On Wed, 2015-06-17 at 17:59 -0700, Mahesh Bandewar wrote:
> Actor and Partner details can be accessed via proc-fs, sys-fs
> entries or netlink interface. These interfaces are world readable
> at this moment. The earlier patch-series made the LACP communication
> secure to avoid nuisance attack from within the same L2 domain but
> it did not prevent "someone unprivileged" looking at that information
> on host and perform the same act.
>
> This patch essentially avoids spitting those entries if the user
> in question does not have enough privileges.
>
> Signed-off-by: Mahesh Bandewar <mahe...@google.com>
> ---
> drivers/net/bonding/bond_netlink.c | 11 ++--
> drivers/net/bonding/bond_procfs.c | 101
> +++++++++++++++++++------------------
> drivers/net/bonding/bond_sysfs.c | 12 ++---
> 3 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 57 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_netlink.c
> b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_netlink.c
> index 5580fcde738f..3fd3aa4b145e 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_netlink.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_netlink.c
> @@ -600,18 +600,23 @@ static int bond_fill_info(struct sk_buff *skb,
>
> if (BOND_MODE(bond) == BOND_MODE_8023AD) {
> struct ad_info info;
> + u8 zero_mac[ETH_ALEN];
>
> + eth_zero_addr(zero_mac);
> if (nla_put_u16(skb, IFLA_BOND_AD_ACTOR_SYS_PRIO,
> - bond->params.ad_actor_sys_prio))
> + capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) ?
> + bond->params.ad_actor_sys_prio : 0))
> goto nla_put_failure;
>
> if (nla_put_u16(skb, IFLA_BOND_AD_USER_PORT_KEY,
> - bond->params.ad_user_port_key))
> + capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) ?
> + bond->params.ad_user_port_key : 0))
> goto nla_put_failure;
>
> if (nla_put(skb, IFLA_BOND_AD_ACTOR_SYSTEM,
> sizeof(bond->params.ad_actor_system),
> - &bond->params.ad_actor_system))
> + capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) ?
> + &bond->params.ad_actor_system : &zero_mac))
> goto nla_put_failure;
>
Hmm... I would rather not send these fake attributes at all ?
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