http://www.chroniclesmagazine.org/News/Trifkovic/NewsViews.htm
OBITUARY OF ALIJA IZETBEGOVIC
by Srdja Trifkovic
October 22, 2003
Alija Izetbegovic, the leader of the Muslim faction in the three-cornered
ethnic and religious war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-1995) died in Sarajevo
on October 19 at the age of 78.
Izetbegovic was born in 1925 in the northern Bosnian town of Bosanski Samac
into a family of impoverished Ottoman aristocrats (beys) whose identity was
not �Bosnian� except as a social-geographic fact. His father, an accountant,
moved the family to Sarajevo in the 1930s, where Izetbegovic completed his
primary and high school education, and�after World War II�the law school.
A devout Muslim from his early years, Izetbegovic was 16 when Yugoslavia was
invaded in 1941 and Bosnia-Herzegovina handed over to the newly-proclaimed
�Independent State of Croatia.� Like many Muslims Izetbegovic avoided
identifying himself either with the Ustasa regime and its anti-Serb
atrocities or with the two resistance movements, Royalist Chetniks and
Communist Partisans, whose rank-and-file was overwhelmingly Serb. He was
sympathetic to the Nazi-sponsored campaign to assert a �Bosniak� Muslim
identity, however, and in 1943 joined the Young Muslims, and organization
sponsored by El Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, that provided
thousands of volunteers for the 13th SS Hanjar (�sword�) division composed
solely of Bosnian Muslims. Izetbegovic�s wartime activities earned him a
three-year jail sentence from Tito�s victorious Partisans; that was not to
be his last spell in prison, however.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s Izetbegovic was a well-known and respected
figure among the Islamist-minded Muslim intellectuals. His reputation was
enhanced by the publication, in 1970, of the Islamic Declaration, a pamphlet
that earned him a second jail term some years later. The Declaration
advocated Islamic moral and religious renewal, and political and armed
struggle for the establishment of an Islamic polity: �The Islamic movement
must, and can, take over power as soon as it is morally and numerically so
strong that it can not only destroy the existing non-Islamic power, but also
build up a new Islamic one.� Its author asserted the �incompatibility
between Islam and non-Islamic systems. There is no peace or coexistence
between the Islamic faith and non-Islamic social and political
institutions.� Izetbegovic��s disdain for �Western� values was particularly
evident in his dismissal of the Kemalist tradition: �Turkey as an Islamic
country used to rule the world; Turkey as an imitation of Europe is a
third-rate country the like of which there is a hundred in the world.� He
accepts the �achievements of Euro-American civilization�, but only in the
sphere of �science and technology.� True to the shari�a-based �Pact of
Umar,� he allows that the non-Muslims may have religious rights within an
Islamic state�but only �on condition that they are loyal.� His goal is umma,
the creation of a single Muslim polity, �religious, cultural and political,
since �Islam is not a nationality, but it is the supra-nationality of this
community.� This �united Islamic community� will rang �from Morocco to
Indonesia.�
Izetbegovic came to national prominence as a political leader of Bosnia�s
Muslims in early 1990, when the break-up of the League of Communists set the
stage for multi-party elections in Yugoslavia�s six federal republics. In
Bosnia-Herzegovina dozens of new parties came into being, but only three of
them mattered�all three organized firmly along ethnic, that is,
national-confessional lines. The Muslims led the field with the
establishment, in March 1990, of Stranka Demokratske Akcije - SDA (Party of
Democratic Action), with Izetbegovic at its helm. At first some Muslims
expected that the SDA could represent the interests of their community
without becoming �Islamist,� but Izetbegovic firmly promoted a clerical
line. One of the founders of the SDA, Adil Zulfikarpasic�, who wanted the
party to be �a civic, liberal organization,� was sharply rebuked by
Izetbegovic�, who told him that �five hundred imams� would play a key role
in it.
