Dear nettimers,

This text is an expanded version of talk given at the Art of Resilience 
conference, organised by the RIXC center for new media culture in Riga, Friday 
October 5, 2012. 
http://rixc.lv/12/en/conference.info.html
https://vimeo.com/53746426
The text will be published in the forthcoming issue of the Acoustic Space 
Journal: 
Smite Rasa, Smits Raitis, Medosch, Armin (editors), (MAH) Techno-Ecologies II, 
Acoustic Space Vol. 12, RIXC: Riga / Liepaja: LiepU MPLab, 2014
The new issue will come out at the occasion of the opening of the Fields 
exhibition and the Art+Communication Festival 2014.
http://fields.rixc.lv/


Contestation and Sustainability of the Digital Commons
by Eric Kluitenberg, Amsterdam, May 2014.

There is a growing body of research and literature on shared resources of 
knowledge and cultural production as a commons [1]. Unsurprisingly much of this 
research focusses on the role that digital media and the internet in particular 
play in constituting these new forms of the commons. The availability of 
digital cultural and knowledge resources online has fundamentally changed the 
nature of these resources, making them at the same time more accessible, but 
also easier to capture and lock down. The educational, emancipatory, and 
empowering potential of a blossoming digital commons is undeniable and clear 
for every person that has used the internet for more than a single afternoon, 
but the dilemma’s involved in establishing and maintaining such digital and 
online common resource pools are far from settled and deeply contested. I want 
to devote specific attention here to the dilemma’s involved in the longer-term 
sustainability of digital and online cultural resources, which is as much a 
political and economic as it is a cultural question of utmost urgency and 
importance.   

Elinor Ostrom, whose research on the commons was awarded the Nobel prize for 
Economics in 2009, and commons theorist Charlotte Hess describe the ‘Commons’ 
as a general term that refers to a resource shared by a group of people (Hess & 
Ostrom, 2007, 4). Typically these resources are governed by mechanisms that 
operate outside the traditional confines of the market and the state to 
regulate their use and ensure their long-term sustainability. Although a broad 
variety of commons and common-pool resources [2] exist, Ostrom and Hess suggest 
that “the unifying thread in all common resources is that they are jointly 
used, managed by groups of varying sizes and interests” (Hess & Ostrom, 2007, 
5).

In traditional economics the knowledge commons is understood as a pool of ideas 
from which it is hard to exclude anyone once created or discovered (ibid, 8), 
and access to and use of them does not limit others in their acces and use (of 
ideas). However, in a digital context more and more forms of knowledge can be 
captured and made subject to property regimes [3] (think for instance of DNA 
sequencing and patented research data), while the digital infrastructures 
needed to produce these capabilities and make them accessible require massive 
investments and constant maintenance to be sustained. In the classic analogy, 
the ideas found when reading a book (as intangibles) are public goods, while 
the book itself (as a material artefact) is classified as a private good (Hess 
& Ostrom, 2007, 9) In the digital context knowledge is increasingly treated as 
a private good unless it is deliberately made accessible for common use, for 
instance via open access publishing. However, this move to create and maintain 
digital knowledge and culture commons requires extensive operational resources.

This is the fundamental dilemma that all digital knowledge and cultural commons 
resources face: At first glance the digital technologies seem to offer 
unprecedented opportunities to share knowledge and culture on an in principle 
planetary scale, and at lowest costs. Yet, these resources can only be 
sustained through continued investments of capabilities (money, skills, 
technical infrastructure, maintenance, resource management). Traditional 
economics is quick to suggest that only markets or public infrastructures are 
able to sustain such common resources. However, in doing so these actors will 
inevitably limit access to these resources, either by requiring payment for 
access (market), or through regulatory exclusionary measures (state). The real 
promise of the digital commons, however, lies in open and unfeathered access 
for anyone to the shared resources, not presupposing either fees or exclusive 
permissions.

The commons proposes a model where collective ownership and governance of 
shared resources offers an alternative for privatisation by the market or 
regulatory control by the state. And the research of Ostrom and many others has 
shown that under the right conditions this is not only a viable, but also a 
rational and efficient model for creating, managing, and protecting such shared 
resources, and thus ensure their long-term sustainability. The question then is 
what the conditions are for such commons resources to thrive? And more 
specifically how does this work in the case of shared digital and online 
knowledge and cultural resources?


