March 12 / 14, 2004
The US Must be Isolated and Constrained
The Coming Elections and the Future of American Global Power
By GABRIEL KOLKO
The Coming Elections and the Future of American Global Power
By GABRIEL KOLKO
We are now experiencing fundamental changes in the international
system whose implications and consequences may ultimately be as
far-reaching as the dissolution of the Soviet bloc.
system whose implications and consequences may ultimately be as
far-reaching as the dissolution of the Soviet bloc.
The United States' strength, to a crucial extent, has rested on
its
ability to convince other nations that it is to their vital interests
to see America prevail in its global role. But the scope and ultimate
consequences of its world mission, including its extraordinarily vague
doctrine of "preemptive wars," is today far more dangerous and
open-ended than when Communism existed. Enemies have disappeared and
new ones--many once former allies and even congenial friends--have
taken their places. The United States, to a degree to which it is
itself uncertain, needs alliances, but these allies will be bound into
uncritical "coalitions of the willing."
ability to convince other nations that it is to their vital interests
to see America prevail in its global role. But the scope and ultimate
consequences of its world mission, including its extraordinarily vague
doctrine of "preemptive wars," is today far more dangerous and
open-ended than when Communism existed. Enemies have disappeared and
new ones--many once former allies and even congenial friends--have
taken their places. The United States, to a degree to which it is
itself uncertain, needs alliances, but these allies will be bound into
uncritical "coalitions of the willing."
So long as the future is to a large degree--to paraphrase
Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld--"unknowable," it is not to the national
interest of its traditional allies to perpetuate the relationships
created from 1945 to 1990. The Bush Administration, through ineptness
and a vague ideology of American power that acknowledges no limits on
its global ambitions, and a preference for unilateralist initiatives
which discounts consultations with its friends much less the United
Nations, has seriously eroded the alliance system upon which U. S.
foreign policy from 1947 onwards was based. With the proliferation of
all sorts of destructive weaponry, the world will become increasingly
dangerous.
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld--"unknowable," it is not to the national
interest of its traditional allies to perpetuate the relationships
created from 1945 to 1990. The Bush Administration, through ineptness
and a vague ideology of American power that acknowledges no limits on
its global ambitions, and a preference for unilateralist initiatives
which discounts consultations with its friends much less the United
Nations, has seriously eroded the alliance system upon which U. S.
foreign policy from 1947 onwards was based. With the proliferation of
all sorts of destructive weaponry, the world will become increasingly
dangerous.
If Bush is reelected then the international order may be very
different in 2008 than it is today, much less in 1999, but there is no
reason to believe that objective assessments of the costs and
consequences of its actions will significantly alter his foreign
policy priorities over the next four years.
different in 2008 than it is today, much less in 1999, but there is no
reason to believe that objective assessments of the costs and
consequences of its actions will significantly alter his foreign
policy priorities over the next four years.
If the Democrats win they will attempt in the name of
internationalism
to reconstruct the alliance system as it existed before the Yugoslav
war of 1999, when even the Clinton Administration turned against the
veto powers built into the NATO system. America's power to act on the
world scene would therefore be greater. John Kerry's foreign policy
adviser, Rand Beers, worked for Bush's National Security Council until
a year ago. More important, Kerry himself voted for many of Bush's key
foreign and domestic measures and he is, at best, an indifferent
candidate. His statements and interviews over the past weeks dealing
with foreign affairs have been both vague and incoherent. Kerry is
neither articulate nor impressive as a candidate or as someone who is
likely to formulate an alternative to Bush's foreign and defense
policies, which have much more in common with Clinton's than they have
differences. To be critical of Bush is scarcely justification for
wishful thinking about Kerry. Since 1947, the foreign policies of the
Democrats and Republicans have been essentially consensual on crucial
issues--"bipartisan" as both parties phrase it--but they often utilize
quite different rhetoric.