At the first multiparty election (fall 1990) the three nationalist parties
were absolute winners. In the Assembly in Sarajevo, of 240 seats the Muslim
SDA won 86 seats, the Serb SDS took 72 seats and the Croat HDZ 44. The three
parties soon agreed on a power-sharing arrangement. Izetbegovic� was elected
President of a seven-member, multi-ethnic rotating presidency; a Croat took
the post of prime minister and a Serb the presidency of the Assembly.
Those three parties represented real, traditional national diversity as
against a Yugoslav-Titoist synthetic, composite identity. After almost five
decades of Communism this was a blast of fresh air; it was not necessarily
the precursor of war. It was a natural response to the decay of communist
authority. Had Yugoslavia not been breaking up in 1991-92, this emphasis on
traditional identities would have passed as a natural democratic
readjustment to reality. The parties representing Serbs, Croats, and Muslims
were not simply in coalition; they were natural allies while Bosnia remained
at peace�although they would become just as natural enemies if Yugoslavia
were to fall apart.
Izetbegovic was a man of strong character and deep convictions. He was a
sincere opponent of secularism and an advocate of Shari�a law and political
Islam. But while he was a pan-Islamist in global terms, once he assumed the
Presidency he started acting locally as a strictly �Bosniak� nationalist,
claiming, for instance, that the Muslims were a nation with a separate
language. He also asserted that for �almost a thousand years Bosnia has
existed as a distinct political entity.� While devoid of any basis in
reality, this claim was meant to foster Bosnian-Muslim nationalist identity.
At the same time he presented a pluralist face to the West, using the
rhetoric of of multi-ethnic and multi-confessional coexistence. The Islamic
Declaration was reprinted in Sarajevo in 1990 with Izetbegovic�s approval,
indicating that he had not abandoned the positions dating back to 1970 or
even earlier. The Serbs and Croats of Bosnia have been censured by some
media in the West for insisting that Izetbegovic should be taken seriously
as an Islamist. In fact there is no community in Europe where such opinions
as his would not cause extreme concern.
Izetbegovic faced a dilemma after the elections of 1990 regarding the future
constitutional arrangements for Yugoslavia, and Bosnia�s place in it.
Earlier in that year nationalist forces had already triumphed in Slovenia
and Croatia. In December Slobodan Milos�evic��s Socialist Party of Serbia
gained an overwhelming victory in Serbia�s elections. The media in different
federal republics had been busy pursuing openly nationalist themes, and the
politicians were never far behind. In the referendum held in December 1990
the Slovenes voted for an independent and sovereign state. By March 1991
Slovenia was no longer sending conscripts to the federal army.
On 25 June 1991 Slovenia and Croatia declared independence, a move that
triggered off a short war in Slovenia and a sustained conflict in Croatia.
These events had profound consequences on Bosnia and Herzegovina, that
�Yugoslavia in miniature.� The three parties managed for most of 1991 to
cooperate in the power-sharing exercise, but by the end of that year they
all had their separate agendas and concerns. The Serbs adamantly opposed the
idea of Bosnian independence. The Croats predictably rejected any suggestion
that Bosnia and Herzegovina remains within a Serb-dominated rump Yugoslavia.
As for Izetbegovic�, already in September 1990 he argued that
Bosnia-Herzegovina should also declare independence if Slovenia and Croatia
secede: �If necessary, the Muslims will defend Bosnia with arms.� The moment
that Izetbegovic declared he would not remain in a Yugoslavia without
Croatia he made the Republic a hostage to events outside its boundaries, and
war became a near-certainty. On 27 February 1991 he went a step further by
declaring in the Assembly: �I would sacrifice peace for a sovereign
Bosnia-Herzegovina, but for that peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina I would not
sacrifice sovereignty.�
Rising inter-ethnic tensions in the summer of 1991 were aggravated by
Izetbegovic��s burgeoning contacts with the Islamic world. In July 1991,
during a visit to Turkey, he put in a request for Bosnia to join the
Organization of Islamic Countries�without consulting his coalition partners,
and in spite of the fact that it had a Muslim plurality, but certainly not a
majority.
