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http://www.philly.com/mld/dailynews/news/opinion/3716714.htm?template=contentModules/printstory.jsp
The Philadelphia Daily News
Posted on Tue, Jul. 23, 2002
U.S. IS FROM MARS, EUROPE IS FROM VENUS
By DANIEL PIPES
WHATEVER THE current burning issue - trade with Iran, war with Iraq, support for Israel, building a missile defense system,,
acceptance of the International Criminal Court - Americans and West Europeans often find themselves on opposite sides of the
argument.
Americans tend to dismiss the Europeans as soft-minded appeasers lacking moral fiber or strategic vision. In turn, Europeans
depict Americans as cowboys under the sway of a "culture of death."
These attitudes tend to be seen as immutable facts of life, arising out of the respective national characters. But these differences
are hardly permanent. Two centuries ago, when Americans acted cautiously around the tough-guy Europeans, the roles were
roughly reversed.
Today's attitudes, Robert Kagan writes in a brilliant analysis in the current issue of the Hoover Institution's Policy Review, reflect
deeper realities - in particular, two post-1945 developments so momentous they tend to go unnoted.
Europe is weak. For 500 years before 1945, Europe dominated the world. Tiny Portugal and Holland took turns ruling the seas.
Mid-sized Britain and France built global empires. But that was then.
Today, the European Union spends far more money on social problems than on arms. It is a military pygmy that lacks the ability
to project force or even handle a minor problem in its own neighborhood (like the Balkans).
In contrast, Americans have continued huge investments in defense, creating a true superpower that no other state can
challenge. "In military terms there is only one player on the field that counts," says Paul Kennedy of Yale.
This huge gap in capabilities causes Europeans and Americans to approach problems very differently. In their strength,
Americans predictably see it as normal and legitimate to use force against enemy states such as Iraq. In their weakness,
Europeans no less predictably find this approach worrisome and even immoral.
Europe is postmodern. For the 80 years before 1945, the demon of German aggression haunted Europe, causing two world wars.
Then, through a lengthy process of negotiation, multilateralism, building of commercial ties and application of international law,
the Europeans engineered what Kagan calls "perhaps the greatest feat of international politics ever achieved" by integrating
Germany into a peaceable Western European state system.
Europeans widely congratulated themselves on a historical breakthrough and concluded that their future global mission was to
develop a "postmodern system" that resolves problems without even the hint of force. (They conveniently forgot that this
transformation was made possible only because the U.S. defeated Germany.) They aspire, Kagan argues, to replicate their
success on a global scale by taming a North Korea or an Iraq as they did Germany.
From this vantage point, American use of force challenges the universal validity of Europe's soft approach. Worse, if the European
methods of cajoling and paying off adversaries do not always work - as they clearly do not - this suggests that Europe's own hope
for perpetual peace may be illusory. The European Union's highly emotional reaction to American use of force derives in large
part, then, from its horror at facing war again in Europe.
The differences, in brief, are stark: Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus. Europeans spend their money on
social services, Americans continue to devote large sums to the military. Europeans draw lessons from their successful
pacification of post-1945 Germany; Americans draw lessons from their defeat of Nazi Germany and the Soviet bloc.
Kagan's insights have important implications:
. U.S.-European differences are not transitory but long-term.
. They are likely to grow with time.
. Europe is highly unlikely to develop a military power to rival America's.
. As Europe settles into strategic irrelevance, Americans need pay it less and less attention.
. because we so predominates, we should make gestures to win European goodwill.
. NATO is little more than a shell.
. Americans should look to countries outside Europe (Turkey, Israel, and India come to mind) for military alliances.
Daniel Pipes (www.DanielPipes.org) is director of the Middle East Forum.
The Philadelphia Daily News
Posted on Tue, Jul. 23, 2002
U.S. IS FROM MARS, EUROPE IS FROM VENUS
By DANIEL PIPES
WHATEVER THE current burning issue - trade with Iran, war with Iraq, support for Israel, building a missile defense system,,
acceptance of the International Criminal Court - Americans and West Europeans often find themselves on opposite sides of the
argument.
Americans tend to dismiss the Europeans as soft-minded appeasers lacking moral fiber or strategic vision. In turn, Europeans
depict Americans as cowboys under the sway of a "culture of death."
These attitudes tend to be seen as immutable facts of life, arising out of the respective national characters. But these differences
are hardly permanent. Two centuries ago, when Americans acted cautiously around the tough-guy Europeans, the roles were
roughly reversed.
Today's attitudes, Robert Kagan writes in a brilliant analysis in the current issue of the Hoover Institution's Policy Review, reflect
deeper realities - in particular, two post-1945 developments so momentous they tend to go unnoted.
Europe is weak. For 500 years before 1945, Europe dominated the world. Tiny Portugal and Holland took turns ruling the seas.
Mid-sized Britain and France built global empires. But that was then.
Today, the European Union spends far more money on social problems than on arms. It is a military pygmy that lacks the ability
to project force or even handle a minor problem in its own neighborhood (like the Balkans).
In contrast, Americans have continued huge investments in defense, creating a true superpower that no other state can
challenge. "In military terms there is only one player on the field that counts," says Paul Kennedy of Yale.
This huge gap in capabilities causes Europeans and Americans to approach problems very differently. In their strength,
Americans predictably see it as normal and legitimate to use force against enemy states such as Iraq. In their weakness,
Europeans no less predictably find this approach worrisome and even immoral.
Europe is postmodern. For the 80 years before 1945, the demon of German aggression haunted Europe, causing two world wars.
Then, through a lengthy process of negotiation, multilateralism, building of commercial ties and application of international law,
the Europeans engineered what Kagan calls "perhaps the greatest feat of international politics ever achieved" by integrating
Germany into a peaceable Western European state system.
Europeans widely congratulated themselves on a historical breakthrough and concluded that their future global mission was to
develop a "postmodern system" that resolves problems without even the hint of force. (They conveniently forgot that this
transformation was made possible only because the U.S. defeated Germany.) They aspire, Kagan argues, to replicate their
success on a global scale by taming a North Korea or an Iraq as they did Germany.
From this vantage point, American use of force challenges the universal validity of Europe's soft approach. Worse, if the European
methods of cajoling and paying off adversaries do not always work - as they clearly do not - this suggests that Europe's own hope
for perpetual peace may be illusory. The European Union's highly emotional reaction to American use of force derives in large
part, then, from its horror at facing war again in Europe.
The differences, in brief, are stark: Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus. Europeans spend their money on
social services, Americans continue to devote large sums to the military. Europeans draw lessons from their successful
pacification of post-1945 Germany; Americans draw lessons from their defeat of Nazi Germany and the Soviet bloc.
Kagan's insights have important implications:
. U.S.-European differences are not transitory but long-term.
. They are likely to grow with time.
. Europe is highly unlikely to develop a military power to rival America's.
. As Europe settles into strategic irrelevance, Americans need pay it less and less attention.
. because we so predominates, we should make gestures to win European goodwill.
. NATO is little more than a shell.
. Americans should look to countries outside Europe (Turkey, Israel, and India come to mind) for military alliances.
Daniel Pipes (www.DanielPipes.org) is director of the Middle East Forum.
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