EXCLUSIVE: KOSTUNICA ON SERBIA’S GOVERNMENT CRISIS
CORRUPTION AT HOME, PRESSURE FROM ABROAD, HELP
RADICALS
by Srdja Trifkovic
Five weeks of negotiations over the
establishment of a coalition government in Serbia have not been successful thus
far. The three likely coalition partners—the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS)
led by the former Yugoslav president and current Prime Minister-designate
Vojislav Kostunica, the G17-plus of Miroljub Labus, and the Serbian Renewal
Movement-New Serbia (SPO-NS) alliance—blame the Democratic Party (DS) of the
outgoing Prime Minister Zoran Zivkovic for the impasse. Those three parties won
109 seats in the 250-seat parliament in the general election on December 28 and
need the backing of one other parliamentary group to have a majority. They had
hoped to get the support of the DS (37 seats) as they were loath to seek the
backing of the Serbian Radical Party of Vojislav Seselj (SRS, 83 seats) or the
Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS, 22) of Slobodan Milosevic.
The DS
originally proved willing but later insisted that it would not support any
government in which it did not fully participate. On January 29 Kostunica
reluctantly agreed to include the DS in the governing coalition, but a day later
Zivkovic’s party escalated its demands, refused to vote for Kostunica’s
candidate for the speaker of the national assembly, and now stands accused of
obstructing the establishment of a new government. “It is now clear that we have
on one side those who are in favor of building institutions in Serbia, and on
the other a party, the DS, which is in favor of crippling these institutions,”
was Kostunica’s comment. He now regards any previous accord with the DS a null
and void, and does not exclude the possibility of seeking support from the
Socialists for the tripartite minority government.
When I spoke to Dr.
Kostunica at his Belgrade office on the eve of the latest round of negotiations,
the issue of disunity among the “democratic, reformist” parties was naturally
foremost in his mind. He insists that the success of the nationalist Radical
Party in the election—with 27 percent of the votes cast and 82 deputies—was not
primarily due to its fiery nationalist rhetoric, but to the widespread
dissatisfaction of voters with the previous government’s policies and the
attitude of the Western powers-that-be. The usually soft-spoken leader of the
Democratic Party of Serbia sounded a note of bitterness over the failure of most
foreign commentators to grasp the causes of the Radicals’
upsurge:
Kostunica: In great degree the Radicals’ success was
the result of the policy of the Serbian government, and of the Democratic Party
that controlled that government. We have witnessed a lot of protest voting.
Social and economic situation in Serbia is close to being unbearable. The
economy is not functioning, unemployment has increased, foreign debt has
increased, people in some enterprises are getting their salaries with two years’
delay; that applies also to the dependents of many farmers. Some industrial
urban centers in Serbia, thanks to the mismanagement of the economy, look like
ghost cities. Of course their predicament is partly due to the effect of NATO
bombs in 1999, and some seven years of sanctions preceding the Kosovo war, but
in over three years after Milosevic the DOS coalition government has not
alleviated the situation. The second most obvious legacy of that government is
corruption. On top of all that we have witnessed the unprecedented arrogance of
power. Had it not been for this third factor the situation would have been
easier. We had a government unable to manage the economy that bred corruption,
and grew arrogant at the same time. Subsequently a large segment of the
electorate turned to the Radical Party that combined an uncompromising critique
of the government with a degree of demagoguery. Once again the Serbs voted out
of protest, not unlike the protest vote against Milosevic just over three years
ago. In addition, we have had continuous, Western, foreign threats, demands and
dictates. People were offended by the wrong approach of the “international
community” to the Kosovo problem embodied in the “standards implementation plan”
and the insistence that the final status of Kosovo must be resolved within one
year. Last but by no means least, we have the never-ending saga of The Hague
Tribunal [for war crimes in the former Yugoslavia]. Only weeks before the
election The Hague Tribunal indicted four high-ranking officers—two army
generals and two police generals—on the grounds of ‘command responsibility.’
These factors explain the outcome of the election in
Serbia.
Trifkovic: Before the fall of Milosevic there
had been extravagant promises by certain opposition leaders—especially the late
Zoran Djindjic—about the imminent influx of foreign capital, Western aid and
investment if and when the regime were to change. Why has this not
materialized?
Kostunica: The main reason is the lack of the
rule of law. The West has not supported us in the establishment of that
essential prerequisite for foreign investors. The “international community” has
failed to support the struggle against corruption and organized crime. In the
name of supporting “reforms” it has allowed the government to manipulate the
judiciary and to carry out highly suspect privatization deals. By overlooking
countless misdeeds of the so-called reformists in Serbia, the West has
de-motivated foreign investors. The same leniency applied to another Western
protégé, Milo Djukanovic in Montenegro, who has not been openly criticized, let
alone penalized, for rampant corruption and criminalization of the society. All
that has made both Serbia and Montenegro unattractive to foreign investors. The
misguided support of the wrong people, coupled with the wrong policy, have
diminished any hope of reviving the Serbian economy by attracting badly needed
foreign investment.
Trifkovic: The second mistake of the
“international community” you’ve mentioned is Kosovo, with constant pressures on
the Serb side to accept “final status” negotiations that presuppose the
province’s ultimate independence. Who exactly is driving this agenda, who is
setting all these deadlines, and insisting on a speedy resolution of its final
status?
