On Thu, 2006-05-11 at 12:25 -0400, Robert G. Brown wrote: > On Thu, 11 May 2006, Aaron Konstam wrote: > > > On Thu, 2006-05-11 at 09:51 -0400, Robert G. Brown wrote: > >> On Thu, 11 May 2006, Russell Harrison wrote: > >> > >>> must remember to hit "reply to all" > >> > >> :-) > >> > >> While we're accreting wish lists, let me add mine: > >> > >> 1) NM should to be able to manage keys and protocols (including WPA > >> and WPA-2, given that WEP is pretty much useless no matter how many bits > >> it has:-) without having to unlock the keyring. I know the > >> key-unlocking problem will soon be solved "outside" of NM per se, but > >> hey, the WEP key for myssid is preserved in e.g. > >> > >> P key > > .gconf/system/networking/wireless/networks/myssid > > > > This is interesting, since the WEP key requested is for 13 characters > > but the WEP key recoorded is only 10 characters. What is going on? > > > > However, my directories are 700 so only I can read it. > > This is a (smart) user choice, of course, but many users or new account > programs might create the tree 755 or whatever. And besides, as long as > it is stored even 700 in cleartext, using a "decryption" step via the > keyring is just silly. Either store it encrypted (only) or don't bother > encrypting it. I'm inclined toward having the choice -- a userspace 700 > DEFAULT security level on this part of the .gconf tree or at least all > files containing keys OR not storing the keys there at all and using > strict encryption. > > This isn't an obvious choice to make -- most users would probably be > just fine with the 700 option, especially for WEP keys. 64-bit WEP takes > anywhere from five minutes to an hour of passive monitoring to break in > the worst cases and WEP in general should never take anyone longer than > ten to twenty hours to break, regardless of key length (the weakness is > in the 24 bit initialization vector used in BOTH 64 and 128 bit WEP, > transmitted in cleartext, which lets people statistically analyze > traffic on easily discoverable broadcast SSID networks and deduce the > static shared key). Additional problems include its vulnerability to > man-in-the-middle attacks because of its lack of host authentication, > because most access points broadcast their ESSID, because tools like NM > can reconnect your network without warning so that you "think" you're > entering something into a secured encrypted channel not realizing that > you've reconnected to a new WAP and the remote password you are typing > is going out in cleartext (something that has happened to me already > more than once, or would have if I didn't use additional layers e.g. > ssh) and so on. > Your post is extremely interesting but leaves me with a question and a statement. Question: I thought I was using 13 character WEP passwd but the file in the .gconf records only a 10 character passwd. Why is this?
Now about locking. You choose a lock consistent with the security you want to have. I am satisfied to have a lock and deadbolt on my house but it is not completely secure. Someone would have to be crazy to spend 10 to 24 hours to crack mt WEP passwd. If I was a bank it would be different. I am not convinced yet that for the vast majority of users a 13 bit WEP passwd is not secure enough. I also agree removing the ESSID makes it harder to figure out what access point you are connected to. -- Aaron Konstam <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> _______________________________________________ NetworkManager-list mailing list [email protected] http://mail.gnome.org/mailman/listinfo/networkmanager-list
