On Thu, Sep 22, 2016 at 09:56:47PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> This fix a pointer leak when an unprivileged eBPF program read a pointer
> value from the context. Even if is_valid_access() returns a pointer
> type, the eBPF verifier replace it with UNKNOWN_VALUE. The register
> value containing an address is then allowed to leak. Moreover, this
> prevented unprivileged eBPF programs to use functions with (legitimate)
> pointer arguments.
> This bug is not an issue for now because the only unprivileged eBPF
> program allowed is of type BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER and all the types
> from its context are UNKNOWN_VALUE. However, this fix is important for
> future unprivileged eBPF program types which could use pointers in their
> context.
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <m...@digikod.net>
> Fixes: 969bf05eb3ce ("bpf: direct packet access")

Please drop 'fixes' tag and rewrite commit log.
It's not a fix.
Right now only two reg types can be seen: PTR_TO_PACKET and PTR_TO_PACKET_END.
Both are only in clsact and xdp programs which are root only.
So nothing is leaking at present.
Best case this patch is a pre-patch for some future work.

Reply via email to