Original to:
https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2021/jun/26/project-cassandra-plan-to-use-novels-to-predict-next-war

At first I thought, this is crazy’: the real-life plan to use novels to predict 
the next war


Three years ago, a small group of academics at a German university launched an 
unprecedented collaboration with the military – using novels to try to pinpoint 
the world’s next conflicts. Are they on to something?


Philip Oltermann 
The Guardian, Sat 26 Jun 2021 


As the car with the blacked-out windows came to a halt in a sidestreet near 
Tübingen’s botanical gardens, keen-eyed passersby may have noticed something 
unusual about its numberplate. In Germany, the first few letters usually denote 
the municipality where a vehicle is registered. The letter Y, however, is 
reserved for members of the armed forces.

Military men are a rare, not to say unwelcome, sight in Tübingen. A picturesque 
15th-century university town that brought forth great German minds including 
the philosopher Hegel and the poet Friedrich Hölderlin, it is also a modern 
stronghold of the German Green party, thanks to its left-leaning academic 
population. In 2018, there was growing resistance on campus against plans to 
establish Europe’s leading artificial intelligence research hub in the 
surrounding area: the involvement of arms manufacturers in Tübingen’s “cyber 
valley”, argued students who occupied a lecture hall that year, brought shame 
to the university’s intellectual tradition.


Yet the two high-ranking officials in field-grey Bundeswehr uniforms who 
stepped out of the Y-plated vehicle on 1 February 2018 had travelled into 
hostile territory to shake hands on a collaboration with academia, the like of 
which the world had never seen before.

The name of the initiative was Project Cassandra: for the next two years, 
university researchers would use their expertise to help the German defence 
ministry predict the future.

The academics weren’t AI specialists, or scientists, or political analysts. 
Instead, the people the colonels had sought out in a stuffy top-floor room were 
a small team of literary scholars led by Jürgen Wertheimer, a professor of 
comparative literature with wild curls and a penchant for black roll-necks.

After the officers had left, the atmosphere among Wertheimer’s team remained 
tense. A greeting gift of camouflage-patterned running tops and military green 
nail varnish had helped break the ice, but there was outstanding cause for 
concern. “We’d been unsure about whether to go public over the project,” 
recalls Isabelle Holz, Wertheimer’s assistant. The university had declined the 
opportunity to be formally involved with the defence ministry, which is why the 
initiative was run through the Global Ethic Institute, a faculty-independent 
institution set up by the late dissident Catholic, Hans Küng. “We thought our 
offices might get paint-bombed or something.”

They needn’t have worried. “Cassandra reaches for her Walther PPK” ran the 
headline in the local press after the project was announced, a sarcastic 
reference to James Bond’s weapon of choice. The idea that literature could be 
used by the defence ministry to identify civil wars and humanitarian disasters 
ahead of time, wrote the Neckar-Chronik newspaper, was as charming as it was 
hopelessly naive. “You have to ask yourself why the military is financing 
something that is going to be of no value whatsoever.”

In the end, the launch of Project Cassandra saw neither paint bombs nor 
sit-ins. The public, Holz says, “simply didn’t take us seriously. They just 
thought we were mad.”

Charges of insanity, Wertheimer says, have forever been the curse of prophets 
and seers. Cassandra, the Trojan priestess of Greek myth, had a gift of 
foresight that allowed her to predict the Greek warriors hiding inside the 
Trojan horse, the death of Mycenaean king Agamemnon at the hands of his wife 
and her lover, the 10-year wanderings of Odysseus, and her own demise. Yet each 
of her warnings was ignored: “She’s lost her wits,” says Clytaemestra in 
Aeschylus’ play Agamemnon, before the chorus dismiss her visions as “goaded by 
gods, by spirits vainly driven, frantic and out of tune”.

The idea that novelists are modern-day Cassandras – “speaking always truths, 
never grasped as true” – may sound positively esoteric. There are tons of 
listicles on the internet hailing books that predicted events before their 
time, but most of these are accidental acts of clairvoyance by sci-fi writers 
describing futuristic technological equipment.

In 1914’s The World Set Free,HG Wells wrote about atomic bombs whose 
radioactive elements contaminate battlefields – three decades before Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki. British author John Brunner’s Stand On Zanzibar from 1968 
imagined Europe’s states forming a collective union, China’s rise as a global 
power, the economic decline of Detroit and the inauguration of a “President 
Obomi”.

