You have a logic fail. This fails because it STILL depends on the DNS for the zone working.
-- Mark Andrews > On 22 Apr 2018, at 07:27, Lyndon Nerenberg <lyn...@orthanc.ca> wrote: > > >> On Apr 21, 2018, at 1:58 PM, b...@theworld.com wrote: >> >> That's actually an excellent point and counterpoint to my suggestion >> to move the WHOIS information into DNS RRs. >> >> But backup and failover are reasonably well understood technologies >> where one cares. Registrars could for example cache copies of those >> zone records and act as failover whois servers. > > Instead of putting the contact info directly into the DNS, put pointers to > the locations of the data instead. I.e. whois moves off dedicated ports and > hardwired servers and into zone-controlled SRV records: > > _whois._tcp.orthanc.ca SRV 0 0 43 orthanc.ca. > SRV 5 0 43 backup.otherdomain.example.com. > > This gives each zone control of the information they want to export (by > directing whois(1) to what they consider to be authoritative servers). > > The domain owners themselves could control the information they chose to > expose to the public, through the SRV records, and the information they chose > to publish in the whois servers those records point at. If the domain owner > is happy with their (say) registrar providing that information, they would > just point the appropriate SRV record at the registrar. This is no different > from how people handle email outsourcing via MX records. > > The idea that whois is in any way authoritative is long gone. Those who want > to hide have been able to do that for ages. (I think I pay $15/year to mask > some of the domains I control.) But for law enforcement, a warrant will > always turn up the payment information used to register a domain, should the > constabulary want to find that information out. And for court proceedings, > whois data is useless. (I speak from $WORK experience.) > > --lyndon >
