On Thu, Oct 02, 2014 at 01:00:04PM +0200, Paolo Bonzini wrote: > Il 01/10/2014 22:23, Wouter Verhelst ha scritto: > > Hi, > > > > On Fri, Sep 05, 2014 at 03:26:09PM +0200, Wouter Verhelst wrote: > >> Tunneling the entire protocol inside an SSL connection doesn't fix that; > >> if an attacker is able to hijack your TCP connections and change flags, > >> then this attacker is also able to hijack your TCP connection and > >> redirect it to a decrypting/encrypting proxy. > >> > >> I agree that preventing a possible SSL downgrade attack (and other forms > >> of MITM) should be high on the priority list, but "tunnel the whole > >> thing in SSL" doesn't do that. > > > > So, having given this some thought, I wanted to come up with a spec just > > so that we had something we could all agree on. As part of that, I had a > > look at qemu-nbd, and noticed that it uses the "oldstyle" handshake > > protocol (on port 10809 by default -- ew, please don't do that). > > Can you use new-style handshake with a single unnamed export? Export > names are a useless complication for qemu-nbd.
Not currently, but I don't think you need that. You could have a default name, which would be used if no name was otherwise specified. It's not much of a stretch to make that name part of the protocol spec, either. -- It is easy to love a country that is famous for chocolate and beer -- Barack Obama, speaking in Brussels, Belgium, 2014-03-26 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Meet PCI DSS 3.0 Compliance Requirements with EventLog Analyzer Achieve PCI DSS 3.0 Compliant Status with Out-of-the-box PCI DSS Reports Are you Audit-Ready for PCI DSS 3.0 Compliance? Download White paper Comply to PCI DSS 3.0 Requirement 10 and 11.5 with EventLog Analyzer http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=154622311&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk _______________________________________________ Nbd-general mailing list [email protected] https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/nbd-general