And, naturally, there is George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, in which a 
one-party state uses “telescreens” to identify people from their expressions 
and heart rate – written more than half a century before the NSA’s Prism 
surveillance programme and China using facial recognition software to track its 
citizens.

But Wertheimer says great writers have a “sensory talent”. Literature, he 
reasons, has a tendency to channel social trends, moods and especially 
conflicts that politicians prefer to remain undiscussed until they break out 
into the open.

“Writers represent reality in such a way that their readers can instantly 
visualise a world and recognise themselves inside it. They operate on a plane 
that is both objective and subjective, creating inventories of the emotional 
interiors of individual lives throughout history.”

We were interested in what hit a nerve. Was a book heaped with awards? Or 
banned and the author had to leave the country?

His favourite example of literature’s ability to identify a social mood and 
cast it into the future is a retelling of the Cassandra myth by the East German 
novelist Christa Wolf. Kassandra, published in 1983, casts Troy as a state not 
unlike the late-stage German Democratic Republic, succumbing to the paranoia of 
a Stasi-like secret police as it veers towards a not-so-cold war. Kassandra, 
cursed with the gift of prophecy, is also a cipher for the author’s own 
predicament: she foresees the decline her society is heading for, but her 
warnings are ignored by the military patriarchy.

If states could learn to read novels as a kind of literary seismograph, 
Wertheimer argues, they could perhaps identify which conflicts are on the verge 
of exploding into violence, and intervene to save maybe millions of lives.

At first glance, Jürgen Wertheimer looks like the least ideal candidate to drag 
literature out of the ivory tower. Born in Munich in 1947, to a Jewish father 
who had escaped from Dachau concentration camp and spent the rest of the war in 
hiding, he started university at the height of the 1968 student movement that 
energised a generation of young postwar Germans, but steered clear of the 
political activism that came with it.

Wertheimer, who says he is scared of crowds, has never joined a march in his 
life. Instead, he has spent time in libraries to work on his dissertation on 
Stefan George, the poet of the German wing of the l’art pour l’art movement: 
the idea that art must serve no function other than that of being art. Apart 
from a doomed love affair with Munich’s less successful football team, 1860 
Munich, literature remains both his vocation and sole hobby, the 74-year-old 
says with a husky Bavarian drawl so melancholy, it suggests that passions can 
also become burdens.

Colleagues say Wertheimer’s air of apolitical world-weariness belies an agile, 
pragmatic mind. “I think he simply didn’t take part in 1968 because everyone 
else was,” Holz says. “He’s always been a bit of an outsider who liked doing 
things his own way.” At the end of the 2000s, when students across Germany rose 
in protest against plans to introduce university fees and a more efficient, 
UK-style bachelor’s-master’s system, Wertheimer found himself on the 
barricades, speaking up in support of the protesters.

As more and more university funding was diverted to Tübingen’s “cyber valley” 
rather than the arts and humanities departments, and literary study was 
increasingly under pressure to prove it could be socially useful, Wertheimer 
discovered his activist zeal.

On 15 December 2014, he posted a letter to Ursula von der Leyen – now president 
of the European Commission, then Germany’s defence minister. He drew her 
attention to the fight against Boko Haram in northern Nigeria – a terrorist 
group whose name is often translated as “western education is forbidden” and 
which has targeted schools and burned down libraries. Clashes of arms, he 
wrote, were usually preceded by wars of – and sometimes on – words, and 
therefore words could also be used to prevent them. He would relish the 
opportunity to put the theories he had developed in this field “into practical 
use in the framework of the German military’s foreign deployments”.

Von der Leyen never personally responded to Wertheimer’s offer. But in the 
spring of 2015 he received a letter from the defence ministry’s politics 
directorate, inviting him for a meeting. Two years of talks and meetings later, 
it commissioned the Tübingen professor to run a pilot project to test his idea 
of literature as an “early warning system”. Cassandra’s dry run was to 
demonstrate how the war in Kosovo and the rise of Boko Haram could have been 
predicted through the study of literary texts.

