Darren Reed wrote:
Dave Miner wrote:

...

Yes it is, otherwise customers will find themselves with Solaris systems that don't work when all of a sudden loopback RPC no longer functions. Further, while customers may be using zones and want IPFilter between them, above all else, by default it needs
to be backward compatible with today's environment.


Not that I care that much about this point, but you could conceivably provide default rulesets which provided exactly the current behavior and enable loopback filtering. The real issue, to me, is that it's incredibly clumsy to have to go muck with /etc/system and reboot if I want to use zones and filtering, which is clearly a very desirable model. This seems like a very high-priority RFE for IPFilter.


In making it easy to enable loopback filtering, it changes the nature of this choice from being a policy decision to something that can be more ad-hoc. I'm concerned about the nature of that from a security perspective - can it become too easy to accidently disable/enable?


I've heard several respected security thinkers take the position that ease-of-use for security features makes them more likely to be used effectively.

Do you view being able to enable/disable it via the driver's .conf file as being equally clumsy?


I'd rather put it in terms of what I'd think would be the user requirements:

- it should be easy for the user to make this selection in the context of other tasks they'd be doing to configure the filtering feature. It should be part of what they'd normally do to set other aspects of filtering policy.

- it must not require a reboot or similarly serious discontinuity of system services to take effect.

If you could meet those requirements putting it in /etc/system, or a driver .conf file, then I wouldn't necessarily care.

Dave
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