to reconstruct the alliance system as it existed before the Yugoslav
war of 1999, when even the Clinton Administration turned against the
veto powers built into the NATO system. America's power to act on the
world scene would therefore be greater. John Kerry's foreign policy
adviser, Rand Beers, worked for Bush's National Security Council until
a year ago. More important, Kerry himself voted for many of Bush's key
foreign and domestic measures and he is, at best, an indifferent
candidate. His statements and interviews over the past weeks dealing
with foreign affairs have been both vague and incoherent. Kerry is
neither articulate nor impressive as a candidate or as someone who is
likely to formulate an alternative to Bush's foreign and defense
policies, which have much more in common with Clinton's than they have
differences. To be critical of Bush is scarcely justification for
wishful thinking about Kerry. Since 1947, the foreign policies of the
Democrats and Republicans have been essentially consensual on crucial
issues--"bipartisan" as both parties phrase it--but they often utilize
quite different rhetoric.
Critics of the existing foreign or domestic order will not take
over
Washington this November. As dangerous as it is, Bush's reelection may
be a lesser evil because he is much more likely to continue the
destruction of the alliance system that is so crucial to American
power. One does not have to believe that the worse the better but we
have to consider candidly the foreign policy consequences of a renewal
of Bush's mandate.
Washington this November. As dangerous as it is, Bush's reelection may
be a lesser evil because he is much more likely to continue the
destruction of the alliance system that is so crucial to American
power. One does not have to believe that the worse the better but we
have to consider candidly the foreign policy consequences of a renewal
of Bush's mandate.
Bush's policies have managed to alienate, in varying
degrees,
innumerable nations, and even its firmest allies--such as Britain,
Australia, and Canada--are being compelled to ask if giving Washington
a blank check is to their national interest or if it undermines the
tenure of parties in power. The way the war in Iraq was justified
compelled France and Germany to become far more independent, much
earlier, than they had intended, and NATO's future role is now
questioned in a way that was inconceivable two years ago. Europe's
future defense arrangements are today an open question but there will
be some sort of European military force independent of NATO and
American control. Germany, with French support, strongly opposes the
Bush doctrine of preemption. Tony Blair, however much he intends
acting as a proxy for the U.S. on military questions, must return
Britain to the European project, and his willingness since late 2003
to emphasize his nation's role in Europe reflects political
necessities. To do otherwise is to alienate his increasingly powerful
neighbors and risk losing elections. His domestic credibility is
already at its nadir due to his slavish support for the war in Iraq.
innumerable nations, and even its firmest allies--such as Britain,
Australia, and Canada--are being compelled to ask if giving Washington
a blank check is to their national interest or if it undermines the
tenure of parties in power. The way the war in Iraq was justified
compelled France and Germany to become far more independent, much
earlier, than they had intended, and NATO's future role is now
questioned in a way that was inconceivable two years ago. Europe's
future defense arrangements are today an open question but there will
be some sort of European military force independent of NATO and
American control. Germany, with French support, strongly opposes the
Bush doctrine of preemption. Tony Blair, however much he intends
acting as a proxy for the U.S. on military questions, must return
Britain to the European project, and his willingness since late 2003
to emphasize his nation's role in Europe reflects political
necessities. To do otherwise is to alienate his increasingly powerful
neighbors and risk losing elections. His domestic credibility is
already at its nadir due to his slavish support for the war in Iraq.
In a word, politicians who place America's imperious demands
over
national interest have less future than those who are responsive to
domestic opinion and needs.
national interest have less future than those who are responsive to
domestic opinion and needs.