Some Muslims were concerned by what they perceived as Izetbegovic�s
fatalistic acceptance of huge risks in pursuit of independence.
Zulfikarpas�ic� went to see Izetbegovic� in mid-July 1991, and obtained his
agreement that he should contact the Serb leaders and negotiate with them on
future constitutional arrangements. The result was �the Belgrade Initiative�
providing for a Serb-Muslim power sharing arrangement. It was immediately
rejected by Izetbegovic�, however. To this day, Zulfikarpas�ic� remains
convinced that a unique chance to secure peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina had
been lost, and he places the responsibility firmly on Izetbegovic.
A key development that escalated tensions occurred during the night of
October 14-15, when Izetbegovic's deputies joined forces with the
Bosnian-Croat HDZ to push through the Assembly a �memorandum� proclaiming
sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina, paving the way for its formal
secession from Yugoslavia. The vote was taken in spite of Serb protests, SDS
deputies having walked out, and by a simple majority although two-thirds of
deputies' votes were required by the Constitution. By that time the question
of Bosnia and Herzegovina had become internationalized. In September the EC
organized a peace conference under the chairmanship of Lord Carrington.
Attached to the Conference was an arbitration commission headed by the
French constitutional lawyer Robert Badinter who was to rule on recognition
claims by Yugoslav republics. At that time it was assumed that any
recognition of former republics would follow an overall Yugoslav settlement.
On 29 November Badinter ruled that Yugoslavia was in a state of
�dissolution�, rather than an existing country from which republics were
seceding. This was a controversial opinion, and it pushed Bosnia closer to
war. By the same yardstick applied by Badinter, it could be argued that
Bosnia itself was as deeply in the process of �dissolution.�
On 23 December Germany jumped the gun and recognized the independence of
Slovenia and Croatia. On 9 January 1992 the Bosnian Serbs responded by
announcing the formation of an autonomous Serb Republic within Bosnia and
Herzegovina, warning that they would secede if Bosnia were to proclaim
independence. The Croat-Muslim coalition in the Bosnian Assembly
nevertheless decided, on 25 January, that a referendum on independence would
be held at the end of February. This vote was taken, as in October 1991, in
disregard of the Serb opposition, and in violation of Bosnia's constitution.
The referendum on independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina took place on 29
February and 1 March. The Serbs duly boycotted it, determined not to become
a minority in an independent, Muslim-dominated Bosnia- Herzegovina. In the
end 62.68 percent of all voters opted for independence, overwhelmingly
Muslims and Croats; but even this was short of the two-thirds majority
required by the constitution. This did not stop the rump government of
Izetbegovic� from declaring independence on 3 March.
Simultaneously one last attempt was under way to save peace. The Portuguese
foreign minister Jos� Cutileiro�Portugal holding at that time the EC
Presidency�organized a conference in Lisbon attended by Izetbegovic,
Karadzic, and the Croat leader Mate Boban. The talks went surprisingly well
at first, and the three parties agreed that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be a
single, independent state internally organized on the basis of ethnic
regions�the so-called �cantonization.� The breakthrough was due to the
Bosnian Serbs' acceptance of a single, independent Bosnia and Herzegovina,
provided that the Muslims give up on a centralized, unitary state.
Izetbegovic appeared to accept that this was the best deal he could make,
but soon he was to change his mind.
