Hi Qin! Top posting to say thanks for the updated texted that was added to -15. It addresses my DISCUSS points.
Regards, Roman > -----Original Message----- > From: Qin Wu <[email protected]> > Sent: Saturday, April 25, 2020 11:00 PM > To: Rob Wilton (rwilton) <[email protected]>; Roman Danyliw <[email protected]> > Cc: [email protected]; Kent Watsen <[email protected]>; draft-ietf- > [email protected]; [email protected]; The IESG <[email protected]> > Subject: RE: Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-netmod-factory-default-14: > (with DISCUSS and COMMENT) > > -----邮件原件----- > 发件人: Rob Wilton (rwilton) [mailto:[email protected]] > 发送时间: 2020年4月25日 0:54 > 收件人: Qin Wu <[email protected]>; Roman Danyliw <[email protected]> > 抄送: [email protected]; Kent Watsen <[email protected]>; draft- > [email protected]; [email protected]; The IESG > <[email protected]> > 主题: RE: Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-netmod-factory-default-14: > (with DISCUSS and COMMENT) > > Hi Qin, > > This document was discussed today. I think that Roman plans to follow up > regarding the security considerations discuss. > > From the discussion today, and reading the Discuss, my understanding is that > Roman has two concerns that are more about the specific text than the use of > the template: > > 1) Concerns read access to the factory-default datastore which could contain > sensitive information. Perhaps read access to that datastore should default > to > nacm:default-deny-all? If so, then this should probably be documented in > section 3, with a sentence in section 6 to explain that is how it is > protected. > > [Qin]: Please See Jurgen and Andy's comment in this thread, I agree with > Jurgen > we should treat factory in the same way as running and other datastores. If > any > text is needed, I could add a few text in the section 6 based on the > discussion in > this thread: > " > Access to the "factory-reset" RPC operation and factory default values of all > configuration data nodes within "factory-default" datastore is considered > sensitive and therefore has been restricted using the "default-deny-all" > access > control defined in [RFC8341]. > " > 2) The second point is asking to expand this paragraph: > > The operational disruption caused by setting the config to factory > default contents varies greatly depending on the implementation and > current config. > > Such that the description also covers "Please note that a default > configuration > could be insecure or not have security controls enabled whereby exposing the > network to compromise." > > [Qin]:So we will see exposing factory default configuration to the network to > compromise also as one kind of operational disruption, if this is true, here > is the > proposed change: > OLD TEXT: > " > The operational disruption caused by setting the config to factory > default contents varies greatly depending on the implementation and > current config. > " > NEW TEXT: > " > The operational disruption caused by setting the config to factory default > contents or lacking appropriate security control on factory default > configuration varies greatly depending on the implementation and current > config. > " > If not, please advise. > > I see that you are already addressing the other comments that have been > raised. > > Regards, > Rob > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: iesg <[email protected]> On Behalf Of Qin Wu > > Sent: 21 April 2020 14:20 > > To: Roman Danyliw <[email protected]>; The IESG <[email protected]> > > Cc: [email protected]; Kent Watsen <[email protected]>; draft- > > [email protected]; [email protected] > > Subject: RE: Roman Danyliw's Discuss on > > draft-ietf-netmod-factory-default- > > 14: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT) > > > > Hi, Roman: > > A few clarification inline below. > > -----邮件原件----- > > 发件人: Roman Danyliw via Datatracker [mailto:[email protected]] > > 发送时间: 2020年4月21日 20:52 > > 收件人: The IESG <[email protected]> > > 抄送: [email protected]; > > [email protected]; [email protected]; Kent Watsen > > <[email protected]>; [email protected] > > 主题: Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-netmod-factory-default-14: > > (with DISCUSS and COMMENT) > > > > Roman Danyliw has entered the following ballot position for > > draft-ietf-netmod-factory-default-14: Discuss > > > > When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all > > email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut > > this introductory paragraph, however.) > > > > > > Please refer to > > https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html > > for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. > > > > > > The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: > > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-netmod-factory-default/ > > > > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > DISCUSS: > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > Please use YANG security considerations template from > > https://trac.ietf.org/trac/ops/wiki/yang-security-guidelines. > > Specifically (as a DISCUSS item): > > > > ** (Per the template questions “for all YANG modules you must evaluate > > whether any readable data”) Would factory-default contain any > > sensitive information in certain network environments where the ACLs > > should be more restrictive that world readable for everyone? > > [Qin]: It does follows yang-security-guidelines but there is no > > readable data node defined within rpc, that's why we don't use third > > paragraph boilerplate and fourth paragraph boilerplate of yang-security- > guidelines. > > YANG-security-guidelines are more applicable to YANG data model with > > more readable/writable data nodes. > > In addition, as clarified in the second paragraph, section 6 of this > > draft, NACM can be used to restrict access for particular NETCONF or > > RESTCONF users to a preconfigured subset of all available NETCONF or > > RESTCONF protocol operations (i.e., factory-reset rpc) > > > > Per “The operational disruption caused by setting the config to > > factory default contents varies greatly depending on the > > implementation and current config”, it seems like it could be worse > > than just an operational disruption. Please note that a default > > configuration could be insecure or not have security controls enabled > > whereby exposing the network to compromise. > > > > [Qin]: As described in the second paragraph of section 6 it by default > > restrict access for everyone by using the "default-deny-all" access > > control defined [RFC8341], what else does it need to address this > > security concern? > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > COMMENT: > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > Please use YANG security considerations template from > > https://trac.ietf.org/trac/ops/wiki/yang-security-guidelines. > > Specifically (as a COMMENT item): > > > > ** Add “The Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) > > [RFC8341] provides the means to …” > > > > [Qin]: We did follow this template, I am wondering how it is different > > from the second paragraph of section 6? I see they are equivalent but > > with more fine granularity security measures, if my understanding is > > correct. _______________________________________________ netmod mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/netmod
