And now:Ish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>Date: Sun, 13 Dec 1998 08:53:17 -0600 (CST)
>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Chiapas95-english)
>Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Subject: En;Marcos on Then and Now,Dec.12
>
>This message is forwarded to you as a service of Zapatistas Online.
>
>
>Date: Sat, 12 Dec 1998 22:03:20 -0800
>Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>From: irlandesa <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>To: Multiple recipients of list <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Subject: supplement: marcos on then, and now
>
>Originally Published in Spanish by the EZLN
>______________________
>Translated by irlandesa
>
>
>November 24, 1997
>
>To National and International Civil Society
>Planet Earth
>
>To Whom it May Concern:
>
>There has been an increase of late in pro-government statements which seek
>to create confusion concerning what is currently happening in Chiapas, and
>concerning the current situation of the dialogue process between the EZLN
>and the federal government. For this reason I am writing you this perhaps
>over-long letter. The companeros asked me to do so in order to try to
>clarify things. Sale and vale.
>
>First, allow me to give you a quick run-down of the 5 minimal conditions
>which we presented more than a year ago in order to renew the dialogue with
>the government, and I will tell you the status of each of them:
>
>1. Fulfilment of Table 1 on "Indigenous Rights and Culture" and the
>Establishment of the Monitoring and Verification Commission (Cosever).
> As you know, the Cocopa presented the EZLN and the government with
>a proposal for constitutional reforms. This was a year ago, on November
>29, 1996. This proposed legislation (or "Cocopa law," as we call it) was
>first accepted by the Zedillo government, and later rejected, with the
>argument that the proposed legislation was, in reality, a proposal for the
>"destruction of the Mexican Nation." You certainly remember the debate in
>the media and how, in that debate, the government position was defeated
>with the demonstration that the indigenous' demand for autonomy would not
>only not lead to the fragmentation of the Mexican State into many "little
>nation states," but rather to the inclusion, with full rights of
>citizenship, of the Indian peoples with their own particular nature.
>Everyone in the debate agreed that the Cocopa proposal captured the
>principals of the San Andres Accords, and those who were opposed to their
>acceptance argued that those accords (and not the Cocopa proposal) were
>those which promoted the "balkanization" of the country. If the San Andres
>Accords were an attack against the Nation, why did the government sign
>them? Was it not, in the best of cases, irresponsible for Zedillo to sign
>such criminal accords? But it was not like that, the government signed the
>accords because it had to recognize various issues, which were:
>
>1. - That the autonomy demanded by the indigenous is inclusive and not
>exclusive.
>
>2. - That it is a demand of all the Indian peoples of Mexico, and not just
>the zapatistas (the EZLN had invited to Table 1 the most honourable of the
>national indigenous movement and those best versed on the indigenous
>question in Mexico).
>
>3. - That this demand is recognized as just in Mexico and in the world.
>
>4. - That the govenrment has no rational argument with which to oppose this
>demand.
>
>5. - That the EZLN is authentic and legitimate in its demands.
>
>Then, what the government did was to sign these accords, yes, but without
>having the slightest intention of complying with them. They were counting
>on your forgetting and weariness, and on our apathy and irresponsibility.
>We waited patiently for the paper to be converted into deeds. When we saw
>that it was not going to happen, we decided not to continue on until they
>were carried out. It was for demands such as these that we rose up in
>arms: are we doing wrong by not giving in, in not letting ourselves be
>deceived, in remaining firm?
>
>The formation of the commission which was to be in charge of watching over
>the fulfilment of these accords (this commission is established in the law
>passed by the Congress of the Union in March, 1995: we did not make it up)
>was another of Zedillo's shams. First he wanted to send, as his
>representatives, a group of unemployed second rate players; later, in the
>face of opposition from the Cocopa, the Conai and the EZLN, he had to
>change and raise the level of his representation. But, at the moment of
>acting, or at the moment the Cosever (which is the acronym for "Commission
>of Monitoring and Verificaiton") had to carry out their work and to verify
>that the accords would be carried out (such as those of Table 1), the
>government then withdrew their people and thus paralyzed this body of
>peace.
