As many of you know, the prospects for widespread RPKI adoption grew more 
promising in 2018. Cloudflare issued route origin authorizations ("ROAs") to 
cover 25% of its prefixes, including its 1.1.1.1 resolver and DNS servers. NTT 
began treating RPKI ROAs as if they were IRR route(6)-objects. Google announced 
its intention to begin filtering routes in early 2019. The Mutually Agreed 
Norms for Routing Security now has over 100 network operators signed on.

Still, as 2019 begins, many worry that legal issues are hindering RPKI 
adoption. This is especially true for North American networks, which have a 
comparatively low percentage of IPv4 space covered by ROAs, and whose ROAs are 
comparatively underutilized by parties using RPKI-based route origin validation 
("ROV") to inform their routing decisions.

My coauthor (David Wishnick) and I have spent the past year delving into the 
legal issues surrounding RPKI. Today, we are publicizing our report on how the 
network operator community should address these issues. It is available 
here<https://ssrn.com/abstract=3308619>. If you are interested in the future of 
routing security, we encourage you to read it (or its Executive Summary). We've 
tried to keep the legalese to a minimum.

RPKI was a major topic of discussion at NANOG 74 and ARIN 42 in Vancouver. 
Going forward, we expect to continue a fruitful dialogue about how the network 
operator community can reduce the legal barriers to RPKI adoption.

Here is a summary of our recommendations:

On the ROV side of the equation, the principal legal hindrances have to do with 
the terms and conditions governing access to the RPKI repository offered by 
ARIN in its Relying Party Agreement ("RPA"), and in the manner it has employed 
to ensure the agreement is binding. Regarding ROV:

1.       The goal of widespread ROV counsels in favor of ARIN reviewing its 
current approach to repository distribution, embodied in the RPA. We conclude 
that two paths would be reasonable. First, ARIN should consider dropping the 
RPA altogether. This would remove the most significant legal barriers to 
widespread utilization of the ARIN RPKI repository. Second, because the legal 
risks faced by ARIN in an RPA-free world are ultimately uncertain, it would 
also be reasonable for ARIN to maintain the RPA for the purposes of 
contractually allocating risks to the parties best positioned to reduce and 
mitigate them. If ARIN keeps the RPA, ARIN should consider removing the RPA's 
indemnification clause, instead relying solely on the RPA's disclaimers of 
warranties and limitations of liability, or at least reducing the 
indemnification clause's scope to eliminate the problem of moral hazard.

2.       Developers of RPKI validation software should consider integrating 
acceptance of ARIN's RPA into their software workflows. ARIN recently enabled 
this possibility, and developers should deliberate on whether to capitalize on 
the opportunity.

3.       The network operator community and ARIN should broadly publicize 
ARIN's policy of revising various RPA clauses for government entities that are 
prohibited from agreeing to them.

4.       In addition to the important step ARIN has already taken to enable 
third-party software developers to integrate RPA acceptance into their software 
workflows, ARIN should consider reducing the barriers to third-party service 
development imposed by the RPA's prohibited conduct clause. Specifically, ARIN 
should consider methods for allowing approved developers to make use of RPKI 
information as an input into more sophisticated services.

5.       Separately, ARIN should consider revising the prohibited conduct 
clause to allow broader distribution of information created with RPKI as an 
input for research and analysis purposes.

6.       As a general alternative, the Internet community should consider 
whether to develop a separate corporate entity that would be responsible for 
operational aspects of RPKI repository provision. That corporation could 
conduct such activities for the North American region, or on a worldwide basis.

Regarding the ROA-issuance side of the equation, the principal legal obstacles 
stem from the terms and conditions found in ARIN's Registration Services 
Agreement ("RSA"), Legacy Registration Services Agreement ("LRSA"), and RPKI 
Terms of Service. Regarding these, the report recommends the following:

1.       ARIN should consider adopting a pathway to provide RPKI services that 
would explicitly refrain from altering the existing balance of property and 
transferability rights associated with IP address allocations.

2.       The network operator community and ARIN should broadly publicize 
ARIN's policy of revising certain RSA/LRSA and RPKI Terms of Service clauses 
for government entities that are prohibited from agreeing to them. ARIN should 
also begin presenting the RPKI Terms of Service to newly-onboarded members 
alongside their RSA/LRSA, so that organizations spend less time dealing with 
legal issues overall.

Separately, the report recommends that the network operator community consider 
whether to encourage companies and the federal government to include RPKI 
adoption in procurement best practices or requirements.

In tandem with recommendations designed to encourage adoption, the report also 
makes two recommendations concerning operational readiness for widespread RPKI 
deployment. Specifically:

1.       To reduce any legal risks associated with RPKI, the network operator 
community should focus on adopting operational best practices. No system is 
100% reliable across all contingencies; as a result, operators should prepare 
for outages and other headaches. RPKI implementations should be resilient in 
the face of such contingencies.

2.       The five RIRs should work to ensure readiness for widespread RPKI 
adoption and strive to publicize deeper details on their service-level 
intentions to the Internet community.

This research is supported by NSF Award No. 1748362. The contents of the report 
represent our independent views, not those of the NSF. Any mistakes, of course, 
are also ours alone.


Christopher S. Yoo
John H. Chestnut Professor of Law, Communication, and Computer & Information 
Science
Founding Director, Center for Technology, Innovation and Competition
University of Pennsylvania Law School
3501 Sansom St.
Philadelphia, PA  19104-6204
(215) 746-8772 (o)
(215) 573-2025 (f)
cs...@law.upenn.edu<mailto:cs...@law.upenn.edu>
http://www.law.upenn.edu/faculty/csyoo/

For more information on the Center for Technology, Innovation and Competition, 
see https://www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/ctic/.

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