Eliminating Some Common Noise

While the intention of this short examination of this wide ranging field (the 
evolving digital commons) is primarily practical, it is nonetheless necessary 
to first address some common misguided pre-occupations with regards to 
questions of sustainability of the commons, digital or otherwise.

First of all, the field seems to be hampered by a persistent legal and 
regulatory preoccupation, which is not to suggest that legal and regulatory 
questions surrounding the commons are not important, or that they can somehow 
be escaped or avoided, but they should not be the starting point of a 
consideration. The future development of the commons is first of all a 
political and an economic question. It is a question in other words of will 
(power) and of rationality in choosing how best to govern shared resources that 
we collectively depend on.    

An eternal debate that apparently needs to be addressed in any discussion of 
the commons is the deplorable ‘tragedy of the commons’, where overexploitation 
and terminal exhaustion seem to be the inevitable fate of any commons that is 
freely accessible, as outlined by Biologist Garret Hardin in his infamous paper 
“The Tragedy of the Commons:” of 1968. Repeated research by economists and 
commons scholars has, however, found that Hardin’s view is mistaken in four 
important respects: (1`) Hardin discusses open access rather than managed 
commons, (2) he assumes little or no communication between those who share (in) 
the commons resource, (3) he assumes that people act only in their immediate 
self-interest (rather than taking some extent of joint interest into account), 
and (4) he only offers two possible solutions for over-exploitation: 
privatisation or government intervention (Hess & Ostrom, 2007, 11), thus 
excluding the possibility that local communities can (and in fact do 
overwhelmingly) introduce forms of collective self-governance that produce 
effective and locally specific solutions for sustainable exploitation of shared 
resources. [4]  

A further misconception that might occur here is to equate the discourse of the 
commons with some form of benevolence. While some of the protagonists of the 
commons might indeed be motivated by a sense that the creation of shared 
resources is ethically the right thing to do, and contributes to the greater 
good of society as a whole and therefore for all its citizens, the point of 
Ostrom’s research has been to emphasise that such self-governed shared 
resources can and do lead to efficient and rational solutions for the 
governance of limited resources. 


Enter the Commons

When first writing about the digital commons in 2003 I began my investigations 
by looking at the dictionary definitions of the word ‘commons’. In the Webster 
on-line dictionary I found perhaps the most interesting one: 

Main Entry: 2common Function: noun Date: 14th century
1 plural : the common people
2 plural but singular in construction : a dining hall
3 plural but singular or plural in construction, often capitalized
a : the political group or estate comprising the commoners
b : the parliamentary representatives of the commoners c : HOUSE OF COMMONS
4 : the legal right of taking a profit in another's land in common with the 
owner or others
5 : a piece of land subject to common use: as a : undivided land used 
especially for pasture b : a public open area in a municipality. [5]

I was particularly struck in this definition by point 4: “the legal right of 
taking a profit in another's land in common with the owner or others”. The 
assertion of this legal right to take a profit in a commons, as long as you do 
not exclude others from doing the same, immediately made me aware that the 
notion of ‘the commons’ could not be conceived of as in opposition to ‘the 
market’. Much rather it seemed to operate, curiously, somehow complementary to 
the market. Taking a profit in a commons in common with others did not imply 
the privatisation of the commons, as this would mean excluding access for 
others. Yet, the problem of (over-)exploitation and depletion of the commons is 
immediately discernible in this principle.

In other words, we need a more differentiated view of the commons if we are to 
understand its relationship to market mechanisms as well as understanding how 
sustainable commons resources can be created


>From Common Land to Digital Commons:

While the dictionary definition cited here focuses primarily on the notion of 
common land, it is not hard to translate the principles outlined here to the 
digital domain. Digital commons, following these principles would then be 
digital and on-line resources subject to common use. Furthermore, we would have 
to accept that this would entail the legal right of taking a profit in 
another's on-line resources in common with the owner or others. This profit 
taking principle is controversial in the context of the digital and online 
commons, however, I consider it also as essential to include this principle in 
a consideration of an economics of the (digital) commons to understand both its 
inherent rationality, and for identifying possible models for longer term 
sustainability of the digital commons.