In the summer of 2017, Wertheimer hired a small team of researchers, including 
Florian Rogge, an unassuming master’s student working on anti-democratic satire 
in the Weimar Republic, and Holz, who was writing her PhD on the literary 
inspirations of the Baader-Meinhof group. A room where the team would convene 
each week was fitted with giant military maps and shelves of literature from 
Nigeria, Algeria and Kosovo. “We felt we had been handed a unique opportunity,” 
Holz recalls, “to show literature was capable of more.”

Predicting unpredictable crises has become the west’s great obsession in the 
21st century. It stumbled into the millennium on the back of two genocides, in 
Bosnia and Rwanda, that were later widely thought to have been preventable if 
the international community had responded with more resolute shows of force. It 
then rushed into a war in Afghanistan, and launched an ill-conceived 
intervention in Iraq, often riding roughshod over the advice of experts who had 
studied political division and sectarian conflicts on the ground.

The terrorist attack on New York’s twin towers that triggered the rush to 
Afghanistan is an example of what Nassim Nicholas Taleb described in his 2007 
book The Black Swan. “Black swan events” are rare, have an extreme impact and 
seem predictable – if only in retrospect. In a world becoming ever more 
interconnected, Taleb argued, such events were increasing exponentially.

The book would become a bestseller, not least because the unpredictable crises 
kept coming: the Lehman Brothers collapse in 2008, the European debt crisis in 
2009, the refugee crisis of 2015, Brexit and Trump in 2016, a global pandemic 
in 2020. Even when Covid-19 has been hemmed in, it seems inevitable that 
another crisis will follow. The only thing governments can do is try to 
anticipate which direction it will come from, and shovel resources in that 
direction in advance. “With the wisdom of hindsight” was the go-to excuse of 
the Bush and Blair era; the next generation of global leaders want to attain 
the gift of foresight.

To an extent, this is nothing new: giving warning of impending crises is what 
foreign intelligence agencies are meant to do. What is new is that information 
that was once accessible only to spies is now freely available online and can 
be openly harvested by other arms of state. Big data is where most governments 
of today hope to find the tea leaves that allow them to read the future. 
America and the Scandinavian countries lead the field in conflict prediction 
through machine learning. In Britain, the Alan Turing Institute is trying to 
harness AI to give policymakers advance warnings through its Global Urban 
Analytics for Resilient Defence – or Guard – project.

Germany, which had contributed to the Afghan war in only a modest capacity and 
stayed out of Iraq, has invested some £43m into figuring out if it can use data 
tools to predict international conflicts. It has set aside a further £2.6bn to 
expand the approach until 2025. The centrepiece of its attempt at geopolitical 
clairvoyance is a megadata management platform developed at Munich’s University 
of the German Federal Armed Forces. It is called Preview – a forced acronym for 
“Prediction, Visualisation, Early Warning” – overseen by Carlo Masala, a 
professor of international politics. Preview sucks up information that could 
give a hint about where on the planet a crisis is about to erupt: RSS feeds of 
news websites, data banks tracking military conflicts, civil protests or car 
bombs going off. Broader structural clues are thrown into the mix: GDP per 
capita, regional educational structures, climate change data.

All this raw information is fed into Watson, IBM’s artificial intelligence 
platform, which helps convert it into maps highlighting potential trouble 
spots: green indicates stability, orange highlights instability, red warns of a 
conflict on the verge of escalation. One German official says the AI prediction 
system had already given Angela Merkel’s government a few months’ warning of 
the rebel insurgency in Mozambique’s northern Cabo Delgado province, where 
security forces are battling with militants trying to set up an Islamic state. 
But the early warning system is still in development: the aim is to eventually 
be able to predict conflicts 12-18 months in advance.

Germany remains more wary than other nations of outsourcing strategic 
assessments to algorithms: “There are some analysts in the US who believe that 
AI can eventually replace human prognostics altogether – we don’t believe 
that,” says Masala, a lively and communicative German-Italianwho enjoys poking 
fun at his country’s earnest moralising on matters military on social media 
(his Twitter profile is a picture of Tyrion Lannister), Game Of Thrones’s 
permadrunk military strategist). “The algorithm may be able to do 84% of the 
work, but we see it as a support system for human analysts, not a replacement.”

Watson, the question-solving supercomputer that sits at the heart of Preview’s 
crisis prediction effort, takes a second to process 500 gigabytes, the 
equivalent of a million books. But Watson isn’t great at reading between the 
lines. A literature professor seemed perfectly placed to complement the 
computer’s linear skill set.

Even with his team of three researchers, the challenge Wertheimer had been set 
seemed overwhelming. “At the beginning of the project, we thought we’d spend 
most of our time sitting in libraries reading books,” recalls research 
assistant Florian Rogge.“But we realised quite quickly that there were simply 
too many books, written in languages we didn’t speak.”

The team considered text mining: scanning books for emotive words and phrases 
to build a cluster map of feelings associated with specific issues, 
geographical regions or political figures. They consulted the IT department. 
The problem was that text mining requires books to be digitised, with the 
researchers’ chosen search terms defined in advance. “It would have bulldozed 
over irony, ambivalence or metaphors, all the literary aspects we were 
interested in,” Rogge says. “We wanted the books to tell us something we didn’t 
already know.”

The group decided instead to focus on what it calls “literary infrastructure”: 
what happens around the text? How is it being received? “We became interested 
in what hit a nerve,” Rogge says. “Was a book heaped with awards and state 
prizes? Or was it banned and the author had to leave the country?” Kuwait, for 
example, saw a rise of novels about the situation of the stateless Bidoon 
minority after 2010. Many of them were censored or banned shortly after their 
publication, prefiguring the crackdown on Bidoon protesters in 2019.

Reading books in translation proved an inefficient way to pick up such trends. 
Rogge says he ended up skim-reading no more than 30 novels over the course of 
the project. Instead, Wertheimer’s team reached out to writers and literary 
critics in regions they were interested in. The response was surprisingly 
enthusiastic. The novelist Wole Soyinka sent links to articles in the Nigerian 
press and supplied contacts to other writers. Kosovar writer Beqë Cufaj 
organised a colloquium at his country’s embassy in Berlin. Hearings in Paris 
and Madrid were attended by novelists from Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Israel and 
France, most of whom volunteered to pay for their attendance out of their own 
pockets.

Our systems could already predict a conflict a year in advance. But five years 
– that was something new.

In 2018, weeks after the Bundeswehr officers had travelled to Tübingen, 
Wertheimer presented his initial findings at the defence ministry in Berlin. He 
drew attention to a literary scandal around Jovan Radulović’s 1983 play Dove 
Hole, about an Ustashe massacre against their Serbian neighbours, and the 
expulsion of non-Serbian writers from the Serbian Writers’ Association in 1986. 
In the years that followed, he showed, there was an absence of tales about 
Albanian-Serbian friendships or love stories, and a rise in revisionist 
historical novels. Literature and literary institutions, he told the military 
men, had “paved the way for war” a good decade before the start of the 
bloodshed of the Kosovo war in 1998.

Carlo Masala was at the presentation. “At the beginning, I thought: this is 
crazy shit,” he recalls. “It won’t fly.” But Masala, who had spent a part of 
his academic career studying the conflict in Bosnia, remembered how the 
hardening tensions in the regions had been preceded by a decline in interfaith 
marriages. “In Kosovo, it seemed, you could detect similar early warning signs 
in the literary scene.”

“It was a small project that created a surprising amount of useful results,” 
says one defence ministry official who attended the presentation. “Against our 
initial instincts, we were excited.”

In its bid for further government funding, Wertheimer’s team was up against 
Berlin’s Fraunhofer Institute, Europe’s largest organisation for applied 
research and development services, which had been asked to run the same pilot 
project with a data-led approach. Cassandra was simply better, says the defence 
ministry official, who asked to remain anonymous.

“Predicting a conflict a year, or a year and a half in advance, that’s 
something our systems were already capable of. Cassandra promised to register 
disturbances five to seven years in advance – that was something new.”

The German defence ministry decided to extend Project Cassandra’s funding by 
two years. It wanted Wertheimer’s team to develop a method for converting 
literary insights into hard facts that could be used by military strategists or 
operatives: “emotional maps” of crisis regions, especially in Africa and the 
Middle East, that measured “the rise of violent language in chronological 
order”.

