Hi Martin, Here is an interesting quote about math from Giorgio de Santillana:
"The Platonists firmly believed in the mystery of numbers, whereas Leonardo developed a rather special notion of mathematics, one closer to the spirit of his old practical teacher, Benedetto dell'Abaco, than to that of Copernicus. The mathematical instrument that he indefatigably pursued was, for him, really an instrument, a means of construction, a way -- as Valéry would put it -- of making himself an equerry of his own ideas. It is not the contemplation of the suprasensible world but the study of the geometrical skeleton of the real one." From the same essay: "Galileo was thought to be a Platonist by order and obedience, so to speak; for the mathematical sciences were under the aegis of Plato, and Galileo's friends and followers were Platonists -- much better Platonists, actually, than he ever was.... Galileo, then, had good reason to belong to the 'sect' as it was called; but more significant is it that he insisted on holding explicit reservations about Platonism as a philosophy." A perhaps related, but certainly very interesting and enigmatic quotation from Leonardo is: "Every instrument requires to be made by experience." To me, this implies Gödel and pertains to Denzin. Perhaps no figure in European civilization is more encrusted with time (as in hours spent viewed, read, and explained) than Leonardo. However, these strata do not necessarily confer understanding and may in fact be a bitter case of the opposite. To cut the Gordian knot I believe one must ask: is there a bridge in Woman Standing in a Landscape? The consensus of the Leonardo literature is that there is not -- or rather, the literature does not ask the question. I would propose that there is indisputably a bridge, and its meaning must be considered. All best, Max (Santillana quotes are from "Leonardo: Man Without Letters," in Reflections on Men and Ideas, pp. 1-3, MIT Press 1968.) https://www.rct.uk/collection/912581/a-woman-in-a-landscape Description A drawing of a woman standing in a landscape, with her body turned to the right, and her head turned to face the spectator. She wears full drapery, which blows out behind her in elaborate folds. Her right hand rests on her breast and with her left hand she points into the distance. Melzi's number 216. The most plausible explanation of this mysterious drawing is that it depicts Matelda, appearing to Dante in Purgatory (Cantos 28–29), the second book of his Divine Comedy: ‘I came upon a stream that blocked / the path of my advance; […] / I halted, and I set my eyes upon / the farther bank, to look at the abundant / variety of newly-flowered boughs; / And there […] / I saw a solitary woman moving, / singing, and gathering up flower on flower. / […] No sooner had she reached the point where that / fair river’s waves could barely bathe the grass, / than she gave me this gift: lifting her eyes. / […] / Erect, along the farther bank, she smiled, / her hands entwining varicoloured flowers.’ The fluttering drapery here echoes that of Matelda in Botticelli’s illustration of the same scene (Berlin, Kupferstichkabinett), though the distinctive pose is derived from a figure in one of Mantegna’s canvases of the Triumph of Caesar, the Bearers of Trophies and Bullion (c.1484–92; Royal Collection, RCIN 403960), perhaps known to Leonardo via a print. The pointing gesture and direct gaze relate the drawing to Leonardo’s compositions of the Angel of the Annunciation (RCIN 912328) and St John the Baptist (Paris, Louvre), and would put us here in the position of Dante, as Matelda indicates her earthly paradise to us. But Leonardo had, it seems, little sustained interest in Dante, and most quotations from the Divine Comedy in his notebooks are on natural phenomena; though the background here is hard to read it seems rocky, and we know from the Leda that Leonardo would not miss an opportunity to illustrate a flowery setting (eg. RCIN 912424). The context and function of the drawing thus remain unknown. Text adapted from Leonardo da Vinci: A life in drawing, London, 2018 https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Botticelli,_Purgatorio_28.jpg ________________________________ From: [email protected] <[email protected]> on behalf of Martin Donner <[email protected]> Sent: Sunday, February 28, 2021 4:03 PM To: [email protected] <[email protected]> Subject: <nettime> Clarifying my thoughts about Leonardo vs. status quo & Vienna Declaration/Denzin Hi Max (& nettime), thank you for your thoughts! I have to admit that I´m not a specialist for the era of Leonardo but your insights and the idea of your book sound interesting. As well your comment about the kinda ‚premodern‘ indigenous view on the practices we divide into arts and sciences just as forms of ‚doing‘ which corresponds in a way to the practice turn in western science. What I was thinking about in a quite speculative way are indeed rather the differences in circumstances and destination routes between that era of the awakening of ‚the human‘ and an era when the idea of this specific historical notion of humanity associated with modernity might blur again (quasi with Foucault´s image on that in the back of my mind). Just to note that I don´t think we´re on the way back to Leonardo´s times although it might seem so. Back then there was still an unfractured conviction of ‚wholeness‘ of the world that a bit later was considered as describable in mathematical ways and expressible in artistic forms derived from that domain. At least a bit later that was the case and Bach´s music you´ve mentioned is an example for that I´d say. Galileo was sure that god has written the ‚book of the world‘ in mathematical expressions. Hence it´s all about finding those mathematical relations because they´re the warrantors of truth and as such also the warrantors of beauty. Western music theory was convinced of that since Pythagoras. But with