Just as Germany had recklessly pushed for early recognition of Slovenia and
Croatia in December 1991, the United States played a key role in the
recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina three months later. It has been suggested
that the U.S. actively encouraged Izetbegovic� to reject the EC-sponsored
Lisbon plan. The key event was the meeting in Sarajevo between Izetbegovic�,
who had recently returned from Lisbon but was already criticizing the
agreement reached there, and Warren Zimmermann, the US Ambassador in
Yugoslavia. The American view, according to Zimmermann, was that �a Serbian
power grab� might be prevented by internationalizing the problem. So when
Izetbegovic said that he did not like the Lisbon agreement, Zimmerrmann
remembered later, �I told him, if he didn�t like it, why sign it?� A
high-ranking State Department official subsequently admitted to The New York
Times that the US policy �was to encourage Izetbegovic� to break with the
partition plan.�
Once he knew that American recognition of independence was imminent,
Izetbegovic had no motive to take the ongoing EC-brokered talks seriously.
Only had Washington and Brussels insisted on an agreement on the
confederal-cantonal blueprint as a precondition for recognition, he could
have been induced to support the Cutileiro plan. But after his encounter
with Zimmermann Izetbegovic felt authorized to renege on tripartite accord,
and he believed that the Clinton administration would come to his assistance
to enforce the independence of a unitary Bosnian state. Jos� Cutileiro was
embittered by the US action, and accused Izetbegovic of reneging on the
agreement. Had the Muslims not done so, Cutiliero concludes, �the Bosnian
question might have been settled earlier, with less loss of life and land.�
More than a decade later it cannot be denied that Izetbegovic�s role in
Bosnia�s descent to war was crucial. In early 1992 most Muslims were
prepared to accept a compromise that would fall short of full
independence�especially if full independence risked war�but Izetbegovic
demanded a leap in the dark. His motive was less fear of being left �alone�
in Yugoslavia with the Serbs than the pressure that was put on him first by
the German government acting unilaterally, then by the EC following his
lead, and finally by the Clinton administration. Had the pressure been the
other way, it is scarcely possible to doubt that Izetbegovic�s choice would
have been more cautious - even if we see him as tempted by Islamist
ambition. And if Bosnia had stayed inside Yugoslavia, it is plain that the
Serbs would not have fought. Milosevic would have had no mechanism for
controlling the republic. The wars in Yugoslavia would have ended with the
cease-fire in Croatia of 2 January 1992.
Germany, the EU and the US, some of them perhaps unwittingly, handed
Izetbegovic his strategy on a plate: to provoke the intervention of the
powers that offered diplomatic recognition. The subsequent crimes of the
warring parties, however severely they must be judged, were the consequence
of a great, complex, and international blunder, they were not pre-existing
strategies which explain Izetbegovic�s decision to secede.
The effect of the legal intervention of the �international community� with
its act of recognition was that a Yugoslav loyalty was made to look like a
conspiratorial disloyalty to �Bosnia��largely in the eyes of people who
supposed ex hypothesi that if there is a �Bosnia� there must be a nation of
�Bosnians.� This was a major success for Mr. Izetbegovic�s political
objectives, and a major disaster for all three nations that live in
Bosnia�as well as for the interests of the United States in the Balkans.
Once the war started the Serbs had an edge in weaponry but the numeric
advantage lay with the Muslims, who were able to win in the end with
international help. Even before the first shots were fired, Acting Secretary
of State Lawrence Eagleburger made it clear that a goal in Bosnia was to
mollify the Muslim world and to counter any perception of an anti-Muslim
bias regarding American policies in Iraq. The subsequent portrayal in the
American media of the Muslims of Bosnia as innocent martyrs in the cause of
multicultural tolerance concealed the fact that the war was not only ethnic
but also religious in nature. A few lonely voices in the U.S. warned that
Izetbegovic did not want to establish a multiethnic liberal democratic
society, but they were ignored. The U.S. Army Foreign Military Studies
Office saw the situation more clearly than the politicians when it stated,
in 1993, that ideal of multi-ethnicity �may appeal to a few members of
Bosnia�s ruling circles as well as to a generally secular populace, but
President Izetbegovic and his cabal appear to harbor much different private
intentions and goals.�
The parallel demonization of the Serbs was a school text case of
media-induced pseudo-reality in the service of an Administration that had
decided to side with Islam in the Balkans. In a complex conflict with
confusing and contradictory pieces, Americans were offered a powerful
package that simplified the equation into a clear-cut morality play: saving
the Muslims would thus expiate for not saving the Jews of Warsaw or Budapest
fifty years earlier. Izetbegovic�s Western apologists dismissed his Islamic
Declaration as a passing indiscretion �taken out of context.� The Parisian
ex-communist �philosophe� Bernard Henry-Levy even declared that Izetbegovic�
s policy �has been demonstrably against the establishment of an Islamic
state.�
President Clinton was still in the White House, however, when a classified
State Department report warned that the Muslim-controlled parts of Bosnia
were a safe haven for Islamic terrorism and that hundreds of foreign
mujaheddin�who had become Bosnian citizens and remained there after fighting
in the war�presented a major terrorist threat to Europe and the United
States. The findings of the report were summarized in the words of a former
State Department official: Bosnia was �a staging area and safe haven� for
Osama bin Laden�s terrorists.