They had the books; but how could they feed their findings into a machine?The 
challenge to bridge the intellectual divide between science and the humanities 
in the space of 12 months fell to Julian Schlicht, who was brought in to 
Project Cassandra in September 2019 to work out how literary criticism could be 
converted into data points. A 30-year-old student of politics, sociology and 
Islam studies who was researching the Taliban’s innovation strategies for his 
MA, he was the only member of the team without a background in literary studies.

“I was probably among the sceptics when I joined,” Schlicht says in hindsight. 
“Coming into this project with a background in politics, I thought their 
approach was… quite cheeky. There was a moment after the first meeting when I 
thought: how is this meant to work?”

Wertheimer’s researchers had become increasingly interested in Algeria, a 
country that had remained mostly silent during the Arab spring. Only 51.7% of 
voters in the north African country had turned out to vote in its 2014 
presidential election, suggesting political apathy or weariness, borne of 
violent memories of the civil war that shook the region in the 1990s: Algeria 
was broadly classified as a “stable” state.

Trends in Algerian book publishing, however, hinted that something was about to 
change beneath the surface. Amar Mezdad’s 2014 novel Yiwen Wass Deg Tefsut (“A 
Spring Day”) follows a group of people who join a demonstration that is 
violently dispersed. Saïd Sadi’s 1991 diary novel Algérie, L’Échec Recommence 
was reissued in the northern Algerian Kabylia region in 2015, revisiting the 
Berber spring of the 1980s. And there was Boualem Sansal’s 2015 novel 2084: La 
Fin Du Monde, an Orwell-referencing dystopia in which an Islamist dictator uses 
religion to control the language and minds of his people. A former high-ranking 
government official who has criticised the rise of political Islam in Algeria, 
Sansal’s books had been banned in his home country since 2006, but were still 
widely read – making this a prime example of literature’s ability to touch a 
nerve.

But turning these atmospheric signals into information that could be of use to 
military or political decision-makers proved a challenge. “We realised there 
was a clash between how someone from the humanities and a scientist would go 
about drawing up a map,” Schlicht recalls. “A cultural historian will say: my 
expertise tells me this region is red and that region yellow. A scientist, 
however, asks: how do we work out when the yellow region turns orange?”

The researchers developed a risk score system with nine indicators for each 
book: thematic reach, censorship of the text, censorship of the author, media 
response, scandals around the text, scandals around the author, literary awards 
for the author, literary awards for the the text, and narrative strategy. In 
each category, the book was assigned a score between –1 and +3: the higher the 
score, the more “dangerous” the text.

In some cases, negative scores were necessary. A book told from several 
perspectives, such as from two opposing enemy camps, was assigned zero or –1 
points in the narrative strategy category. Zoltán Danyi’s 2015 novel The 
Carcass Remover, for example, scored only 12 points, mainly because it 
reflected on the Yugoslav wars without using black-and-white depictions of 
heroes or villains. “We realised that literature can also help solve or lessen 
conflicts,” Schlicht says. “Not every book divides opinion.”

Dystopian fiction from Algeria scored much higher. Body Writingby Mustapha 
Benfodil, a 2018 collage novel made up of the diaries and scribbles of a 
fictional astrophysicist killed in a mysterious car accident on the day of the 
presidential election, spoke of the desire to create order out of the chaotic 
memories of the Algerian civil war in the 90s, expressing a yearning for 
democratic change. Twenty points, the Project Cassandra researchers decided.

Had the book had more impact, it would have scored higher: La Faille by 
Mohamed-Chérif Lachichi, a 2018 thriller portraying violence in Algerian 
prisons, a corrupt legal system and a growing protest movement, scored 22 
points because it represented a case of a well-known and widely reviewed author 
questioning the status quo. The highest-scoring work in the project’s 300-book 
data bank was Sansal’s 2084: Wertheimer’s team assigned it 25 points.

Project Cassandra’s scoring system had several flaws. Its indicators were 
malleable: should rave reviews or hatchet jobs contribute to a book’s score 
only when they were published in its country of origin? Was a book with 24 
points really twice as dangerous as a book with 12 points? Converting scores 
into emotional heat maps came with additional headaches: what does a dystopian 
Algerian novel set in a parallel universe really tell you about the different 
political allegiances of Algiers and Oran? “Translating literature into numbers 
is difficult; you constantly end up making compromises,” Rogge says. “You need 
to score a lot of books in order to even out the imprecisions.”

