Where does US intelligence go from here - and were they really to
blame?
Amid widespread domestic criticism of its failure to identify and counter the recent terrorist attacks, US intelligence agencies are coming under increasing pressure to explain their apparent inability to deal with Islamic extremist activity on American soil. The key debate revolves around the question of whether these incidents were preventable. JID's leading expert on Western intelligence warns that similar failures are all too likely in the future unless there is fundamental reform.
At the risk of stating the all-too-obvious, the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington are proof of very serious shortcomings in the operational methods and intelligence-gathering capabilities of the various US agencies. However, there was no shortage of advance warnings of these problems. In the first JID of this year, it was pointed out that "the real focus of intelligence operations should be the few wealthy non-state actors ... (such as Japan's Aum cult or the followers of Osama bin Laden)" (see JID 12 January 2001).
However, although there was clear evidence that Bin Laden and his Al-Qa'eda network were capable of both planning and executing major acts of terrorism against US targets (notably the provable link with the suicide bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen last year), there appears to have been a remarkable reluctance to commit resources to gather reliable intelligence on those suspected of having links - however distant - with Al-Qa'eda or allied Islamic fundamentalist organisations in Algeria, Egypt and elsewhere.
As one very well-informed source close to US intelligence told JID, "The main problem is not a lack of information - that comes in all the time - but that we simply don't have sufficient skilled operatives capable of analysing the intelligence we receive in a timely manner and identifying those who pose a real risk to our interests."
According to some analysts, at the time of the suicide attacks on 11 September, the US intelligence agencies did not have a single competent speaker of Pushto - the language of the Taliban - on active service. Local intelligence agents on the ground in the 90% of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban are believed to have been similarly lacking, despite Bin Laden's presence on the FBI's 'Most Wanted' list for several years.
However, some of JID's informed sources have also suggested that previous plans to capture or kill the Al-Qa'eda chief, which were supported by Moscow, had been shelved by the previous US administration on the grounds that they might end in humiliating failure and loss of US service personnel (see JID 21 September 2001). As one of our sources put it: "Before the latest catastrophe there was a distinct lack of political will to resolve the Bin Laden problem and this had a negative impact on wider intelligence operations."
JID's investigations indicate that although there were financial aspects involved in the failure to develop an efficient covert penetration of Al-Qa'eda and its support network, the fundamental problems were linked more to a political reluctance to take decisive action during the Clinton era, mainly because of a fear that it might derail the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, combined with a general complacency in Washington towards warnings that the USA itself (as opposed to US facilities and personnel abroad) might be targeted.
Given the particular structure of Al-Qa'eda's terror cells, it was very unlikely that a Western intelligence agent could ever have penetrated such a group. Their members are often related by blood or tribal origins, so the only practical option would have been to 'turn' one of the existing or prospective members - a near impossible task given the fanatical devotion such suicide bombers have to their cause.
However, developing a network of native Pushto-speaking informants in Afghanistan itself should not have been an impossible task given the unpopularity of the regime amongst many ordinary Afghans and the desperate poverty of those sheltering in refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran. If this was not attempted by Western intelligence agencies - and the evidence certainly suggests that it wasn't - then one must ask why. US intelligence was very active in Afghanistan during the Soviet era, not least among the anti-Soviet mujahidin groups, which at that time included one Osama Bin Laden.
There has been considerable debate in the Western media over the shift from human intelligence-gathering to electronic and satellite methods. In part, such criticism is justified. The sheer volume of communications intercepts, even when using systems such as the Echelon monitoring network, make it far easier to gather information after an act of terror has taken place. This often involves little more than old-fashioned police techniques.
Preventative intelligence, however, requires significantly greater investment, most noticeably in terms of skilled personnel who are capable of interpreting material and deciding which of the many warnings received each day represent a real and credible threat. Contrary to popular fantasy, fuelled by the image portrayed in movies of the James Bond genre, a career in most Western intelligence services is not overly well paid and often involves tedious, routine analysis of low-level material. As one renegade intelligence officer observed, "Ninety per cent of the work I did involved probably the most boring tasks I have ever performed in my life." It is not hard to see why many able high-fliers wouldn't even consider a career in intelligence.
Reform of such a system will take time, and that is something of which the West is running short. After the attacks on the USA it is easy to see why some pundits have passed the blame to the intelligence services. Our investigations suggest that a lack of political will in the past was the real problem.
931 of 3105 words
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Amid widespread domestic criticism of its failure to identify and counter the recent terrorist attacks, US intelligence agencies are coming under increasing pressure to explain their apparent inability to deal with Islamic extremist activity on American soil. The key debate revolves around the question of whether these incidents were preventable. JID's leading expert on Western intelligence warns that similar failures are all too likely in the future unless there is fundamental reform.
At the risk of stating the all-too-obvious, the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington are proof of very serious shortcomings in the operational methods and intelligence-gathering capabilities of the various US agencies. However, there was no shortage of advance warnings of these problems. In the first JID of this year, it was pointed out that "the real focus of intelligence operations should be the few wealthy non-state actors ... (such as Japan's Aum cult or the followers of Osama bin Laden)" (see JID 12 January 2001).
However, although there was clear evidence that Bin Laden and his Al-Qa'eda network were capable of both planning and executing major acts of terrorism against US targets (notably the provable link with the suicide bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen last year), there appears to have been a remarkable reluctance to commit resources to gather reliable intelligence on those suspected of having links - however distant - with Al-Qa'eda or allied Islamic fundamentalist organisations in Algeria, Egypt and elsewhere.
As one very well-informed source close to US intelligence told JID, "The main problem is not a lack of information - that comes in all the time - but that we simply don't have sufficient skilled operatives capable of analysing the intelligence we receive in a timely manner and identifying those who pose a real risk to our interests."
According to some analysts, at the time of the suicide attacks on 11 September, the US intelligence agencies did not have a single competent speaker of Pushto - the language of the Taliban - on active service. Local intelligence agents on the ground in the 90% of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban are believed to have been similarly lacking, despite Bin Laden's presence on the FBI's 'Most Wanted' list for several years.
However, some of JID's informed sources have also suggested that previous plans to capture or kill the Al-Qa'eda chief, which were supported by Moscow, had been shelved by the previous US administration on the grounds that they might end in humiliating failure and loss of US service personnel (see JID 21 September 2001). As one of our sources put it: "Before the latest catastrophe there was a distinct lack of political will to resolve the Bin Laden problem and this had a negative impact on wider intelligence operations."
JID's investigations indicate that although there were financial aspects involved in the failure to develop an efficient covert penetration of Al-Qa'eda and its support network, the fundamental problems were linked more to a political reluctance to take decisive action during the Clinton era, mainly because of a fear that it might derail the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, combined with a general complacency in Washington towards warnings that the USA itself (as opposed to US facilities and personnel abroad) might be targeted.
Given the particular structure of Al-Qa'eda's terror cells, it was very unlikely that a Western intelligence agent could ever have penetrated such a group. Their members are often related by blood or tribal origins, so the only practical option would have been to 'turn' one of the existing or prospective members - a near impossible task given the fanatical devotion such suicide bombers have to their cause.
However, developing a network of native Pushto-speaking informants in Afghanistan itself should not have been an impossible task given the unpopularity of the regime amongst many ordinary Afghans and the desperate poverty of those sheltering in refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran. If this was not attempted by Western intelligence agencies - and the evidence certainly suggests that it wasn't - then one must ask why. US intelligence was very active in Afghanistan during the Soviet era, not least among the anti-Soviet mujahidin groups, which at that time included one Osama Bin Laden.
There has been considerable debate in the Western media over the shift from human intelligence-gathering to electronic and satellite methods. In part, such criticism is justified. The sheer volume of communications intercepts, even when using systems such as the Echelon monitoring network, make it far easier to gather information after an act of terror has taken place. This often involves little more than old-fashioned police techniques.
Preventative intelligence, however, requires significantly greater investment, most noticeably in terms of skilled personnel who are capable of interpreting material and deciding which of the many warnings received each day represent a real and credible threat. Contrary to popular fantasy, fuelled by the image portrayed in movies of the James Bond genre, a career in most Western intelligence services is not overly well paid and often involves tedious, routine analysis of low-level material. As one renegade intelligence officer observed, "Ninety per cent of the work I did involved probably the most boring tasks I have ever performed in my life." It is not hard to see why many able high-fliers wouldn't even consider a career in intelligence.
Reform of such a system will take time, and that is something of which the West is running short. After the attacks on the USA it is easy to see why some pundits have passed the blame to the intelligence services. Our investigations suggest that a lack of political will in the past was the real problem.
931 of 3105 words
[End of non-subscriber extract.]
The full version of this article is accessible through our subscription services. Please refer to the box below for details.
http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/jid/jid270901_1_n.shtml
