What comes after bombing Afghanistan? Tuesday, October 30, 2001 - Page A20 http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentEditorials Steady as she goes, the long-term objective is clear, and slowly but surely we're getting there. Such is the collective reply of the U.S. administration and the British government to the worried chorus of criticism arising from the bombing of Afghanistan, now in its fourth week. These are early days in a hugely complex conflict likely to last years, and it is a fair response. But it should not preclude asking of the Pentagon: How long will this bombing last, and what will follow it? The attack on Afghanistan, designed to crush Osama bin Laden and his Taliban friends, is a necessary evil for which scores of innocent Afghan civilians have already paid the price. Global stability demanded such an assault. Failing to respond militarily to the Sept. 11 terror attacks would have all but guaranteed further mass atrocities by Mr. bin Laden and his holy warriors. Along with the rest of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Canada signed on for this mission because it had no choice. Moreover, three weeks is a relatively short time for a mass bombing campaign. When NATO forces attacked Serb military forces in Kosovo in 1999, the air assault lasted 78 days. Ousting Iraq from Kuwait in 1991 was preceded by ferocious bombing that went on for six weeks. The key difference between then and now is that both earlier conflicts had readily discernible, short-term goals. As with Afghanistan, the basis of launching military action was the need to oust unpleasant, totalitarian regimes that most of the world deemed unacceptably dangerous. But in both Kosovo and Kuwait, viable political players were waiting in the wings to take, or reassume, power. With Afghanistan, the largest headache for the United States and its allies is the vacuum that will immediately arise if and when the ruling Taliban clique is vanquished. Afghanistan does have a government-in-waiting, in the Northern Alliance guerrillas who used to constitute the Afghan government and to whom the United States is now lending strategic help. Yet, as most acknowledge, tribal loyalties in Afghanistan ensure that simply reinstalling the Northern Alliance, fiercely opposed by Pakistan's government, would be a surefire recipe for long-term upheaval. More than once, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell has stressed the need for a postwar coalition government drawn from all sectors of Afghan society, including moderate Taliban elements. That's easier said than done. What seems clear is that as the bombing continues, the law of diminishing returns has set in. There was never much to bomb in Afghanistan, ruined by decades of civil war. Now there is less still, and any hopes that al-Qaeda and the Taliban would be intimidated into surrendering appear to have been firmly dashed. The civilian deaths, meanwhile, are fuelling anti-U.S. sentiment across the region. So what next? A massive U.S. ground invasion? A long series of clandestine, highly specialized commando operations? A lengthy pause in the bombing to accommodate winter and the dire needs of Afghanistan's several million displaced people? All these options pose tremendous difficulties. But so does the highly uncertain status quo. No one expects Washington to show all its cards. But some better indication of where it believes this all leads, and by what means, is becoming increasingly necessary. Serbian News Network - SNN [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.antic.org/
