Folks,
I want to add two thoughts to this discussion. They both concern the
terminology of the "spheres of influence" and "imperialism".
I'm not a political scientist and presume that there are elaborate
debates about this elsewhere. What I notice in the current discussions
is that this narrative is frequently used to either justify, or explain,
the Russian military attack on Ukraine. (One tendency seems to be to
call the US "imperialist", whereas Russia appears to have understandable
security concerns, or is provoked to be worried about its security.)
I don't believe that such "spheres" (or empires) exist 'per se'; they
exist as powerful constructs, they are part of elaborate trade,
financial and military dependencies, but this "imperiological"
narrative, so long as it focuses on a supposed main imperial actor,
cannot really account for the aspect that some actors (in our case e.g.
the formerly socialist countries of central Europe) might actively
choose, if not desire the participation in such a set of relations (for
reasons of security, prosperity, freedom of travel and work for its
citizens, etc.).
The impression that Prem's analysis might be marred by the conceptual
limitations of "imperiology" is underscored by the fact that his
examples (anecdotal, but no doubt valid examples) relate only to the US.
The stories about Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan or Latin America would become
more complicated and perhaps inconsistent if they took the perspectives
of Turkey, France, Germany, Poland or Latvia into account. All of these
are NATO countries, but it is not easy to simply address them as "the
West". - I raise this point, because the discussion we are having here
is not only one on mechanics of geopolitics, but also on morals, and in
such a discussion it is important to keep the differences within such
sets of relations in mind.
My second point is that the imperiological narrative is itself a weapon
in this war (and other wars), in that it implies the claim for concerns
(or interests) that transgress national borders, and that therefore have
to be "dealt with" outside a country's own territory. The important
point is that as a general principle, the imperiological narrative
_legitates_ such actions (we are currently talking about the Russian
military attack on Ukraine, but this of course concerns all sorts of
other such "transgressions" that have been mentioned; a German version
of this was defence minister Peter Struck's claim in 2002 that "German
security is also being defended at the Hindukush").
I'm 'realist' enough to know that a potential threat by a neighbouring
or more distant country (or a non-state agent like IS or Al Qaida) can
be actual, or that it can really be felt - and thus become a reason for
action.
However, I also believe that it might be a step forward to work on the
delegitimation of the imperiological narrative by changing the
perspective, away from the apparent 'imperial' actors (like Russia, or
the US), and towards the interests and fears of the non-imperial actors
(like, in the current case, Ukraine, Latvia, Hungary, Moldova, and
others). [Perhaps it is the same conceptual gesture that feminisms make
to reddress gendered power relations?] What if the "empire" or "sphere
of influence" was a figment that, more than anybody, serves the
'imperial' actors who therefore try to uphold this narrative?
We have already heard here that it appears difficult to reconcile the
imperiological narrative with the legitimacy of the interest of "minor"
countries. What if the minoritarian perspective became the basis of the
mechanisms of legitimation in international relations? (If you now say,
"naa, impossible, get real", then you should consider that your
imperiological realism might in fact be part of the problem.)
Another advantage of such a move might be that we would, just perhaps,
be spared some of the senseless comparisons (also imperiological at
heart) that weigh one bombed city against another, and one occupied
country against another. All of these brutalities and destructions are
reprensible, and their comparison does not reduce anybody's burden -
existential or moral - that they bring.
Regards,
-a
Am 10.03.22 um 15:43 schrieb Prem Chandavarkar:
Hi Brian,
Good to hear from you and to be in an exchange of thoughts with you once
again.
My thoughts:
Let me start with your question on NATO’s eastward expansion. Yes - on
principle, one cannot deny the freedom of the Eastern European states to
choose their alliances. But the consequences must be dispassionately
assessed. Security could be on offer from an alliance toward the West,
but security concerns from Russia, as the military power to the East,
must be factored in the equation, particularly from the possibility of
their destabilising security. This was foreseen in the cable sent by
William Burns in 2008 which I cited in my previous email, where he
predicted that NATO expansion into Ukraine could provoke a military
invasion by Russia, even though such an invasion may not be Russia’s
first choice. So what is the net balance of security that is on offer in
such a situation? One must factor that NATO is an institution that is
primary to allowing the US to keep Europe within its sphere of
influence, the eastward expansion appears to spring from a blind belief
that Pax Americana is the inherent history of the world to come, and it
is necessary to account for the reaction that may be provoked from a
military power that has historically been viewed with hostility by the
Pax Americana project.
# distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission
# <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism,
# collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets
# more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l
# archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: [email protected]
# @nettime_bot tweets mail w/ sender unless #ANON is in Subject:
