Was Srebrenica a Hoax?
Eye-Witness Account of a Former United Nations Military Observer in Bosnia
by Carlos Martins Branco
Srebrenica, 4 March 1998
20 April 2004
The URL of this article is: http://globalresearch.ca/articles/BRA403A.html
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Editor's Note
This detailed account first published in 1998 by former UN Military
Observer Carlos Martino Branco casts serious doubt on the decision of The
Appeals Chamber of the Hague Tribunal (ICTY) that "genocide was committed in
Srebrenica in 1995."
".Bosnia Serb forces carried out genocide against the
Bosnian Muslims (.) .Those who devise and implement genocide seek to deprive
humanity of the manifold richness its nationalities, races, ethnicities and
religions provide. This is a crime against all humankind, its harm being
felt not only by the group targeted for destruction, but by all of
humanity."
Under these premises, Radislav Krstic was found "guilty of aiding
and abetting genocide" and sentenced to 35 years imprisonment.
For details on the 14 April 2004 judgment, see the ICTY Press
release (!9 April 2004) at:
http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/2004/p839-e.htm
Michel Chossudovsky, 20 April 2004
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Author's Preface
I was on the ground in Bosnia during the war and, in particular,
during the fall of Srebrenica.
One may agree or disagree with my political analysis, but one really
ought to read the account of how Srebrenica fell, who are the victims whose
bodies have been found so far, and why the author believes that the Serbs
wanted to conquer Srebrenica and make the Bosnian Muslims flee, rather than
having any intentions of butchering them. The comparison Srebrenica vs.
Krajina, as well as the related media reaction by the "free press" in the
West, is also rather instructive.
There is little doubt that at least 2,000 Bosnian Muslims died in
fighting the better trained and better commanded VRS/BSA. Yet, the question
remains, WHEN did most of these casualties of combat occur? According to the
analysis below, it was before the final fall of Srebrenica: the Muslims
offered very little resistance in the summer of 1995.
I was UNMO [United Nations Military Observer] Deputy Chief
Operations Officer of the UNPF [United Nations Population Fund] (at theatre
level) and my information is based upon debriefings of UN military observers
who where posted to Srebrenica during those days as well as several United
Nations reports which were not made public.
My sources of information are not Ruder & Finn Global Public
Affairs. My name is not included in their database.
I do not wish to discuss numbers and similar matters pertaining
thereto. There is reason to believe that figures have been used and
manipulated for propaganda purposes. These figures and information do not
provide a serious understanding of the Yugoslavian conflict.
The article is based upon TRUE information and includes my analysis
of the events. The story is longer than what I have presented here in this
article.
It is my hope that it will contribute to clarifying what really
happened in Srebrenica.
________________________________
Was Srebenica a hoax?
It is now two years since the Muslim enclave, Srebenica, fell into
the hands of the Serbian army in Bosnia. Much has been written about the
matter. Nonetheless the majority of reports have been limited to a broad
media exposure of the event, with very little analytic rigor.
Discussion of Srebrenica cannot be limited to genocide and mass
graves.
A rigorous analysis of the events must take into consideration the
background circumstances, in order to understand the real motives which led
to the fall of the enclave.
The zone of Srebrenica, like almost all of Eastern Bosnia, is
characterized by very rugged terrain. Steep valleys with dense forests and
deep ravines make it impossible for combat vehicles to pass, and offers a
clear advantage to defensive forces. Given the resources available to both
parties, and the characteristics of the terrain, it would seem that the
Bosnian army (ABiH) had the necessary force to defend itself, if it had used
full advantage of the terrain. This, however, did not occur.
Given the military advantage of the defensive forces it is very
difficult to explain the absence of military resistance. The Muslim forces
did not establish an effective defensive system and did not even try to take
advantage of their heavy artillery, under control of the United Nations (UN)
forces, at a time in which they had every reason to do so.