Kostunica: It is in the interest of the current U.S.
administration to disengage from the Balkans, to free its forces currently
posted to both Bosnia and Kosovo, because Washington is focused on the war
against terror—but does not appreciate the danger of the Balkans as a terrorist
base. Washington is trying to get an agreement [on Kosovo’s final status] within
one year—something that could not be achieved in many previous years. We need an
agreement that will take account of many different demands that will bring the
necessary stability. This cannot be done on present form. If we look at the
numbers, it is evident that less than one percent of IDPs [“Internally Displaced
Persons” i.e. Serbs and other non-Albanians ethnically cleansed from Kosovo]
have returned, and their freedom of movement is curtailed. It is obvious that no
solution is possible within such an artificial deadline, if no solution had been
found in years and decades before this time. The Europeans, on the whole, have a
better understanding of the Kosovo problem than the US administration. They
realize that a new institutional arrangement is needed. And yet there is no
joint approach, there is no common policy. It is more than clear that the Serbs
in Kosovo need autonomy, a sort of Serbian entity that would give them the sense
of security and self-reliance that has been lacking thus far. At one moment, at
the end of 2002, the Council of Europe did propose some sort of decentralization
of Kosovo, but later on this idea fell victim to bureaucratic inertia and that’s
where we are now.
Trifkovic: In general, though, is it
possible for the Serbs to project themselves as part of the solution, rather
than the perennial part of the problem? Can they present themselves in
Washington as a pillar of stability in the Balkans, as partners in the war
against terror?
Kostunica: With the political situation in
Serbia such as it is, with the present state of mind, it is very difficult to
change much in the short run. Just as it is impossible to resolve the problem of
Kosovo within one year, it is not possible to obtain a better representation of
our interests in Washington overnight. What the Serbs are missing right now, and
that problem is reflected in the intellectual and political circles, is the very
idea of the state and its institutions. The behavior and attitudes of the
largest part of the elite in Serbia create the impression that we are a
stateless nation. The moment you concentrate on some of those important issues
of statehood, you are criticized by a large segment of the elite opinion. Why is
it so important, they ask, to focus on the adoption of the new constitution?
Isn’t it more important to improve the economy?
Trifkovic:
The third problematic aspect of Western policy that you’ve mentioned
relates to The Hague Tribunal.
Kostunica: The Hague is an
unnecessary problem, and, just like Kosovo and Bosnia, it is a problem that the
Americans appear to find somewhat boring at this moment. The Europeans, on the
whole, take a more nuanced approach. The U.S. is dealing with these issues in a
bureaucratic manner, which was reflected in the Congressional act that defined
conditions that Serbia needed to satisfy in order to be “certified” [for normal
trading relations]. There one finds just one name [that of General Ratko Mladic]
and some old phrases about minority rights and the freeing of all political
prisoners, issues that no longer posed a problem as we had already implemented
them. In fact there were some political prisoners in Serbia last year, when
thousands of people were arrested under the state of emergency in the aftermath
of the assassination of Zoran Djindjic, but that was something that Washington
did not mind. But our main problem remains The Hague, it is the rope around our
neck, and one must try and make that rope at least less tight than it is
now.
Trifkovic: In view of most recent events do you
still believe that you will be able to form a stable government, or do you see a
new election within months?
Kostunica: When we contemplate
various options for the governing coalition, one complicating aspect is that for
foreign as well as domestic policy reasons one cannot count on one political
party [the Radicals] that enjoys broad support and has many deputies. This
situation reminds us of Italy after the Second World War, when the Communist
Party maintained a significant parliamentary presence but for various reasons
could not be included in a governing coalition. The balance is therefore
unstable, and although an early election is not what the people want that may be
an outcome that we may not be able to avoid.
Trifkovic:
The exclusion of Italian communists from government ended with the
reformist course of Enrico Berlinguer. Can the Serbian Radical Party re-invent
itself accordingly?
Kostunica: We already see some signs of a
new approach within the Radical Party. One should hope that it will continue to
develop that way, because we need to be able to count on all parties represented
in parliament as potential partners. That would be the normal situation in a
normal democratic country, where all combinations should be possible. The
Radicals, for their part, have a choice: to become a party of the mainstream, or
to be marginalized like the party of Zhirinovsky in Russia. They need to discard
careless rhetoric and demagoguery, and act like a responsible
force.
Trifkovic: As far as your own party is concerned,
what are the causes for its declining electoral support? Is it the price of
trying to strike a middle course between the Radicals’ nationalist rhetoric and
the subservience of “pro-Western reformists”?
Kostunica: From
the very beginning we have been aware of the risks of that policy, between two
extremes, between those who want to confront the international community and
those who want to serve it unreservedly. We have been trying to follow a “Third
Way”—please do not confuse this with Tony Blair’s “third way”—and it is very
difficult to attract great support with that sort of policy: it opens us to
attacks from both sides. Before this latest election some Westerners treated the
DSS not as a democratic, reformist party but as a nationalist party closer to
the Radicals. Now all of a sudden that attitude has changed and the DSS is
assumed to belong to a “democratic reformist bloc,” and on top of that we are
told that among these “democrats” there should be no quarrels, that we should be
united. All differences between us and the DS are assumed to be personal, which
they are not: they are political, they are conceptual. We, the DSS, insist on
the rule of law, on an independent judiciary, on the separation of powers, on
upholding the dignity of parliament. Other parties, and the DS in particular,
have behaved in a sort of revolutionary way, disregarding the rule of law, not
making the state institutions strong and respected, allowing corruption, and
even treating it as a necessary means to the achievement of its goals. These
differences between us are real, and important—and that is completely
misunderstood in the West. If I were to rank the misunderstandings of Serbia’s
internal politics that are still prevalent in the Western world, this claim that
there are no fundamental differences among the “democrats” would top the
list.
