On 09.01.2018 21:52, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> On Tue, 2018-01-09 at 18:00 +0300, Kirill Tkhai wrote:
>> Since people may mistakenly obtain destroying net
>> from net_namespace_list and from net::netns_ids
>> without checking for its net::counter, let's protect
>> against such situations and insert BUG_ON() to stop
>> move on after this.
>>
>> Panic is better, than memory corruption and undefined
>> behavior.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktk...@virtuozzo.com>
>> ---
>> include/net/net_namespace.h | 2 +-
>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/net/net_namespace.h b/include/net/net_namespace.h
>> index 10f99dafd5ac..ff0e47471d5b 100644
>> --- a/include/net/net_namespace.h
>> +++ b/include/net/net_namespace.h
>> @@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ void __put_net(struct net *net);
>>
>> static inline struct net *get_net(struct net *net)
>> {
>> - atomic_inc(&net->count);
>> + BUG_ON(atomic_inc_return(&net->count) <= 1);
>> return net;
>> }
>
>
> Why not simply use refcount_t instead of duplicating its logic?
The main goal of the change is to catch rare races happening on production nodes
with real load and to prevent memory corruption. You can't simply use refcount_t
primitives, as there is no appropriate primitive with BUG_ON() among them.
WARN_ON()
from the primitives doesn't protect from memory corruption.
Also, keep in mind, that CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL is usually disabled on no-debug
kernel.
I've checked both Fedora and Debian. So, the only possibility to catch such the
races,
if someone really happy meets them on test kernel and test workload, which is
usually
is very unlikely.
Kirill
