Key lengths can't be negative.

Comparison with nla_len() is left signed just in case negative value
can sneak in there.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobri...@gmail.com>
---

 include/net/xfrm.h   |    2 +-
 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c |    2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/include/net/xfrm.h
+++ b/include/net/xfrm.h
@@ -1774,7 +1774,7 @@ static inline unsigned int xfrm_alg_len(const struct 
xfrm_algo *alg)
        return sizeof(*alg) + ((alg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
 }
 
-static inline int xfrm_alg_auth_len(const struct xfrm_algo_auth *alg)
+static inline unsigned int xfrm_alg_auth_len(const struct xfrm_algo_auth *alg)
 {
        return sizeof(*alg) + ((alg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
 }
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ static int verify_auth_trunc(struct nlattr **attrs)
                return 0;
 
        algp = nla_data(rt);
-       if (nla_len(rt) < xfrm_alg_auth_len(algp))
+       if (nla_len(rt) < (int)xfrm_alg_auth_len(algp))
                return -EINVAL;
 
        algp->alg_name[sizeof(algp->alg_name) - 1] = '\0';

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