NIN, Belgrade, Yugoslavia
Issue 2648, 28 September 2001
Target Belgrade
By STEVAN NIKSIC
Last week Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Nebojsa Covic was one of the
most frequently quoted domestic politicians because of exceptional
political activity in connection with the upcoming, controversial
elections in Kosovo and Metohija but even more because of warnings of
possible terrorist activities throughout Serbia made without any beating
around the bush.
NIN: Your statement regarding the threat of terrorist attacks in
Belgrade has gotten everyone pretty excited for obvious reasons. Are you
still of the same opinion?
I didn't make anything up. My warning was based on operational data from
the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP). They have a rough number of
about 100 people divided into smaller groups and trained for terrorist
activities. These men are born in Serbia; they know the Serbian language
well; and they are ready to carry out activities in cities throughout
Serbia for the sake of certain Albanian separatist and nationalist
goals. Belgrade MUP is aware of this and it is essential that we all
exercise proper caution due to what some crazy minds may be planning.
We are also approaching November 17, when elections for the parliament
of Kosovo and Metohija will be held; after them, it is possible that the
Albanian majority parliament will unilaterally declare the independence
of Kosovo. This possibility does not exist in UN Resolution 1244;
however, there are many other things not in the documents that have
occurred nevertheless. That is why it is necessary to exercise caution
because danger from terrorist activities certainly exists.
NIN: Do you mean only forms of terrorism that we have seen previously or
do you mean plans for some sort of spectacular activities such as those
in America?
I do not believe that terrorist activities such as those in America are
possible here. I think that we are talking primarily about conventional
forms of terrorism: the possibility of planting an explosive device in
crowded public place, under a car, on a road or railway track. Or the
assassination of certain individuals from the political establishment of
Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY); there have been
indications of this for months.
Terrorism has been present in our region for about ten years with the
most striking examples occurring in the south of Serbia until just
recently.
NIN: Recently we have seen a new wave of political and diplomatic
activity by the Belgrade governments represented, among other things, by
your activities at NATO headquarters in Brussels and the UN Security
Council in New York to which the Kosovo Albanian press has already
reacted with the claim that this is new Serbian aggression. Why are you,
too, now being denounced as an aggressor?
Of course, there is no aggression of any kind involved. However, the
reactions of the Albanian media in Kosovo and Metohija are the best
evidence that we are successful in diplomatic activities, from London,
Berlin and Brussels to New York and Washington. Our plan is completely
clear. It is based on something in which we had no choice and that is
Security Council Resolution 1244, the Rambouillet agreement and the
framework agreement for Kosovo. Even in this we found enough room to
protect the Serb national community in Kosovo and Metohija: in the first
phase, to ensure that those now living there are able to survive and in
the second phase, to provide that approximately 250,000 expelled and
displaced persons from Kosovo and Metohija return to their homes.
We are not prejudicing solutions with respect to the final status of
Kosovo. In this phase Kosovo is a protectorate of the international
community and after November 17 it will obviously be a limited autonomy
under the control of the international community.
Our approach is nothing like anything that our country has implemented
in the past that brought us to this position where the Albanians have
all the initiative. It gives enough room for a new Kosovo to be created
on a multiethnic basis; however, there can be no multiethnic Kosovo if
there is no freedom of movement, no safety and no members of other
national communities here.
Since UNMIK assumed power on June 20, 1999, ethnic cleansing of Serbs in
Kosovo has been obvious. Every year, ten to twelve thousand more Serbs
leave Kosovo. This process is still continuing. On the other hand, in
the past two years only 80 (yes, eighty!) Serbs out of 250,000 have
returned to Kosovo and Metohija; this is unacceptable. If you compare
this with Bosnia, where some 30,000 refugees returned in two years and
where this number, too, was considered to be too low and a sign of
failure, then what is it that we have happening here? In our plan and
program we propose a completely realistic concept of a multiethnic
Kosovo, in the first phase, according to the system of life in ethnic
communities next to each other and in the next phase, according to life
in mixed communities. Because right now we have a de facto situation
where the Albanian national community is concentrated throughout most of
the territory of Kosovo and Metohija while only small Serb enclaves
appear as dots or small oases completely surrounded by Albanians and
left without elementary necessities for life.
We are also expecting that after the elections there will certainly be a
necessity for talks between the FRY and Republic of Serbia governments
and the new government to be formed under the auspices of the
international community in Kosovo and Metohija. The fact that this did
not occur earlier is through no fault of the new democratic government
in Serbia because we were ready for talks but the Albanian political
representatives were not. They are still not able to control their most
extreme elements, which continue to perpetrate violence and are involved
in criminal activities to a very great degree.
