On Sun, Jul 10, 2016 at 4:04 AM, Eric Dumazet <eric.duma...@gmail.com> wrote:
> From: Eric Dumazet <eduma...@google.com>
> Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
> (RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
> to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
> paper.
> This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
> some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
> sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
> Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
> Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
> to remove the host limit in the future.
> v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
> Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
> Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao...@ucr.edu>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eduma...@google.com>
> Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torva...@linux-foundation.org>
> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ych...@google.com>
> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardw...@google.com>

Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardw...@google.com>

Thanks, Eric!


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