>
>Everything which has to do with peace (whether the Conai, whether the
>Cocopa, whether the peaceful initiatives by the EZLN or by you) ends up
>being attacked by the government. Should we believe Zedillo when he speaks
>of peace and acts by attacking the peace?
>
>2. - Serious Proposal Concerning the Table II Accords. This was the table
>on "Democracy and Justice." We did the same as we had in Table I, that is,
>instead of just sitting down ourselves and proposing what we wanted, we
>invited many social and political organizations, intellectuals, artists,
>unsung citizens, those who were not in agreement with us, and also those
>who were against us. The government representatives were frightened,
>because they had no experience in speaking with intelligent people (they
>had only spoken with members of Salinas' and Zedillo's cabinents, which is
>the same thing). They did not speak one word during the discussions, and,
>at the moment of the accords, they only repeated one: "no." And so, we
>reached no accords as a consequence of this table. The government did not
>even bother to argue their refusal to agree to anything, what they did was
>to dialogue with the upper echelons of the political parties and to re-sell
>an old and worn out product (which certainly no one is buying now) to
>public opinion: State reform (then dressed up as "definitive" electoral
>reform). And so we demand a serious proposal on this issue, because, if we
>stopped fighting in order to talk, then we have to talk with seriousness,
>because we fight with seriousness. But time passes, and not only is there
>no serious proposal, now they want to discuss State reform once again,
>excluding civil society.
>
>3. Military Detente in Chiapas.
> Everyone knows, because it is daily news in the press, that in the
>north of Chiapas there is a permanent campaign of unfettered violence.
>Every day there are deaths, dislocations, jailings, disappeared. The
>majority of these have to do with us, with the zapatistas. Those
>reponsible for these deaths, dislocations, disappearances and jailings are
>sometimes called "Peace and Justice," sometimes "Chinchulines," other times
>"Red Mask" or "Mira," other ones are "State Public Security," others
>"Judicial Police," a little less, "Federal Army."
>
>But the names are of the least importance, because those who act, those who
>finance, those who train, those who order, are the same. And behind them
>there is a power, that of the Mexican government, and a decision: the
>total annihilation of everyone who is suspected of zapatismo. In sum, here
>there is total deterioration and open war. We demand that it be stopped,
>one cannot have a dialogue of peace on the one hand, while war is suffered
>on the other. But what has happened is, as a response to our demand, not
>only is there no detente, but rather it is extended to other regions in
>Chiapas. Now the bloody "experiment" in the northern part of the state is
>moved to Los Altos and the municipality of Chenalho, inhabited by
>indigenous tzotiles (zapatistas or zapatista sympathizers, primarily).
>
>In response to these attacks we lack neither arms, nor combatants, nor
>decision. The certainty that a war between the indigenous (which is what
>the government is looking for) would help those who do not want a true
>solution, and a patience which is beginning to run out, is what has kept
>our weapons silenced. Because we believe that "when kindness and cruelty
>fight for a Nation, the kind opponent will win most quickly." And this was
>not said by Lenin, but rather by Shakespeare ("Richard V").
>
>4. - Release of the Zapatista Prisoners.
> For the government it is a crime to be, or to appear to be, a
>zapatista. It matters little that there is a law which prohibits the
>persecution of the EZLN, with the Federal Army and police of all sizes and
>groups fighting over the zapatistas as if they were hunting prey. In
>Veracruz there is still a presumed zapatista prisoner, one of those from
>February 1995, and in Chiapas, the Cerro Hueco jail has so many that we are
>in the majority there as well. How are we going to dialogue if they treat
>us as criminals?
>
> 5. - A Commission Capable of Decision-making, Respect, etc.
