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Commentary
We Aren't Fighting to Win Anymore
U.S. troops in Iraq are only trying to buy time.
Los Angeles Times (CA)
February 20, 2005
Author: Andrew J. Bacevich; Andrew J. Bacevich is professor of
international relations at Boston University and author of "The New
American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War" (Oxford University
Press, 2005).
Americans of a certain age will recall Douglas MacArthur's pithy aphorism:
"There is no substitute for victory." The remark captures an essential
element of our military tradition. When the United States goes to war, it
fights to win, to force the enemy to do our will. To sacrifice our
soldiers' lives for anything less -- as MacArthur charged was the case in
Korea and later unambiguously became the case in Vietnam -- smacks of being
somehow un-American.
But among the various official statements being issued to explain events in
Iraq, any mention of military victory has become notable by its absence.
Tacitly -- unnoticed even by the war's critics -- the Bush administration
has all but given up any expectation of defeating the enemy with whom we
are engaged.
In the early days of the insurgency, Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez vowed to use
"whatever combat power is necessary to win," displaying all the pugnacity
of a George Patton or Stormin' Norman Schwarzkopf. "That's what America
expects of me," declared Sanchez in December 2003, "and that's what I'm
going to accomplish." Senior commanders no longer make such bold promises.
Nor do senior civilian officials in Washington.
Indeed, today the Bush administration's aim is not to win but to relieve
itself of responsibility for waging a war that it began but cannot finish.
Debate in national security circles focuses not on deploying war-winning
technologies or fielding innovative tactics that might turn the tide, but
on how we can extricate ourselves before our overstretched forces suffer
irreparable damage.
Optimists are placing their hopes on a crash program to create a new Iraqi
security force that just might permit us in a year or so to begin reducing
the size of our garrison. Pessimists have their doubts. But virtually no
one is predicting we will be even remotely close to crushing the
insurgency. The decisive victory promised by the war's advocates back in
March 2003 -- remember all the talk of "shock and awe"? -- has now slipped
beyond our grasp.
Of course, following the heady assault on Baghdad, the conflict took an
unexpected turn -- precisely as wars throughout history have tended to do.
As a consequence, today a low-tech enemy force estimated at about 10,000
fighters has stymied the mightiest military establishment the world has
ever seen. To be sure, the adversary cannot defeat us militarily. But
neither can we defeat it. In short, U.S. troops today are no longer
fighting to win, but simply to buy time: This has become the Bush
administration's substitute for victory. Worse, in a war such as in Iraq,
time is more likely to work in the other guy's favor.
Whether this reality has yet to fully sink in with the majority of the
American people is unclear. No doubt President Bush hopes the citizenry
will continue to snooze. Better to talk about Social Security reform and
banning gay marriage than to call attention to the unhappy fact that we are
spending several billion dollars per month and losing, on average, two
soldiers per day -- not to prevail but simply to prolong the stalemate.
Moreover, if the administration gets its way, we can expect that
expenditure of blood and treasure to continue for many months, until there
emerges an Iraqi government able to fend for itself or Iraq descends into
chaos.
Pending the final judgment of President Bush's war, this much we can say
for sure: Two years after the dash on Baghdad seemingly affirmed the
invincibility of the U.S. armed forces, the actual limits of American power
now lay exposed for all to see. Our adversaries, real and potential, are no
doubt busy contemplating the implications of those limits.
So too must we. Our effort to do so should begin with the admission that
the idea, promoted during the heady spring of 2003, that through the
aggressive use of military power the United States might transform the
Islamic world and cement U.S. global preeminence was a dangerous delusion.
It remains a delusion today.
Edition: Home Edition
Section: Opinion
Page: M-5
Index Terms: Opinion
Copyright 2005 Los Angeles Times
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