In developing such models for longer term sustainability of the digital commons 
we furthermore need all three main actors that have entered the stage of the 
commons so far: obviously the commoners themselves, the people and 
organisations who create shared resources, the market in its broadest sense, 
and the state. A complicating factor in all of this is that each of these can 
act both in a complementary as well as an antithetical fashion. It all depends 
on the specific roles these actors are allowed to assume, whether or not a 
sustainable model for the digital commons might emerge. The idea that the 
commons can simply replace the functions of the state or the market, or somehow 
make them redundant, to me seems for the foreseeable future both unrealistic 
and even dangerous - particularly with regards to the role of the state and 
public institutions. Again, we need a differentiated and careful analysis and 
process of modelling, not singular preoccupations or grand gesture sweeping 
statements to achieve progress towards a sustainable digital commons. 

Some years ago, Harvard Law professor and co-founder of the Creative Commons 
Lawrence Lessig visited Amsterdam and at this particular occasion was speaking 
in the Waag Society’s Anatomical Theatre to a rather small crowd of local 
digerati. Lessig was speaking on the evolving battles between copyright holders 
in the entertainment industry and file-sharers who were increasingly branded as 
pirates. Lessig observed: “There is a war going on, a war between copyright and 
piracy. And we need to bring a balance back to this fight..”.

The first thing I particularly disliked about his comments was the war 
metaphor. We were already burdened by a US-lead War on Drugs, followed by a 
“War on Terror”, and now we were witnessing the onset of a “War on Piracy”? The 
metaphor also seemed to imply a similar asymmetrical investment of capabilities 
by the state and market versus those civic actors could possibly mobilise. It 
suggested an image of virtual trench warfare that has indeed come to dominate 
the sharing versus piracy debate in recent years.

Instead of speaking of a ‘war’, I would prefer to say: There is a conflict of 
interest between those parties seeking the commodification of information and 
knowledge, and those seeking to enhance the cause of the common good of 
knowledge.This conflict is political and it is economical. The conflict is 
political, because knowledge is power. Having access to knowledge determines 
the degree to which any single actor, individual or organisation, can take 
control of her, his, or its destiny, and increasingly so in a context of 
massive digital interconnectivity. The conflict is economical, because the 
commons resources need to be sustained and constitute economic value that can 
be exploited in a market place. Hence there is an inherent drive towards 
privatisation of the resources if there are no proper principles of governance 
in place, and the means to impose them.

This political and economic battle is, however, more diversified than the 
simple opposition of copyright and copyleft. Different and often initially 
opposing interest are at stake, but also different conceptions tend to produce 
disagreement. In the case of the digital commons we mostly refer to cultural 
commons, comprising the totality of cultural expressions that can be accessed, 
distributed and experienced with digital and online means, and knowledge 
commons, comprising the totality of knowledge resources that can be accessed, 
distributed and used with digital and online means. Here some fundamental 
debates are on-going, for instance the commons versus public domain debate, 
where the first (commons) implies ownership by a group of commoners who share 
the resource among themselves and with others, whereas the latter (public 
domain) asserts a sphere where things exist outside of property rights, subject 
to appropriation by anyone and no one in particular. The commoners will insist 
that resources need to be maintained and looked after to flourish, while the 
public domain constitutes a sphere of ultimate freedom and possibility 
maximising the possible gains to be had from any given resource available in 
the public domain. 

In the case of the Creative Commons, the project is usually regarded as a 
highly successful and pragmatic intervention creating a space of shared 
cultural and knowledge resources that operates within the confines of existing 
intellectual property rights regimes and therefore does not require massive 
political interventions to operate (changes in copyright law being notoriously 
undoable). However, here the debate rages on about the notion of “Some Rights 
Reserved” versus the abolishment of copyright and Intellectual Property Rights 
(IPRs) altogether that some protagonists of an expanded public domain argue 
for. The most popular cc license is still the “Attribution-NonCommercial” 
version [6], which is a far cry from the freedom of the public domain (although 
Creative Commons now also offers public domain tools [7]), but also is in 
direct contradiction with the fourth principle of the cited dictionary 
definition of  the commons, the legal right to take a profit in a commons 
resource in common with the owner and others.

