> On Feb 26, 2019, at 1:34 PM, James Renken via NANOG <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Feb 25, 2019, at 5:20 AM, Bill Woodcock <[email protected]> wrote: >> We know that neither Comodo nor Let's Encrypt were DNSSEC validating before >> issuing certs. > > I’d like to clarify that Let’s Encrypt has always validated DNSSEC, dating to > before we issued our first publicly trusted certificate in September 2015.
Yes, my apologies… Comodo may well have been used in the attack against us
_because_ Let’s Encrypt was DNSSEC validating. I’m sorry for tarring both
Let’s Encrypt and Comodo with the same brush.
The fact remains, however, that both Let’s Encrypt and Comodo are facilitating
these hijacks by issuing illegitimate certificates to attackers. So, ipso
facto, both organizations’ security practices are insufficient.
We had what I thought to be a productive call with Jacob Hoffman-Andrews, of
Let’s Encrypt, late last week, and arrived at a couple of possibilities for
improving the situation a bit, but I don’t imagine that PCH has the expertise
to contribute substantively to CA business process improvements, as that’s well
outside our field.
-Bill
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