------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> 
$9.95 domain names from Yahoo!. Register anything.
http://us.click.yahoo.com/J8kdrA/y20IAA/yQLSAA/1dTolB/TM
--------------------------------------------------------------------~-> 

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/08/politics/08intel.html

Evolving Nature of Al Qaeda Is Misunderstood, Critic Says
By JAMES RISEN

Published: November 8, 2004

WASHINGTON, Nov. 7 - The Bush administration has failed to recognize that
Al Qaeda is now a global Islamic insurgency, rather than a traditional
terrorist organization, and so poses a much different threat than
previously believed, says a senior counterterrorism official at the Central
Intelligence Agency.

Michael Scheuer, the former chief of the C.I.A.'s Osama bin Laden unit and
the author of a best-selling book critical of the administration's handling
of the fight against terrorism, said in an interview with The New York
Times this weekend that the government "doesn't respect the threat" because
most officials still regard Al Qaeda as a terrorist organization that can
be defeated by arresting or killing its operatives one at a time.

He noted that President Bush and other officials had repeatedly said
two-thirds of the leadership of Al Qaeda has been killed or captured, but
he said the figure was misleading because it is referring to the leaders
who were in place as of Sept. 11, 2001.

Al Qaeda has replaced many of those dead or captured operatives and
continues to thrive as a guiding force for Islamic extremists around the
world.

"I think Al Qaeda has suffered substantially since 9/11, and it may have
slowed down its operations, but to take the two-thirds number as a
yardstick is a fantasy," Mr. Scheuer said. "To say that they have only
one-third of their leadership left is a misunderstanding. That is looking
at it from a law enforcement perspective. They pay a lot of attention to
leadership succession, and so one of the main tenets of Al Qaeda is to
train people to succeed leaders who are captured or killed."

The C.I.A. disputed the idea that it did not understand the evolving nature
of Al Qaeda and said the agency had never characterized the two-thirds
figure for those killed and captured as anything other than the Qaeda
leaders who where in place before Sept. 11.

"The leadership of the intelligence community and those they brief have a
very clear understanding of the threat and understand it to be a question
of a global movement rather than a single organization," a C.I.A. spokesman
said.

Mr. Scheuer said that in addition to running its own core terrorist
network, Al Qaeda was also now providing support to regional Islamic
rebellions around the world. Mr. bin Laden is providing inspiration to
Islamic extremists far beyond Al Qaeda's own membership, vastly
complicating the task of combating the threat to the West, he said.

"The amount of punishment the C.I.A. has delivered to Al Qaeda since 9/11
would have wiped out any other terrorist organization," Mr. Scheuer said.
"But this is an insurgent organization.''

"The difference between fighting a terrorist group and fighting an
insurgency is one of size," he added. "Yet we still don't know how big it
is. We still, today, don't know the order of battle of Al Qaeda."

Mr. Scheuer's interview with The Times was his first since the C.I.A.
imposed stringent rules on his access to the news media. A C.I.A. spokesman
said Sunday that Mr. Scheuer was not authorized to speak for the agency.

Since the publication of his book, "Imperial Hubris," in July, Mr. Scheuer
has emerged as the agency's most vocal in-house critic, and the agency has
gone to great lengths to try to silence him. His book was published
anonymously and, at first, the C.I.A. allowed him to grant interviews to
promote it as long as he was not publicly identified by name.

But since he was openly critical of the Bush administration's decision to
invade Iraq, saying that it inflamed anti-American sentiment in the Arab
world and served as a recruiting tool for Al Qaeda, both he and his book
sparked political controversy, and Mr. Scheuer's name soon made its way
into print. Mr. Scheuer quickly granted about 100 media interviews to
promote his book, angering the White House, where officials came to believe
that C.I.A. management was sending a message to the president about its
opposition to the war in Iraq by allowing him to speak out and publish his
book. The C.I.A. then clamped down, effectively ending his ability to speak
publicly.

The complete text of a letter that he wrote to the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence, the substance of which has been previously reported, is
being published in the December issue of The Atlantic Monthly. Mr. Scheuer
agreed to discuss, on the record, the issues he raised in that letter as
well as a range of other matters.

Mr. Scheuer served as chief of the C.I.A.'s bin Laden station from 1996
through 1999 and so knows the history of the government's pre-9/11 efforts
against Al Qaeda. He testified before the Sept. 11 commission, but is now
critical of the commission for refusing to identify by name any top
officials who should be held responsible for failing to prevent the
attacks.

"The American people need a better understanding of how we got to 9/11," he
said. "But I think the 9/11 commission was bound and determined not to find
any culpability. By finding no one guilty, they managed not to deal with
the real problems."

He remains deeply frustrated by the failures of leadership at the C.I.A.,
the F.B.I. and other agencies that he witnessed before the Sept. 11
attacks, and believes that top officials have escaped personal
accountability.

Mr. Scheuer is particularly critical of the F.B.I. for failing to
adequately focus on Al Qaeda before the attacks, and then, he said, trying
to avoid blame afterwards. "From the start of the C.I.A.'s bin Laden unit
until today, there was no information that we had that wasn't available to
the F.B.I.," he said. "They sat in the same building, read the same
information I read. But for whatever reason, the 9/11 commission said that
we weren't sharing things with them."

He is now derisive of the F.B.I. agents who came to the bin Laden unit
before the attacks on New York and Washington. "With the exception of one
very good officer, the F.B.I. agents who came to the unit came to have
coffee, and to try to get trips to Europe," he said. "The agency carried
the bureau on its back."

 

Yahoo! Groups Links

<*> To visit your group on the web, go to:
    http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Nat-International/

<*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
    [EMAIL PROTECTED]

<*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to:
    http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
 




Reply via email to