In a more general sense we find very different interests in the culture and 
knowledge industries depending on the different roles of the principal actors. 
Three main parties can be distinguished here: content producers versus 
mediators versus the public at large. They each have very different and partly 
opposing stakes here. Content producers want to be able to do their work 
professionally, be paid for what they do and produce and be able to build a 
sustainable practice for themselves, sharing without retribution is not an 
obvious or logical choice for them. Mediators want to create channels of acces 
for knowledge and cultural products, and like content producers want to build a 
sustainable practice for themselves. Enabling sharing without retribution is 
not a logical choice for them, but they also will find strong incentives to 
minimise the costs of access to the cultural and knowledge products they want 
to distribute, as is evidenced in the remarkable disparity between mediators 
shares and producers shares in revenues in for instance the music industry, but 
also in academic publishing. The public at large, finally, wants to get 
affordable, preferably free, and easy access to the full breadth and wealth of 
cultural and knowledge products and will generally follow the path of least 
resistance to obtain this.  

All these contesting views and positions further indicate the need for a 
differentiated analysis of the digital commons, its politics, economics as well 
as its ethics.


Values of the Digital Commons

Before venturing more deeply into the economic mechanisms of the digital 
commons it is important to emphasise some of the core values that inform its 
constitutive principles. 

* Access is the obvious starting point of any commons resource - without acces 
to the resource sharing cannot take place and the value of the resource remains 
locked up. 
* Distribution is a very important aspect of the digital commons. In particular 
the sophistication of peer to peer distribution technologies (P2P) such as for 
instance the widely used bittorrent protocol have created highly differentiated 
low cost distribution infrastructure that utilise local resources of ordinary 
internet users to combine them into ever evolving distributed content delivery 
structures.
* Sharing is the act that enables the creation of common pool resources. This 
can be organised collectively or individually, but involves by necessity a 
social process of exchange and usually communication about the resource that is 
shared. While the ethical impetus is clear, sharing can also act as an 
effective instrument for efficient resource allocation. 
* ReMix / ReUse are crucial values of the commons. A true commons is never a 
mute resource, but rather a productive source for the creation of new products, 
cultural expressions, and new forms of insight and knowledge that build on the 
wealth of shared resources in the digital commons.
* Learning; the educational potential of shared digital commons resources is 
evident. Low costs accessibility to high-quality cultural and knowledge is 
particularly relevant for economically disadvantaged zones of the planet and 
society to bridge knowledge gaps and increase their potential for self-reliance.
* Co-operation is vital for the longer-term sustainability of common pool 
resources, particularly those that are naturally scarce. Developing efficient 
fors of collective governance requires intricate modes of co-operation, that 
should ideally be scalable and transferrable. The remarkable rise of free and 
open source software has proven this model in the digital domain, but similar 
cases can be made for traditional forms of the commons (land, water, air, 
fisheries, etc.).
* Social Production refers to processes of collective productive processes that 
can create and extend the commons and may at the same time operate in a market 
environment. Open source software production is a clear example of such social 
production processes, but the model applies also in other sectors of the 
economy.
* Empowerment can be regarded a key-value of the commons, digital and 
otherwise. The commons is principally oriented on self-organised and 
self-reliant solutions to immediate economic, material and immaterial needs. 
The strengthening of the social process through social production serves to 
empower individuals and groups to accommodate local needs. 


Economies of the Commons
‘Paying the Costs of Making Things Free’

In a series of three conferences, organised in 2008, 2010, and 2012 called 
“Economies of the Commons” [8], we explored in a broad coalition of cultural 
organisations and initiatives the question what commons based approaches might 
mean and contribute to creating widely accessible cultural and audiovisual 
media collections online. While the series was informed by critical theory on 
the commons and its underlying economic principles we focussed specifically on 
cultural resources in the digital domain, and on online audiovisual resources 
because they are most resource intensive and therefore hardest to sustain. 

At the beginning of the first Economies of the Commons conference we stated 
that the aim of these gatherings was to raise the economic competence of 
cultural and public sector organisations. With this we meant not that these 
organisations should adapt to the logic of market, but rather that these 
organisations need to understand the economic logic and mechanisms at work in a 
connected economy so that these can be put at the service of the aims public 
sector and cultural organisations try to achieve.

By looking both at large public organisations as well as independent 
initiatives, all of whom were exploring how to create public access to 
audiovisual online cultural resources, we were able to study the issues they 
run up against at vastly different scales. One principal insight results from 
this close examination became clear early on: The idea that there could be a 
‘one-size-fits-all’ solution to the question of creating and sustaining these 
resources (particularly a ‘killer revenue model’), does not hold up. Instead we 
found out that it is necessary to look at a patchwork of different solutions 
that work in different combinations in specific local contexts. Most often 
these would rely on a mix of public, community and derivative (including 
market-based) sources of support.