This process of alienating traditional close friends is best seen
in
Australia, but in different ways and for quite distinctive reasons it
is also true elsewhere--especially Canada and Mexico, the U.S.' two
neighbors. In the case of Australia, Washington is willing to allow it
to do the onerous chores of policing the vast South Pacific and even
take greater initiatives, at least to a point, on Indonesia. But the
Bush Administration passed along to it false intelligence on Iraq's
alleged weapons of mass destruction, which many of Australia's own
experts disputed, and Bush even telephoned Prime Minister John Howard
to convince him to support America's efforts in innumerable ways. As
Alexander Downer, the foreign minister, admitted earlier this month,
"it wasn't a time in our history to have a great and historic breach
with the United States," and the desire to preserve the alliance
became paramount. (1) But true alliances are based on consultation and
an element of reciprocity is possible, and the Bush Administration
prefers "coalitions of the willing" that raise no substantive
questions about American actions--in effect, a blank check. Giving it
produced strong criticism of the Howard government's reliance on
Washington's false information on WMD and it has been compelled to
endorse a joint parliamentary committee to investigate the
intelligence system--sure to play into opposition hands this election
year.
Australia, but in different ways and for quite distinctive reasons it
is also true elsewhere--especially Canada and Mexico, the U.S.' two
neighbors. In the case of Australia, Washington is willing to allow it
to do the onerous chores of policing the vast South Pacific and even
take greater initiatives, at least to a point, on Indonesia. But the
Bush Administration passed along to it false intelligence on Iraq's
alleged weapons of mass destruction, which many of Australia's own
experts disputed, and Bush even telephoned Prime Minister John Howard
to convince him to support America's efforts in innumerable ways. As
Alexander Downer, the foreign minister, admitted earlier this month,
"it wasn't a time in our history to have a great and historic breach
with the United States," and the desire to preserve the alliance
became paramount. (1) But true alliances are based on consultation and
an element of reciprocity is possible, and the Bush Administration
prefers "coalitions of the willing" that raise no substantive
questions about American actions--in effect, a blank check. Giving it
produced strong criticism of the Howard government's reliance on
Washington's false information on WMD and it has been compelled to
endorse a joint parliamentary committee to investigate the
intelligence system--sure to play into opposition hands this election
year.
Even more dangerous, the Bush Administration has managed to turn
what
was in the mid-1990s a budding cordial friendship with the former
Soviet Union into an increasingly tense relationship. Despite a 1997
non-binding American pledge not to station substantial numbers of
combat troops in the territories of new members, Washington plans to
extend NATO to Russia's very borders--Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
especially concern Moscow--and it is in the process of establishing a
vague number of bases in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Russia has
stated that the U.S. encircling it warrants its retaining and
modernizing its nuclear arsenal--to remain a military superpower--that
will be more than a match for the increasingly expensive and ambitious
missile defense system the Pentagon is now building. It has over 4,600
strategic nuclear warheads and over 1,000 ballistic missiles to
deliver them. Last month Russia threatened to pull out of the crucial
Conventional Forces in Europe treaty, which has yet to enter into
force, because it regards America's ambitions in the former Soviet
bloc as provocation. "I would like to remind the representatives of
[NATO]," Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov told a security conference in
Munich last February, "that with its expansion they are beginning to
operate in the zone of vitally important interests of our country."
(2) The question Washington's allies will ask themselves is whether
their traditional alliances have far more risks than benefits--and if
they are necessary.
was in the mid-1990s a budding cordial friendship with the former
Soviet Union into an increasingly tense relationship. Despite a 1997
non-binding American pledge not to station substantial numbers of
combat troops in the territories of new members, Washington plans to
extend NATO to Russia's very borders--Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
especially concern Moscow--and it is in the process of establishing a
vague number of bases in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Russia has
stated that the U.S. encircling it warrants its retaining and
modernizing its nuclear arsenal--to remain a military superpower--that
will be more than a match for the increasingly expensive and ambitious
missile defense system the Pentagon is now building. It has over 4,600
strategic nuclear warheads and over 1,000 ballistic missiles to
deliver them. Last month Russia threatened to pull out of the crucial
Conventional Forces in Europe treaty, which has yet to enter into
force, because it regards America's ambitions in the former Soviet
bloc as provocation. "I would like to remind the representatives of
[NATO]," Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov told a security conference in
Munich last February, "that with its expansion they are beginning to
operate in the zone of vitally important interests of our country."
(2) The question Washington's allies will ask themselves is whether
their traditional alliances have far more risks than benefits--and if
they are necessary.
