worked on it while at Cisco.
Given that you are setting up prefix filters with your peers, you can add to
the peering agreement that you will only accept packets whose source addresses
matches the prefixes sent.
You then take that BGP session, feed that into a VRF on the interface, and run
uRPF against that VRF. If a source address does not match, drop.
If the BGP session adds more routes, those automatically update the VRF “white
list” for the uRPF.
It was build to scale. Not sure where it is at in the code or the hardware. Ask
PS - So yes, you can do uRPF on your peering sessions. It was coded and
deployed back in 2006.
> On Mar 1, 2018, at 13:57, Todd Crane <t...@toddcrane.com> wrote:
> Since we cannot count on everyone to follow BCP 38 or investigate their
> abuse@, I was thinking about the feasibility of using filtering to prevent
> spoofing from peers’ networks.
> With the exception of a few edge cases, would it be possible to filter
> inbound traffic allowing only packets with source addresses matching the
> peer’s BGP announcement? Theoretically it should be a two way street to any
> address I can receive from, thus if I can’t send to it, I shouldn't be
> receiving from it. I realize this is not currently a feature of any router
> (to my knowledge), but could it be implemented into some NOSs fairly easily
> and jerry-rigged into others for the time being.
> This would allow us to peer with OVH et al, and not worry as much.
> Furthermore, whereas BCP 38 is reliant upon everybody, this could
> significantly reduce amplification attacks with even just a handful of
>> On Feb 28, 2018, at 6:52 PM, Job Snijders <j...@ntt.net> wrote:
>> On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 09:52:54PM +0000, Chip Marshall wrote:
>>> On 2018-02-27, Ca By <cb.li...@gmail.com> sent:
>>>> Please do take a look at the cloudflare blog specifically as they
>>>> name and shame OVH and Digital Ocean for being the primary sources
>>>> of mega crap traffic
>>>> Also, policer all UDP all the time... UDP is unsafe at any speed.
>>> Hi, DigitalOcean here. We've taken steps to mitigate this attack on
>>> our network.
>> NTT too has deployed rate limiters on all external facing interfaces on
>> the GIN backbone - for UDP/11211 traffic - to dampen the negative impact
>> of open memcached instances on peers and customers.
>> The toxic combination of 'one spoofed packet can yield multiple reponse
>> packets' and 'one small packet can yield a very big response' makes the
>> memcached UDP protocol a fine example of double trouble with potential
>> for severe operational impact.
>> Kind regards,