When Azerbaijan gave anti-Armenian books to Georgian libraries, the project 
predicted conflict. A year later, war broke out

But the literary seismograph’s instincts proved reliable. In February 2019, two 
years after Wertheimer’s team had identified Algeria as a region of interest, 
civil protests broke out in Algiers and several other cities, culminating in 
the resignation of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. When Wertheimer handed over 
his team’s findings in the summer of 2020, they met the defence ministry’s 
formal requirements for taking their methodology to the next level. Project 
Cassandra had established a tangible link between literature and empirical 
historical events. Plus the cancellation of trips and seminars because of the 
pandemic meant the study had come in almost £34,000 under budget.

A meeting with Operations Command was scheduled. “We all had our hopes up,” 
Holz remembers. “We couldn’t wait to apply our findings in the field.”

Then Wertheimer received a phone call. Project Cassandra would be discontinued 
in winter 2020.

In the fallout, some blamed the pandemic, which had placed unforeseen strain on 
government budgets. Others pointed the finger at the five-year reshuffle cycle 
for government posts, which meant one of the most supportive officers had been 
dispatched to Moscow and the new guard knew little about Cassandra’s original 
promise. Via official channels, the defence ministry is tight-lipped: 
“Retrospectively we like to emphasise how much we appreciated this innovative 
approach,” is all a spokesperson could say on the matter.

“Of course it was a massive blow, even more so because we hadn’t expected it,” 
Holz says. Behind the scenes, some officials remain baffled. Crisis prediction 
through literature, one says, would have been a “self-fulfilling success 
story”. It came with a free network of enthusiastic, expert volunteers, who 
could not only help identify conflicts several years in advance but provide 
diplomatic corps with the right counter-narratives to quell it. Perhaps, 
another official pondered, Project Cassandra was simply too good to be true, 
and would have risked showing up the more costly undertaking of data-driven 
programmes.

In the Greek myth, Cassandra’s warnings go unheeded because the Trojan 
priestess has been cursed by the god Apollo, angered after being turned down 
for sex. In Christa Wolf’s modern adaptation, the Trojan generals know she is 
speaking the truth, but ignore her regardless. “King Priam prefers to remain 
ignorant out of political calculation,” Wertheimer says. “I used to believe 
modern politicians were different, that they simply didn’t know better. It 
turns out they are much like their ancient counterparts: they prefer not to 
know.”

In one of his last reports to the defence ministry, towards the end of 2019, 
Wertheimer had drawn attention to an interesting development in the Caucasus. 
The culture ministry of Azerbaijan had recently supplied libraries in Georgia 
with books carrying explicit anti-Armenian messages, such as the works of poet 
Khalil Rza Uluturk. There were signs, he warned, that Azerbaijan was ramping up 
propaganda efforts in the brewing territorial conflict with its neighbouring 
former Soviet republic.

War broke out a year later: 6,000 soldiers and civilians died in a six-week 
battle over Nagorno-Karabakh, an enclave of Azerbaijan populated by ethnic 
Armenians. Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan used the war to bolster his 
strongman image, hailing Armenia’s defeat in December as a “glorious victory”. 
Russia, traditionally allied with Armenia, successfully leveraged the conflict 
to consolidate its influence in the region. Germany and the EU, meanwhile, 
looked on and stayed silent: being able to predict the future is one thing, 
knowing what to do with the information is another.

Wertheimer isn’t bitter about the end of Project Cassandra, he says: “I’m not a 
bitter person, only melancholy.” At any rate, the project may still have a 
future after all. The German interior ministry has commissioned his team to 
investigate the hidden scars of the country’s reunification process. There have 
been talks with the EU representative for foreign affairs and security policy, 
Josep Borrell, about docking Cassandra in Brussels. Wertheimer says he is 
interested in applying his method to analyse geopolitical tensions in Ukraine, 
Lithuania and Belarus.

Above his writing desk in Tübingen hangs a map of the world with travel visas 
pinned to the white spaces next to the continents. “Literature is at the centre 
of my life,” he says, “but only because I believe it can be a springboard into 
the real world.”
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