Riemann´s non-euclidean geometries and other mathematical and physical questions this conviction was gone, so to say. This is i.a. reflected in the fast acceptance of the term „model“ that Hertz invented in physics/science some years after Riemann´s discovery. Finally, with Einsteins theories of relativity the three Kantian notions (possibility of apriori knowledge from maths/logic, apriori space, apriori time) were deconstructed. So from Hertz on you can build different models for the same phenomena but you cannot say which one is the right or ‚true‘ one. You might measure which one fits better in experiments but that´s not always possible and of course it doesn´t back the notion of an apriori truth and beauty. However, the ones who invent those models with their research and creativity are humans, or with Descartes a special kind of immaterial ‚essence‘ called res cogitans in opposition to the rest of the material world called res extensa. The mentioned deconstructions which are a serious problem for epistemology became the more a boost for the Kantian notion of an autonomy of art and the exceptionalism of humans within the world (as the creators of models, artworks and so on). The world itself was still considered to be a machine describable in mathematical terms.That´s in short the basis of the political and institutional logics of modernity. Hence if there is any chance to find a ‚well-ordered universe‘ again like in the days of old – or in other words: a timeless mathematical apriori truth and beauty as quasi-metaphysical ‚safety ground‘ – then you have to include human creativity and contingency within your mathematical/formal descriptions, at least in this kind of logics and ideology. Or in cybernetic terms you have to include the observer. No other way to get back to the vision of an all-embracing unity. Turing by the way has called that special skill of humans which machines cannot perform ‚intuition‘ in his 1937 paper which is the blueprint for digital computers. Another term closely related to the arts… If you succeed in cracking this hard problem of creativity or intuition you would be able to automate it and hence innovation as well. (In the DARPA there is an attempt to do so within the development of a special AI system as far as I know.) Since Gödel we know that cracking this hard problem is not possible – at least not in a supratemporal mathematical sense. However a key promise of cybernetics was nevertheless to tackle that, now with probabilistic models and with regard to the specific situation and context someone is acting in. For this you best need feedback loops which allow continuous real-time measurement to then be able to derive models of creativity on the basis of massive quantitative data. Neuroscience may be one attempt, big data extracted from social networks, smart gadgets and so on another. The more people articulate and produce data the better for attemps to make them computable (and hence controllable). That seems to be the point where we are right now. And in addition to that creativity plays a key role in the western societies of our days in an economic sense. Reckwitz, a famous german sociologist, spoke of the „dispositif of creativity“ which is the basis of the economy in postindustrial societies. So it is no coincidence that the arts as the representation of creativity are in focus – there are, as set out above, several reasons for this with utilitarian backgrounds and those do not always have liberating intentions but rather its opposite, namely negative post- and transhuman ones. This is a big difference to Leonardo´s times as I see it. I think it is important to have this in mind when being seized with questions about creativity and the research on it. Of course it is at least equally important to emphasize that there are (and to the best of my belief will be) many examples for liberating intentions and examples in art. But as this is usually emphasized strongly I didn´t mention it in my arguments because I assume we all agree in that. However, at exactly that point the dilemma which I stated with my question regarding Denzin´s approach appears on the scene. Because on the one hand under the conditions of modernity the autonomy of arts was always a guarantee for these kinds of possibilities and freedom. On the other hand that autonomy of art is deeply entangled with the conditions of modernity (see Kant) which are not only under pressure in the light of contemporary technological developments but which are also not sustainable in an ecological sense and on top of that tend to reduce humans to social atoms which in the end have to survive as individuals under the reign of all-pervasive markets. The role of the artist in this picture can feel a bit like that of a court jester. In his existence the civic society insures itself traditionally about its liberty, so to say. And in recent times artists have become more and more a ressource for the development of new and ‚creative‘ technologies which are intended to perpetuate the economical and ideological status quo. What I want to say with that is that the arts may have to reflect themselves more in regard to the posed circumstances. That is also what Denzin (as a non artist as far as I know) is inviting us to do as I read him. To taper it once more: the notion of an autonomy of art has itself a legitimization function for the conditions of an unsustainable modernity. It is not an innocent and purely idealistic playground like a sort of detached space. An example might be the success of Jackson Pollock which was a project of the CIA who arranged exhibitions in important galleries and so on to show how free and abstract the western world is in opposition to soviet realism. But would I have liked a kind of institutionalized Denzin in the form of, let´s say, an ‚ethics commission‘ that judges my art if it is „ethical“ as related to the prevailing consensus and norms of