NIN: Your plan for Kosovo and Metohija has never been published in its
entirety. Why?
You are aware that we published the complete plan for resolution of the
crisis in the south of Serbia, in the municipalities of Presevo,
Bujanovac and Medvedja. However, due to the high degree of sensitivity,
primarily among international subjects who have completely excluded
Belgrade and the FRY as partners in the resolution of the problem in
Kosovo and Metohija, it was determined that it is better for our plan
not to be published, at least for now. However, I think that we will
gradually find ourselves in the situation where this entire plan, too,
will be accessible to the public. In general, the key elements of the
plan are concerned with rebuilding confidence because the Serbian
national community - there is no need to hide this - does not have
confidence in the international peacekeeping forces in Kosovo and
Metohija.
If the exodus of Serbs is continuing; if two-thirds of the total number
of Serbs killed were killed from June 20, 1999 to the present day; if
two-thirds of the total number of Serbs and other non-Albanians
kidnapped were kidnapped after the arrival of KFOR and UNMIK; if
violence is continuing; freedom of movement has not been secured; no
plan for the integration of Serbs into the system under the auspices of
the international community has been formulated, then how can the Serb
people possibly have confidence in international peacekeeping and
military forces? Moreover, when you see the enormity of the ethnic
distance between the Serb and Albanian national communities, then you
can only conclude that it will take many years for things to get to the
point where we would like to see them.
Also clearly defined in this plan is a method for discovering all
perpetrators of crimes, both Serbs and Albanians, as well as a way of
discovering the fate of missing and kidnapped persons. However, we still
do not have all the necessary documentation on this, which is completely
unfair because everyone involved is a citizen of our country. 2,900
Albanians and 1,500 Serbs and other non-Albanians who are citizens of
this country have gone missing. Our plan also concerns itself with the
problem of biased national court decisions, since there are presently no
Serbian judges in Kosovo. It is a fact that some international judges
have arrived but there are very few of them, too. 44 Serbs are
imprisoned and it is obvious that the great majority of them are
innocent. Respected Serbs were simply accused of alleged crimes by
someone in order to apply additional pressure to carry out ethnic
cleansing and encourage the exodus of Serbs from this region. Not one
court decision in a case where the accused was a Serb was based on
material evidence and I am talking about court decisions that carry very
heavy sentences of 10, 15 and 20 years. All these decisions were made
exclusively on the basis of the testimonies of witnesses, Albanian
witnesses, whose testimony was orchestrated beforehand and who were
prepared to testify. This means that this was a clear strategy.
It is completely normal for Serbs to be in the police force in locations
where Serbs form the majority of the population, regardless of what that
police force is called. Serbia provided a list of 200 candidates for the
job but not one of them was accepted? What's going on? Former members of
the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), obviously a terrorist organization,
are being integrated into the new police force and this does not bother
anyone; but when they need to integrate former members of the MUP, this
bothers them. Of course, this is not a good approach.
In any case, we are attempting to turn the biggest problem in this
region into our greatest advantage, to create a new system in Kosovo
that is in accordance with European standards and norms. We do not want
to just sit and wait as some have been recommending.
NIN: The government in Belgrade has been saying the whole time that the
possible participation of the Serbs in the upcoming Kosovo elections
will depend on the actions of the international community, on the
creation of conditions where they can freely express their will.
However, obviously none of those expected conditions has been fulfilled
to the present day. Does this maybe mean that someone in the
international community really does not want the Serbs to participate in
those elections?
We will see if that is the case. This is the sort of problem where one
should not lose one's head and move too fast, even though we do not have
much time. It is very important that no one can say that we are to blame
for the failures of others. And that is why it was important that the
Serbs register. It is also important that we secure the verification of
at least one political subject representing the Serbs in Kosovo and
Metohija, and that is the Povratak (Return) coalition. Now it is the
international community's move.
NIN: Why do representatives of the international community in Kosovo and
Metohija act the way they do? Is it just a question of incompetence or
perhaps of ill intentions?
In my opinion the main reason is indecisiveness and further inertia, as
well as unwillingness to openly confront the violence occurring in
Kosovo. This irresponsible approach to the problem of violence carried
out by Albanian extremists and terrorists, of course, has been the cause
of many casualties. Why did the international community come to Kosovo?
To prevent the ethnic cleansing of the Albanians. And once it was there,
then it used Kosovo and the south of Serbia, too, as we saw for
ourselves, for further destabilization of the Milosevic regime. But
Milosevic is gone now.
NIN: It is obvious that the foreign troops in Kosovo are afraid and that
they want to avoid confrontation with the Albanian terrorists at any
price. Will a change in the dominant military philosophy in America
itself, where they are now beginning to realize that casualties are
unavoidable in the war against terrorists, perhaps have some influence
on the actions of the international forces in Kosovo, too?
Absolutely. It is obviously that the American approach with respect to
terrorism is undergoing a profound change. I think that we should not
miss out on this opportunity because what we have is a comprehensive
global coalition against terrorism. That means that we can no longer
have the situation where someone is a terrorist in New York but that the
same person is only an "extremist" over here or even a "freedom
fighter".
In general, it is completely clear that their governments were not
prepared to prevent ethnic, nationalistic, extremist and terrorist
violence against other national communities in Kosovo and Metohija even
at the price of casualties among their own troops and police. We know
how the disarmament of the KLA was conducted. It was not conducted at
all.
NIN: The man who is accused of planting the bomb under the Nis Express
bus was arrested, imprisoned in the American military base Bondsteel and
then allegedly escaped from prison. How do you interpret this?
I will tell you very openly. I have been to Bondsteel; Bondsteel is
escape-proof. You can only get out if someone lets you out. I have said
the same thing to KFOR generals and the people from UNMIK to their face,
quite bluntly. And now the former commander of the former Liberation
Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac from the south of Serbia, Ljirim
Jakupi, aka Nazi, who is presently imprisoned in Bondsteel, is supposed
to be released as well because allegedly his jail term is up! Why would
he be released? He needs to be transferred so he can be held accountable
for crimes he committed in the south of Serbia. You cannot have double
standards.
NIN: Has his extradition been formally requested?
Of course, and we provided complete documentation, too. That is why I am
expecting that he actually will be extradited because many people in the
world are slowly beginning to understand what we are talking about. The
UN Security Council discussed problems in Kosovo and Metohija for three
and a half hours.
NIN: Mr. Haekkerup described that discussion by the UN Security Council
in one way and you described in a different way. What, in fact, was the
outcome of the discussion?
I spoke for half an hour. Mr. Haekkerup spoke after me for half an hour.
I used facts, numbers and where I expressed criticism on certain issues
and problems that have not been resolved, I also proposed constructive
solutions and proposals how we can accomplish them, all within the
framework of Resolution 1244.
Mr. Haekkerup had a somewhat different story, a more general one.
After that we engaged in a discussion with ambassadors of the member
countries of the Security Council for two and a half more hours. Not one
of those ambassadors failed to express support for the necessity of
cooperation between the foreign factors in Kosovo and Metohija and the
FRY.
It is, therefore, completely logical to interpret this as the support of
the Security Council for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and our
approach. In the end, Mr. Haekkerup was forced to remove a number of
Albanian terrorists and extremists from the election ballot. He really
had to do this because there was great pressure. Is this a favorable
development for us or not? Albanian violence is becoming the key factor
of instability in the entire region of Southeastern Europe. This region
will be unable to embark upon a system of self-sustaining security until
we confront Albanian violence and terrorism, and that is a fact that
cannot be hidden any longer.
NIN: There have been some indications that the violence is gradually
spilling over into Montenegro, too. In your opinion, are these just
isolated incidents or is something far more serious going on?
We need to be very, very cautious with Albanian violence, extremism,
terrorism and nationalism because it has nothing to do with the
protection of Albanian human rights. If we Serbs were the bad guys for
the last 10 years, say we were because we did, in fact, have a bad
regime, the Macedonians were the good guys. So what happened to the
Macedonians? Obviously there are ambitions toward the creation of a
Greater Albania that is completely ethnically homogenous. This must be
stopped before it becomes a crisis in Montenegro tomorrow, a crisis in
Greece the day after.
We can only protect ourselves by joining European and global
developments, first and foremost, Partnership for Peace. The next step
is NATO. Other politicians may be afraid to say it but that is the
reality facing Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. And this
must not become the subject of our political games and squabbles. With
regard to this we must no longer split ranks into so-called patriots and
traitors.
Translated by S. Lazovic (Sep. 29, 2001)
Serbian News Network - SNN
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http://www.antic.org/