Based on these insights we concluded that the commons and the market are often 
wrongfully pitted against each other.  A strong  space of open and shared 
resources is much rather a prerequisite for a flourishing 21st century 
information economy. The creation of commons resources in the digital domain 
avoids unnecessary replication costs. For purely digital products the costs are 
mostly contained in the creation of the first copy, while storage and 
distribution, while by no means free are much less cost-intensive. Making first 
copies available in commons resources (for instance after their initial market 
cycle is over and first copy production costs have been recouped), drives down 
transaction costs involved in reuse of materials tremendously. the commons and 
the public domain can thus be seen as raw materials and the common pool 
resources as infrastructure for new cultural and knowledge production in the 
digital domain.

We could also clearly see that public support still has a role to play: While 
for instance crowd funding and crowd sourcing strategies offer exciting 
opportunities, especially to engage audiences much more actively in the process 
of producing new cultural products, as yet they do not scale to match existing 
public institutional and funding infrastructures. Crowd funding is also not 
reliable enough for long-term planning required for instance for the large 
scale archiving institutions we worked with in the conference series 
(Netherlands Institute of Sound and Vision, Institut National de l’Audiovisuel, 
BBC Archives, British Film Institute, Eye Institute and others). It is much 
more useful to consider them as complementary mechanisms to provide tailored 
solutions for local needs.

Public institutions can, for instance, provide larger scale infrastructures for 
the digital commons, making knowledge and cultural resources out of public 
holdings available for reuse in the digital domain, by schools, publishers, 
media producers as well as individuals and civic initiatives, thus contributing 
to the digital commons as well as to a thriving information economy. We found 
that public / collective arrangements are a much more cost-effective way of 
dealing with the Indirect distributed costs in various knowledge production 
processes (whether public or market driven). As a result in all these sectors 
costs are driven down for the system as a whole, and overall efficiency of the 
system is greatly enhanced. The digital commons thus provides a measurable 
rational beneficial economic effect.

More important still than trying to fit the commons approach to an existing 
market logic is that we need to understand the new forms of value creation that 
happen in these commons environments and around such open and shared resources. 
It is crucial to recognise that these exceed the narrow definition of a market 
based on monetary exchange - as is evidenced in our list of values of the 
digital commons, which include social values (involvement, co-operation), 
cultural enrichment (building on the common global heritage), as well as local 
and individual empowerment.  

The rationality of the digital commons at the level of society as a whole is 
clear. What is holding us back in delivering on this promise are primarily 
vested interests in the cultural and knowledge industries, whose specific 
interests (read: revenue models) are not served by the digital commons. Given 
the scale of these interests (in global entertainment and media conglomerates, 
global science publishers, patented knowledge pools in pharmaceutical 
industries and beyond) it is unthinkable that a thriving digital commons will 
come about on its own, or purely out of grassroots civic initiatives. A 
political intervention is clearly necessary here to shift emphasis from IPR 
monopolies to digital common-pool resources. Neither civic initiatives, new and 
emerging market players, commons initiatives, nor legal interventions of the 
creative commons type on their own will be able to effect the required changes. 
Therefore the public sector, foremost the state, has an important role to play 
to create the prerequisites for a flourishing digital commons.


Revenue Models for the Digital Commons

In the absence of such strategic intervention at the state level it is useful 
to conclude here with a brief examination of ‘tactical’ models that can sustain 
commons based initiatives in the digital domain for the intermittent period. 
The most immediate need for most digital commons initiatives is finding secure 
levels of funding to sustain operations. These will in most case typically 
consist of a combination of different instruments, each with specific 
capabilities and limitations:

Donations
Donations are attractive as sources of ‘free money’ not tied to specific return 
services that initiatives a high degree of flexibility and policy freedom. 
Donation collection mechanisms are also well established on the internet.
The main problem of this form of funding is the absence of long-term prospects. 
Even for a super high profile project such as Wikipedia the reliability of 
donations as a revenue source is highly uncertain and for the longest time the 
financial horizon of the initiative barely exceeded a six months time frame, 
while for the myriad of users the idea of lossing wikipedia within half a year 
seemed simply inconceivable.
Donations are also highly sensitive to economic fluctuations, which impedes 
their longer term reliability further.

