On 28/02/2018 01:09, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 12:00 AM, Mickaël Salaün <m...@digikod.net> wrote:
>> On 28/02/2018 00:23, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>> On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 11:02 PM, Andy Lutomirski <l...@kernel.org> wrote:
>>>> On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 10:14 PM, Mickaël Salaün <m...@digikod.net> wrote:
>>>> I think you're wrong here.  Any sane container trying to use Landlock
>>>> like this would also create a PID namespace.  Problem solved.  I still
>>>> think you should drop this patch.
>> Containers is one use case, another is build-in sandboxing (e.g. for web
>> browser…) and another one is for sandbox managers (e.g. Firejail,
>> Bubblewrap, Flatpack…). In some of these use cases, especially from a
>> developer point of view, you may want/need to debug your applications
>> (without requiring to be root). For nested Landlock access-controls
>> (e.g. container + user session + web browser), it may not be allowed to
>> create a PID namespace, but you still want to have a meaningful
>> access-control.
> The consideration should be exactly the same as for normal seccomp.
> If I'm in a container (using PID namespaces + seccomp) and a run a web
> browser, I can debug the browser.
> If there's a real use case for adding this type of automatic ptrace
> protection, then by all means, let's add it as a general seccomp
> feature.

Right, it makes sense to add this feature to seccomp filters as well.
What do you think Kees?

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