The threat of Islamic fundamentalism in Europe finally persuaded the U.S.
and other Western nations to oppose the presence of foreign mujahedeen in
Bosnia as part of the November 1995 Dayton peace agreements, which
specifically called for the expulsion of all foreign fighters. But
Izetbegovic calmly circumvented the rule by granting Bosnian citizenship to
several hundred Arab and other Islamist volunteers, thus ostensibly
eliminating their �foreign� status before the accord took effect. By 1996
even The Washington Post�normally supportive of Clinton�s Balkan
policy�confirmed that �the Clinton Administration knew of the activities of
Bin Laden�s so-called Relief Agency, which was, in fact, funneling weapons
and money into Bosnia to prop up the Izetbegovic Muslim government in
Sarajevo.�
>From that point on Washington had complained periodically and
>ineffectually
to Izetbegovic about the continued presence of the mujahadeen in Bosnia, but
to little avail. In 1999 the U.S. established that several suspects linked
to Bosnia were associated with a terrorist plot to bomb the Los Angeles
International Airport. Some months earlier an Algerian with Bosnian
citizenship tried to help smuggle explosives to a group plotting to destroy
U.S. military installations in Germany. The State Department tried to force
his deportation from Bosnia, but only when the U.S. threatened to stop all
economic aid Izetbegovic agreed to do so.
Izetbegovic stepped down in 2000, but he had prepared a cadre of Islamic
hard-liners loyal to him. They were deeply embedded in Bosnia�s state
structure, and to this day they are suspected of operating their own rogue
intelligence service that protects Islamic extremists. In addition to being
a terrorist base, Bosnia has become a staging post for illegal Muslim
immigrants from the Middle East making their way into Western Europe. Most
of them are economic migrants, but European officials fear that many
terrorist operatives and their potential recruits are slipping in. In 2000
up to 10,000 migrants a month were smuggled through Bosnia to Western
Europe. Senior Muslim politicians in Sarajevo were not interested in
stopping this trade in human cargo, and they had no reason to try. To most
of them, and especially to the political class nurtured on Izetbegovic�s
ideology, it is a great and good thing to help as many of their
co-religionists as possible settle in the infidel West.
In the aftermath of 9-11 no effective anti-terrorist strategy is possible
without recognizing past mistakes of U.S. policy that have helped breed
terrorism, starting with Dr. Brzezinski�s unholy alliance with jihad 14
years ago. Eight years of the Clinton-Albright Administration�s covert and
overt support for Izetbegovic and his ilk have been a foreign policy debacle
of the first order. Its beneficiaries are Osama bin Laden�since 1993 a
Bosnian citizen, compliments of then-President Izetbegovic�and his
co-religionists in Sarajevo, Tirana, and Pristina. If we are to take the War
on Terrorism seriously, such blunders need to be recognized and rectified.
Taking a long and sober look at Alija Izetbegovic�s political record and
legacy would be an important first step.
Serbian News Network - SNN
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.antic.org/