> We do not ask that someone pleasant or nice sit on the government
>side (we doubt that there is anyone in the government with those
>qualities), we only ask that the person who sits on that side does have the
>power to make decisions, is responsible and conducts himself with
>seriousness and respectfulness. The Bernal-Del Valle pair left their place
>to Pedro Joaquin Coldwell. What we know about this last one is what he has
>said, and it reveals that, not only does he not have decision-making
>powers, but also that he is trying to make up for that by usurping the role
>of mediation!
>
>And now, in addition, the government returns to its same old "the
>zapatistas do not want to dialogue", "the zapatistas are intransigent".
>For example, the Cocopa legislators are said to be waiting for our response
>to their invitations to renew dialogue. Forgetting everything we explained
>above and calling on the EZLN to renew dialogue as if nothing had happened,
>does nothing but reinforce the government strategy of presenting us as
>"intransigent", a step prior to a military action.
>
>The Cocopa was created as a body of the Federal Legislative branch, it
>worked and acquired commitments which it should honor. The fact that some
>of their members have left, and others have arrived, does not absolve the
>Cocopa from carrying out their word, nor subject their responsibilities to
>negotiation. There can be no "making a fresh start" of this, as some of
>the legislators' plentiful and disorganized statements to the press might
>suggest.
>
>All these public statements suffer from amnesia: they forget Zedillo's
>unkept word, they forget the Cocopa's commitment to remain firm in their
>position and to not take a step backwards, they forget our dead, they
>forget the militarization, they forget there is a war in Chiapas...and they
>forget Herberto Castillo.
>
>"Don Herberto" (as his companeros in the CCRI called him) was the one who
>confronted, first, Chuayffet, and, later, Zedillo. The Cocopa legislators
>will remember him, indeed, they will give a myriad of details to whomever
>wants to hear them. Don Herberto Castillo also reproached those who are
>now arguing that the San Andres Accords signify the destruction of the
>Mexican State, and which, nonetheless, they signed in February 1996. He
>reproached their lies.
>
>But that was before, now Don Herberto is dead, and there are new members in
>the Cocopa. Now you have some of its legislators walking around declaring
>that we zapatistas "are tying their hands" and - did you guess? - that we
>are intransigent. Those who are saying that should remember history. In
>those days of Herberto, the Cocopa went from one side to the other, they
>visited the conflict zone several times, they freed prisoners, they stayed
>firm in the face of government pressure, they did not intervene in the
>mediation work and, in their commitment to co-advising peace, they offered
>to untangle the dialogue and to try to have the EZLN's 5 minimum demands
>met. A lot of work and few press statements. In payment for their
>efforts, the Cocopa earned our respect and recognition in those days, and
>contempt and humiliation from Zedillo and the Secretary of Government.
>
>It is the government who is making a joke of the Cocopa and their proposal,
>it is the govenrment who is not keeping their word, it is the government
>who is persecuting us and killing us, it is the government who is refusing
>to dialogue with seriousness and responsibility. It is the government whom
>they must accuse of "tying their hands", it is they of whom they must
>demand that the war which they are making against us be stopped, and the
>path of dialogue be retaken.
>
>If the Cocopa is going to honor their commitment, and "the memory of the
>deceased Herberto Castillo", it is not with us whom they must meet. They
>have already received from us, a year ago, approval of their document on
>proposed legislation. If they are going to
>be consistent, then it is up to them to demand a response from the Federal
>Executive which honors their word, given in the first San Andres Accords.
>
>But if the Cocopa is not going to carry out their commitment and their role
>- how are they going to come and offer anything to those who believe that
>carrying out one's word is the measure of human quality? For what are we
>going to meet?
>
>Peace shall not be reached, nor obstacles resolved, with historical amnesia
>and empty calls to dialogue. Here - is it necessary to repeat it? - there
>is a war. We have the dead, and the govenrment has their press
>statements...and the assassinations. There, I am almost ready to say
>goodbye. I only also wanted to tell you that, behind that absurd
>stubborness of the government in not carrying out the San Andres Accords, a
>fundamental problem is hiding. What it is, deep down, is that there are
>two models of dialogue which are at odds.