Public Funding
Public funding is obviously the ‘classic’ model of financing services in the 
public (common) interest via tax revenues. Where available this funding 
instrument should be cherished and where possible extended. Especially in a 
transparent democratic process it allows for a maximum focus on content and 
(longer term) policy for cultural and public interest organisations.
An important consideration here is that funding depends on a legitimisation 
strategy, which suggest an interesting potential cross-pollination between the 
commons and the public sector. Commons driven initiatives demonstrate the 
involvement of citizens in the project which should be an added recommendation 
for public support. More importantly though, contributing the results of 
projects enabled by public support to the digital commons could be considered 
as an important prerequisite for obtaining this public support. Public funding 
would thus directly contribute to the growth of the digital commons and thus 
create further indirect public benefits through availability in the commons. 

Sponsorship
Similar to public funding sponsorship involves a legitimisation strategy to 
make an activity eligible for support - the activity has to either benefit the 
common good or the specific interests of the sponsor. ‘Legitimacy’ of the 
project is passed on by the project to the sponsor / ‘patron’ in return for 
financial and material support.
Besides the obvious limitations in policy freedom for projects and 
organisations depending on sponsorship for key resources this source of funding 
is also highly sensitive to economic fluctuation.

Crowd Funding
Crowd funding has become truly fashionable right now, and also quite 
successful. Following the early successes of Kickstarter and Indiegogo a wide 
variety of crowd funding platforms has emerged on the internet, often catered 
to specific local needs and interests. 
Comparable to donations and sponsorship crowd funding is highly sensitive to 
economic fluctuation. 
Crowd funding is mostly successful for high-profile projects and thereby tends 
to replicate the ‘reputation economy’ of traditional (mass-) media forms and 
established cultural industries. 
Curiously  crowd funding generally still replicates the ownership model of 
traditional cultural industries, i.e. it promotes and funds project in which 
there is a limited or exclusive ownership of the project’s results and its 
Intellectual Property Rights.
Here ‘Crowd Funding for the Commons’ is required as a principle. The simple 
idea that projects funded by the crowd, the public, also need to become 
available to the public by entering and being available in / to the commons.
The crowd funding platform Goteo is one of the earliest examples that adopted 
this logic. However, this mechanism does not have sufficient scale yet to 
create a significant impact. Many content producers meanwhile prefer the closed 
IPR model of mainstream crowd funding platforms.

Open Access Publishing
Perhaps the most promising and already very successful model for enlarging the 
(knowledge) commons is the practice of open access publishing. The economic 
model is split between the user / consumer- and the producer side of the 
product: Users / consumers are given free access to resources (optionally to 
read or view / use / copy / modify). The producers of the content (research 
institutions / universities / professional content producer) pay for 
dissemination. The publisher provides publishing and dissemination services as 
a regular paid-service in the market place.
Results of projects thus become immediately freely accessible in the commons 
upon the moment of publishing and directly enlarge its scope and significance. 
The issue here is that the system relies on indirect forms of (public) support 
- mostly of publicly financed institutions (universities / research centres) 
that want to make their results publicly accessible and are able to pay for 
them. An effective political intervention here would be to make open access 
publishing mandatory for publicly financed research institutions and projects, 
thereby maximising the delivery of public benefits of the initial public 
investment (tax payer money).  

Distributed Micropayment Systems
A rather experimental and new approach to creating revenue for commons based 
projects in the public domain is the use of distributed micropayment systems. 
The best example here as yet might be Flattr [9]. Flattr organises a central 
allocation of user / crowd funding for projects, while the individual user 
decides locally to support projects by ‘flattering’ a project, in effect 
clicking a Flattr button on the website of  participating on-line open access 
projects, much like the well known ‘like’ buttons of social media platforms.
The system calculates an automatic proportional distribution based on user’s 
seed funding divided by number of Flattr clicks in a given period (for instance 
a week or month). Individual contributions can be small but the cumulative 
effect could be potentially substantial, while the donation threshold is low. 
The main drawback of Flattr and other micro payment systems, so far, is that 
the scale funding remains rather small in comparison to mainstream crowd 
funders such as Kickstarter or Indiegogo.

Hybrid Business Models
Some initiatives have explored the complementarity of commons and market based 
approaches quite literally. Such hybrid business models usually consist of a 
combination of open access to the core product, combined with paid services and 
/ or derivative paid-for products.

