On 15 Aug 2018, at 9:27, Randy Bush wrote:
my theory is that, as the attacks were mitigated the attackers moved on to other things.
With regards to BGP, the MD5 thing was promulgated to counter what was a largely theoretical threat. iACLs, and later GTSM and CoPP and LPTS and so forth really obviated the need for it.
For IGPs, MD5 was belt-and-suspenders against someone deliberately or accidentally bringing up a new router and manipulating traffic internally. Passiving the IGP on non-core links was the BCP, but often was honored in the breach; pushing an additional feature for 'security' purposes got some folks' attention when the passiving BCP was ignored.
We still see DDoS attacks against routers, of course. But the goal there is disruption of availability, not trying to move traffic onto some alternate path which would somehow benefit the attacker.
----------------------------------- Roland Dobbins <rdobb...@arbor.net>