>
>The one, which the Mexican political system likes, is a dialogue between
>elites, they do not, nor will they, take either you or us into
>consideration.
>
>The other, the one which gives real results, is a dialogue among everyone.
>This second model of dialogue is what we tried to build at San Andres
>Sakamch'en de los Pobres.
>
>The other dialogue, that of those of above, is closer to criminal
>conspiracy than it is to democratization, and it is the one practiced in
>the governing classes.
>
>It is true that we are not talking about the same thing when the government
>says "dialogue," and when you and we say "dialogue."
>
>The government refuses to carry out the accords because they are the result
>of a new model of dialogue. To accept them would be the end of the
>dialogue scheme of the "ticket office," where one asks the government for
>something and it decides yes or no, a dialogue between elites, without
>social participation. Carrying out the San Andres Accords would mean the
>government's recognizing that another type of dialogue is possible, one in
>which the answers are constructed by all the participants.
>
>In Table 1 at San Andres, the indigenous became actors and exemplary
>creators. They participated in building their own destiny, and not in
>asking, receiving, or bargaining. The National Indigenous Congress, born
>out of this meeting of thoughts and struggles, today represents a network
>of hopes and struggles.
>
>The San Andres Accords on Indigenous Rights and Culture are inalienable for
>the EZLN. They represent the best aspirations of the Indian peoples of
>Mexico, and not just of the zapatistas. We cannot pass them on up, or
>avoid their being carried out in the name of a pragmatism that goes against
>our political ethic.
>
>Our commitment in the indigenous struggle is not to the government, nor
>even to ourselves, it is to all the indigenous peoples of Mexico, to their
>history, to their struggle and to their dignity.
>
>This is our political duty, and we will accept nothing which implies its
>not being carried out or its carrying out being watered down.
>
>The outcome of the San Andres Dialogue will be the outcome of a model of
>participatory and inclusive dialogue.
>
>That is why the government is counting on its defeat and promoting violence
>and impunity.
>
>That is why you and we are struggling against violence and impunity, and
>why the dialogue will be true.
>
>That is why we are determined that the indigenous demands be carried out.
>That is why we demand that the word be kept.
>
>Vale. Salud and may the struggle for the truth win.
>
>>From the mountains of the Mexican Southeast
>
>Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos
>
>Mexico, November of 1997
>
>P.S. AN ENCORE FOR "YA BASTA!". - Next Saturday, November 29, 1997,
>delegations of zapatista support bases from the regions of Los Altos, La
>Selva, the North, Sierra, Frontera and the Coast, will carry out a peaceful
>march in the city of San Cristobal de las Casas. "Against violence and
>impunity" is one of this mobilization's banners, and a bridge with the
>march which civil society in the Federal District will hold from the Angel
>of Independence in the Zocalo at the same day and time. Dignity and
>rebellion once more join two Mexicos of Mexico.
>
>P.S. POST MORTEM. - As late as December of 1996, Comandantes David, Tacho,
>Zebedeo and I were talking with Herberto Castillo in one of the patios. We
>were just about to leave to return to the mountains, and we already knew
>that Zedillo had asked for time in order to "think", prior to going back on
>his acceptance of the Cocopa proposal. The other legislators had recounted
>the histories of the meetings with Chuayffet and Zedillo to us, and all of
>them emphasized Don Herberto's courage. Ans so we asked to speak with him
>alone, a bit in order to learn his version, and even more in order to thank
>him for his posiiton. He met with us, greeted us, and we told him that we
>appreciated the firmness and courage of his position. He responded that he
>was not with us, but rather with justice, and what we were demanding was
>just, and that was why he was supporting it. "As to the other, what can I
>say, there is very little time left to me, and I have nothing to lose," he
>said to us when we were saying goodbye. Did he know then that he was
>dying? I do not know, but I do know that he remained firm and honorable in
>those, his last days. Why am I relating this? Well, a bit in order to
>remember it, and even more in order to pay the yet ungiven homage to a man
>who was consistent, even as a politician.
>
>--
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>
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