their money sources? Of course not! To be honest I wouldn´t have given a shit on that kind of judgement. The transgressive and ‚visionary‘ power of art is not least rooted in it´s self-authorization to do and/or arrange things differently which can mean to break norms. And if you break norms you might potentially ‚insult‘ people. If this shouldn´t be allowed anymore within art/PhD projects because it´s ‚unethical‘ then art is wrapped up in cotton wool and looses its visionary power. It becomes negligible. Of course this is not Denzin´s desire (rather its opposite) but it may play out like this in institutional contexts. And needless to say that art should be ethical but this ethics cannot be decreed. Insofar it´s hard to defend the idea to surrender the autonomy of art like Denzin et al suggest it (in chapter6/7?). On the other hand: Do I like the negative examples of artworks mentioned in Denzin which disrespect human dignity and then usually argue with the autonomy of art? Of course not! But in an „economy of attention“ (as Franck called the upcoming logics of the social in consideration of the internet society in the 90s) provocation for the sake of provocation is profitable even if it´s pubertal in a way. Under that circumstances transgressive powers tend to reduce themselves to pure effect/affect aesthetics, by all means necessary. Put together with the modern ‚regime of artist´s subjectiviziation‘ as a court jester to perpetuate the status quo and its known unsustainability it´s hard to defend the idea of an autonomy of art. That´s the dilemma. – But I have to admit that this might be a very Eurocentric view or question. A short while ago I was on an online conference with artists from all over the world who make their (communal) art projects not seldom under the danger of real oppression without any idea about elaborated art markets. That felt so different and showed the strength of art in a way that really touched me. Very different situation! However, all told I had the impression that both ambiguities – the problem with the Vienna Declaration Florian was writing about and the problem to defend or reject Denzin´s idea of two forms of art from which only one form is legit in institutional contexts – point to the same spot, namely that vision of Foucault that the modern notion of ‚the human‘ might one day blur again like a picture in the sand when the waves roll over it. Or in more concrete words it points to the questions of posthumanism, not so much back to Leonardo´s era. In my perspective Leonardo and the recent developments appear more as outer borders of an era that gave birth to the idea of an autonomy of art signifying the modern notion of humanity and its hyperindividualized subjectivization processes, its ethics and its tendency to develop into a world of all-pervasive markets. In opposition to the days of Leonardo there are (at least) perspectives of second order going on today which result from the desire to find a mathematically well-ordered universe again – the big story of western metaphysics so to say – and which therefore tend to „bypass“ the contingent and for any sort of power basically dangerous human experience and dignity in a technological manner as Adam Curtis might phrase it. The metaphysics isn’t just there anymore like in Leonardo´s times, we have to instantiate it and technology is the preferred key. (I write that as somebody who really loves technology and worked extensively with it!) If posthumanism is standing on the doorstep let´s not deny but face it. How could it look like in an ethical way that doesn´t have to be decreed? There still seem to be different ways of development: on the one side a posthumanism that is questioning the dualities of modernity (then including notions like the autonomy of art, its idealizations and remnants of avant-garde thinking and court jester artists as Denzin et al argue with Barad and others). Or on the other side a posthumanism that shows up as solutionism and neo-metaphysics with the attempts to bypass ‚human factors‘ (that is communal sensemaking, embodied experience and so on) except for the calculable ‚wow-trigger‘ effect of an superficial affect aesthetics as just another ‚market gimmick‘. When I thought about my own thinking reflexes I had the impression that one might intuitively tend to defend modernity in some cases (e.g. in case of the freedom to be visionary as under the ‚regime‘ of an autonomy of art) while at the same time disliking it in other cases (all-pervasive markets which govern the processes of subjectivization to their inner core). But what about the x standing on the doorstep? And how to deal with it within institutional contexts? A defence of some aspects of modernity might not be enough in the long run although it´s surely a legitimate thing to do from an institutional point of view. (That was the reason why I´ve mentioned last time that the liberty of the arts in modernity is in fact quite enclosed within specific institutionalized contexts and social classes. With my education biography I didn´t belong to those classes and their subjectivization games felt always a bit strange to me as I didn´t learn them. Nevertheless [well paid] art was coincidentaly open for me and I’m thankful for that.) To me that x is a hard question I cannot answer at the moment. When I was reading Florians posted article (whose texts I appreciate a lot) and your comment on it I thought I take the chance to state that question in here. Maybe an artist habit: state the question ; ) But I have to admit that I´ve never posted something in a mailing list, I even didn´t know how to when I tried first and I also don´t read along in here for so long. Insofar maybe a bit overdone. However it helped me to clarify my thoughts. Regards, Martin ✌️
# distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: [email protected] # @nettime_bot tweets mail w/ sender unless #ANON is in Subject:
