'A long, difficult and dangerous campaign'
By Nick Cook, JDW Aerospace Consultant, London
US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld last week sought to dampen speculation of an all-out offensive against Afghanistan by saying that there would be no single co-ordinated "D-Day-style assault" on Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda terrorist network or the forces of the ruling Taliban regime. Instead, Rumsfeld warned, the US-led anti-terror campaign would be long, difficult and dangerous.
Rumsfeld's comments raise the spectre of a prolonged conflict, but they also point towards a careful double-edged strategy, analysts believe, comprising a comprehensive military build-up backed by a barely perceptible psychological operations offensive, designed to throw the enemy off-guard and to maximise the effects of US and allied military action when it takes place. This is hardly surprising, they add, given that psychological operations (Psyops) are an integral part of US information warfare (Infowar) strategy and Infowar is now an accepted part of US battle-planning.
The US Air Force (USAF) has established itself as the lead US service in information operations (IO). USAF IO is a complex and diverse field that includes electronic warfare, defence against cyber-attacks as well as offensive operations against enemy computer systems. Critically, however, it also includes Psyops.
Since its activation in 1993, the USAF's Information Warfare Center (AFIWC) at Kelly Air Force Base, Texas, has been transitioning its Infowar skills to USAF front-line units. USAF officials told Jane's Defence Weekly that Infowar needed to be viewed by senior officers within the service's major theatre commands as a tool they should rely on alongside more traditional 'warforms' to achieve their mission objectives. The extent to which the USAF is calling on its information warfare flights at this time remains unclear, but their deployment and use is inevitable, observers believe.
The absence of solid official information on USAF or allied deployments during the current campaign, in marked contrast to the widespread dissemination of the coalition order of battle in the 1990-91 military build-up against Iraq, also points towards a subtle strategy that from the outset includes Psyops – some would call it structured public relations – a number of analysts suggest.
Unlike the Gulf War and NATO's 1999 action against Yugoslavia, "there is no CNN factor to take into account this time around," one US defence official noted. The absence of a CNN-factor will aid certain kinds of operations and assist in the delivery of overwhelming surprise as soon as military action commences.
"In the [1990-91] Persian Gulf War and the Kosovo campaign you had target-rich environments - it was all a matter of priority," said Clark Murdock, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington-based think-tank. "In the case of Afghanistan, it's acquiring targets that's the difficulty. They have very few fixed targets of any real value." Such an environment favours the use of special forces operating in close conjunction with tactical air power, Murdock said.
The Gulf War combat experience of the UK's Special Air Service (SAS) is likely to prove invaluable in Afghanistan, he added. During that campaign, the SAS inserted several 30-person 'convoys', each comprising six fighting vehicles, a support vehicle and motorbikes, into the desert west of Baghdad.
Their primary mission was to locate Iraq's mobile 'Scud' ballistic missile launchers and to disrupt associated lines of communication. As forward air controllers, they worked closely with US tactical air power assets and relied heavily on helicopters for resupply. If the SAS and US special forces are to operate as effectively in Afghanistan, air power will play a crucial and close-knit role in their operations, analysts agree.
A US Army special operations aviation unit, capable of deep-penetration operations at night – the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment – is already believed to be in-theatre. The unit is equipped with AH-60L/MH-60K Pave Hawk covert infiltration/exfiltration helicopters and AH-6/MH-6 Little Bird scout/attack escorts (JDW 19 September). Already a very quiet helicopter, the AH-6/MH-6 is understood to have been upgraded to a six-blade main rotor configuration that cuts noise emissions further still.
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[End of non-subscriber extract.]
http://www.janes.com/defence/air_forces/news/jdw/jdw011002_1_n.shtml
By Nick Cook, JDW Aerospace Consultant, London
US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld last week sought to dampen speculation of an all-out offensive against Afghanistan by saying that there would be no single co-ordinated "D-Day-style assault" on Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda terrorist network or the forces of the ruling Taliban regime. Instead, Rumsfeld warned, the US-led anti-terror campaign would be long, difficult and dangerous.
Rumsfeld's comments raise the spectre of a prolonged conflict, but they also point towards a careful double-edged strategy, analysts believe, comprising a comprehensive military build-up backed by a barely perceptible psychological operations offensive, designed to throw the enemy off-guard and to maximise the effects of US and allied military action when it takes place. This is hardly surprising, they add, given that psychological operations (Psyops) are an integral part of US information warfare (Infowar) strategy and Infowar is now an accepted part of US battle-planning.
The US Air Force (USAF) has established itself as the lead US service in information operations (IO). USAF IO is a complex and diverse field that includes electronic warfare, defence against cyber-attacks as well as offensive operations against enemy computer systems. Critically, however, it also includes Psyops.
Since its activation in 1993, the USAF's Information Warfare Center (AFIWC) at Kelly Air Force Base, Texas, has been transitioning its Infowar skills to USAF front-line units. USAF officials told Jane's Defence Weekly that Infowar needed to be viewed by senior officers within the service's major theatre commands as a tool they should rely on alongside more traditional 'warforms' to achieve their mission objectives. The extent to which the USAF is calling on its information warfare flights at this time remains unclear, but their deployment and use is inevitable, observers believe.
The absence of solid official information on USAF or allied deployments during the current campaign, in marked contrast to the widespread dissemination of the coalition order of battle in the 1990-91 military build-up against Iraq, also points towards a subtle strategy that from the outset includes Psyops – some would call it structured public relations – a number of analysts suggest.
Unlike the Gulf War and NATO's 1999 action against Yugoslavia, "there is no CNN factor to take into account this time around," one US defence official noted. The absence of a CNN-factor will aid certain kinds of operations and assist in the delivery of overwhelming surprise as soon as military action commences.
"In the [1990-91] Persian Gulf War and the Kosovo campaign you had target-rich environments - it was all a matter of priority," said Clark Murdock, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington-based think-tank. "In the case of Afghanistan, it's acquiring targets that's the difficulty. They have very few fixed targets of any real value." Such an environment favours the use of special forces operating in close conjunction with tactical air power, Murdock said.
The Gulf War combat experience of the UK's Special Air Service (SAS) is likely to prove invaluable in Afghanistan, he added. During that campaign, the SAS inserted several 30-person 'convoys', each comprising six fighting vehicles, a support vehicle and motorbikes, into the desert west of Baghdad.
Their primary mission was to locate Iraq's mobile 'Scud' ballistic missile launchers and to disrupt associated lines of communication. As forward air controllers, they worked closely with US tactical air power assets and relied heavily on helicopters for resupply. If the SAS and US special forces are to operate as effectively in Afghanistan, air power will play a crucial and close-knit role in their operations, analysts agree.
A US Army special operations aviation unit, capable of deep-penetration operations at night – the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment – is already believed to be in-theatre. The unit is equipped with AH-60L/MH-60K Pave Hawk covert infiltration/exfiltration helicopters and AH-6/MH-6 Little Bird scout/attack escorts (JDW 19 September). Already a very quiet helicopter, the AH-6/MH-6 is understood to have been upgraded to a six-blade main rotor configuration that cuts noise emissions further still.
652 of 908 words
| A
US Navy HH-60H lands to recover downed aircrew during Exercise 'Desert
Rescue IX' in June. Special operations aircraft are likely to play an
important role in anti-terrorist operations (Source: T Ripley) |
[End of non-subscriber extract.]
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