Example 1: Prelinger Archives.
Prelinger Archives consists of a (physical) collection of over 60,000 
"ephemeral" (advertising, educational, industrial, and amateur) films, brought 
together by film maker and archivist Rick Prelinger. In 2002 acquired by the 
Library of Congress, Motion Picture, Broadcasting and Recorded Sound Division. 
Prelinger Archives retained 5000 copies in a digital format taken from the 
original footage and has started a process of transferring these to publicly 
available viewing copies distributed via archive.org, where currently about 
3000 movies are available. [10] Individual users can freely access and reuse a 
large movie collection from the archive for free via archive.org.
The collection and service is sustained by selling stock footage as 
high-quality film print or digital video for professional media producers. 
Prelinger’s decision to make viewing copies freely available in the public 
domain on the internet had a rather unexpected result for the business side of 
his archive. Because of the increased visibility of the materials and the 
collection, and the enthusiastic response of online audiences who created an 
entire new archive of Prelinger mash-up movies, the revenues of the 
professional part of the organisation doubled in the first year the materials 
were made available at archive.org

Example 2 - The Music Industry:
Most analysts expect that because of technological factors selling music will 
not in itself be enough to sustain a substantial business volume for music 
vendors in the future. One radical model to innovate the music related 
businesses and at the same time make the poisonous debate on ‘piracy’ would be 
to make recorded music available for free as digital files for free, while 
creating derivative added value services, such as (exclusive) packaging, 
annotation and documentation, merchandising, new revenue streams via 
live-performances, creating exposure for related products.
A growing number of musicians is now also creating these kinds of mixed 
business models for themselves, making music available online for free 
listening, sometimes free download, selling music or asking donations (pay what 
you want), creating merchandising and special editions offers, and using 
increased visibility online to enhance other aspects of their professional 
practice (performance, teaching, workshops, lectures, studio sessions, etc.).   


To conclude: 
What should guide the debate on the future development of the commons, digital 
and otherwise, is its rationality, its efficiency in resource allocation, its 
ability for expanded forms of value creation, and its capacity for delivering 
broad public benefits. The commons does not replace the market, but instead 
complements and enhances it, in particular by alleviating unwarranted market 
distortions caused by monopolised resource allocations. There is a danger, 
however, in considering the commons as a magical formula that will make public 
institutions and infrastructures  redundant. As I have shown repeatedly here, 
public institutions, both public sector and cultural organisations as well as 
state institutions play a crucial role in creating the prerequisites and 
infrastructures for the commons to thrive, also and particularly so in the 
digital domain. 


Notes:

1]  A highly recommended overview of the diversity of research and activity 
around the commons can be found in the recent anthology “The Wealth of the 
Commons  - A World Beyond Market & State” (Bollier & Helfrich, 2012), edited by 
David Bollier and Silke Helfrich. The book is freely available online here:
http://wealthofthecommons.org/contents  
2]  Common pool resources are shared resource systems that consist of “types of 
economic goods independent of particular property rights” (Hess & Ostrom, 2007, 
5)
3]  James Boyle speaks about a ‘second enclosure of the commons’ involving the 
capture of the ‘intangible commons of the mind’ in new intellectual property 
regimes enabled by information processing technologies. (Boyle, 2008, 42-53)
4]  For a more extensive discussion of the research on systems of 
self-governance of the commons a good point to start is reading the Nobel Prize 
acceptance lecture delivered by Elinor Ostrom on December 8, 2009: 
Beyond Markets and states: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems.
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2009/ostrom-lecture.html
 
5]  Webster on-line dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/  (accessed 
March 2003)
6]  http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
7]  http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/
8]  The archive of the conference series can be found at: http://ecommons.eu/
9]  https://flattr.com/
10]  https://archive.org/details/prelinger 


Principal Sources:

URLs:
http://wealthofthecommons.org/ 
http://ecommons.eu
http://www.thepublicdomain.org/
http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/

Books:
David Bollier & Silke Helfrich, eds. (2012): The Wealth of the Commons - A 
World Beyond Market & State, Levellers Press, Amherst (Mass.).
James Boyle (2008): The Public Domain - Enclosing the Commons of the Mind, Yale 
University Press, New Haven & London.
Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom (2007): Understanding Knowledge as a Commons, 
MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass.).
Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons (1990): The Evolution of Institutions for 
Collective Action, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.



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