On 16-11-30 06:30 AM, Jakub Kicinski wrote:
> [add MST]
>
Thanks sorry MST. I did a cut'n'paste of an old list of CC's and missed
you were not on the list.
[...]
>> + memcpy(page_address(page) + page_off, page_address(p) + offset, *len);
>> + while (--num_buf) {
>> + unsigned int buflen;
>> + unsigned long ctx;
>> + void *buf;
>> + int off;
>> +
>> + ctx = (unsigned long)virtqueue_get_buf(rq->vq, &buflen);
>> + if (unlikely(!ctx))
>> + goto err_buf;
>> +
>> + buf = mergeable_ctx_to_buf_address(ctx);
>> + p = virt_to_head_page(buf);
>> + off = buf - page_address(p);
>> +
>> + memcpy(page_address(page) + page_off,
>> + page_address(p) + off, buflen);
>> + page_off += buflen;
>
> Could malicious user potentially submit a frame bigger than MTU?
Well presumably if the MTU is greater than PAGE_SIZE the xdp program
would not have been loaded. And the malicious user in this case would
have to be qemu which seems like everything is already lost if qemu
is trying to attack its VM.
But this is a good point because it looks like there is nothing in
virtio or qemu that drops frames with MTU greater than the virtio
configured setting. Maybe Michael can confirm this or I'll poke at it
more. I think qemu should drop these frames in general.
So I think adding a guard here is sensible I'll go ahead and do that.
Also the MTU guard at set_xdp time needs to account for header length.
Thanks nice catch.
>
>> + }
>> +
>> + *len = page_off;
>> + return page;
>> +err_buf:
>> + __free_pages(page, 0);
>> + return NULL;
>> +}
>> +
>> static struct sk_buff *receive_mergeable(struct net_device *dev,
>> struct virtnet_info *vi,
>> struct receive_queue *rq,
>> @@ -469,21 +519,37 @@ static struct sk_buff *receive_mergeable(struct
>> net_device *dev,
>> rcu_read_lock();
>> xdp_prog = rcu_dereference(rq->xdp_prog);
>> if (xdp_prog) {
>> + struct page *xdp_page;
>> u32 act;
>>
>> if (num_buf > 1) {
>> bpf_warn_invalid_xdp_buffer();
>> - goto err_xdp;
>> +
>> + /* linearize data for XDP */
>> + xdp_page = xdp_linearize_page(rq, num_buf,
>> + page, offset, &len);
>> + if (!xdp_page)
>> + goto err_xdp;
>> + offset = len;
>> + } else {
>> + xdp_page = page;
>> }
>>
>> - act = do_xdp_prog(vi, xdp_prog, page, offset, len);
>> + act = do_xdp_prog(vi, xdp_prog, xdp_page, offset, len);
>> switch (act) {
>> case XDP_PASS:
>> + if (unlikely(xdp_page != page))
>> + __free_pages(xdp_page, 0);
>> break;
>> case XDP_TX:
>> + if (unlikely(xdp_page != page))
>> + goto err_xdp;
>> + rcu_read_unlock();
>
> Only if there is a reason for v4 - this unlock could go to the previous
> patch.
>
Sure will do this.