In the case of China, Bush's key advisers were publicly committed
to
constraining its burgeoning military and geopolitical power the moment
they took office. But China's military budget is growing rapidly--12
percent this coming year--and the European Union wants to lift its
15-year old arms embargo and get a share of the enticingly large
market. The Bush Administration, of course, is strongly resisting any
relaxation of the export ban. Establishing bases on China's western
borders is the logic of its ambitions.
constraining its burgeoning military and geopolitical power the moment
they took office. But China's military budget is growing rapidly--12
percent this coming year--and the European Union wants to lift its
15-year old arms embargo and get a share of the enticingly large
market. The Bush Administration, of course, is strongly resisting any
relaxation of the export ban. Establishing bases on China's western
borders is the logic of its ambitions.
The United States is not so much engaged in "power projection"
against
an amorphously defined terrorism by installing bases in small or weak
Eastern European and Central Asian nations as again confronting Russia
and China in an open-ended context which may have profound and
protracted consequences neither America's allies nor its own people
have any interest or inclination to support. Even some Pentagon
analysts have warned against this strategy because any American
attempt to save failed states in the Caucasus or Central Asia,
implicit in its new obligations, will risk exhausting what are
ultimately its finite military resources. (3)
an amorphously defined terrorism by installing bases in small or weak
Eastern European and Central Asian nations as again confronting Russia
and China in an open-ended context which may have profound and
protracted consequences neither America's allies nor its own people
have any interest or inclination to support. Even some Pentagon
analysts have warned against this strategy because any American
attempt to save failed states in the Caucasus or Central Asia,
implicit in its new obligations, will risk exhausting what are
ultimately its finite military resources. (3)
There is no way to predict what emergencies will arise or what
these
commitments entail, either for the U. S. or its allies, not the least
because--as Iraq proved last year and Vietnam long before it--its
intelligence on the capabilities and intentions of possible enemies
against which it is ready to preempt is so completely faulty. Without
accurate information a nation can believe and do anything, and this is
the predicament the Bush Administration's allies are in. It is simply
not to their national interest to pursue foreign policies based on a
blind, uncritical faith in fictions or flamboyant adventurism premised
on false premises and information. It is far too open-ended both in
terms of time and costs. If Bush is reelected, America's allies and
friends will have to confront such stark choices, a painful process
that will redefine and perhaps shatter existing alliances.
commitments entail, either for the U. S. or its allies, not the least
because--as Iraq proved last year and Vietnam long before it--its
intelligence on the capabilities and intentions of possible enemies
against which it is ready to preempt is so completely faulty. Without
accurate information a nation can believe and do anything, and this is
the predicament the Bush Administration's allies are in. It is simply
not to their national interest to pursue foreign policies based on a
blind, uncritical faith in fictions or flamboyant adventurism premised
on false premises and information. It is far too open-ended both in
terms of time and costs. If Bush is reelected, America's allies and
friends will have to confront such stark choices, a painful process
that will redefine and perhaps shatter existing alliances.
But America will be more prudent and the world will be far safer only
if the Bush Administration is constrained by a lack of allies and
isolated.
if the Bush Administration is constrained by a lack of allies and
isolated.
Gabriel Kolko is the leading historian of modern warfare. He is
the
author of the classic Century of War: Politics, Conflicts and Society
Since 1914 and Another Century of War?. He can be reached at:
[EMAIL PROTECTED].
author of the classic Century of War: Politics, Conflicts and Society
Since 1914 and Another Century of War?. He can be reached at:
[EMAIL PROTECTED].
Notes
1. Australian Broadcasting Company Online interview with Downer,
March
2, 2004.
2, 2004.
2. Wade Boese, "Russia, NATO at Loggerheads Over Military Bases,"
Arms
Control Today, March 2004.
Control Today, March 2004.
3. Dr. Stephen J. Blank, "Toward a New U.S. Strategy in Asia," U.S.
Army Strategic Studies Institute, February 24, 2004.
Army Strategic Studies Institute, February 24, 2004.