The lack of a military response stands in clear contrast to the
offensive attitude which characterized the actions of the defensive forces
in previous siege situations, which typically launched violent "raids"
against the Serbian villages surrounding the enclave, thus provoking heavy
casualties amongst the Serbian civilian population.
But in this instance, with the attention of the media focused upon
the area, military defence of the enclave would have revealed the true
situation in security zones, and demonstrate that these had never been
genuinely demilitarized zones as was claimed, but were harboured
highly-armed military units. Military resistance would jeopardize the image
of "victim", which had been so carefully constructed, and which the Muslims
considered vital to maintain.
Throughout the entire operation, it was clear that there were
profound disagreements between the leaders of the enclave. From a military
viewpoint, there was total confusion. Oric, the charismatic commander of
Srebenica, was absent.
The Sarajevo government did not authorize his return in order to
lead the resistance. Military power fell into the hands of his lieutenants,
who had a long history of incompatibility. The absence of Oric's clear
leadership led to a situation of total ineptitude. The contradictory orders
of his successors completely paralyzed the forces under siege.
The behavior of the political leaders is also interesting. The local
SDP president, Zlatko Dukic, in an interview with European Union observers,
explained that Srebrenica formed part of a business transaction which
involved a logistical support route to Sarajevo, via Vogosca.
He also claimed that the fall of the enclave formed part of an
orchestrated campaign to discredit the West and win the support of Islamic
countries. This was the reason for Oric to maintain a distance from his
troops. This thesis was also defended by the local supporters of the DAS.
There were also many rumours of a trade within the local population of the
enclave.
Another curious aspect was the absence of a military reaction from
the 2nd Corps of the Muslim army, which did nothing to relieve the military
pressure on the enclave. It was common knowledge that the Serbian unit in
the region, the "Drina Corps", was exhausted and that the attack on
Srebenica was only possible with the aid of the units from other regions.
Despite this fact, Sarajevo did not lift a finger in order to launch an
attack which would have divided the Serbian forces and exposed the
vulnerabilities created by the concentration of resources around Srebenica.
Such an attack would have reduced the military pressure on the enclave.
It is also important to register the pathetic appeal of the
president of Opstina, Osman Suljic, on July 9, which implored military
observers to say to the world that the Serbians were using chemical weapons.
The same gentleman later accused the media of transmitting false news items
on the resistance of troops in the enclave, requiring a denial from the UN.
According to Suljic, the Muslim troops did not respond, and would never
respond with heavy artillery fire. Simultaneously, he complained of the lack
of food supplies and of the humanitarian situation. Curiously, observers
were never allowed to inspect the food reserve deposits. The emphasis given
by political leaders on the lack of military response and the absence of
food provisions loosely suggests an official policy which began to be
discernible.
In mid 1995, the prolongation of the war had dampened public
interest. There had been a substantial reduction in the pressure of public
opinion in the western democracies. An incident of this importance would
nonetheless provide hot news material for the media during several weeks,
could awaken public opinion and incite new passions. In this manner it would
be possible to kill two birds with one stone: pressure could be laid to bear
in order to lift the embargo and simultaneously the occupying countries
would find it difficult to withdraw their forces, a hypothesis which had
been advanced by leading UN figures such as Akashi and Boutros-Boutros
Ghali.
The Muslims always harbored a secret hope that the embargo would be
lifted. This had become the prime objective of the Sarajevo government, and
had been fuelled by the vote in the US Senate and Congress in favor of such
a measure. President Clinton, however, vetoed the decision and required a
two thirds majority in both houses. The enclaves collapse gave the decisive
push that the campaign needed. After its fall, the US Senate voted with over
a two thirds majority in favor of lifting the embargo.
It was clear that sooner or later the enclaves would fall into the
hands of the Serbians, it was an inevitability. There was a consensus
amongst the negotiators (the US administration, the UN and European
governments) that it was impossible to maintain the three Muslim enclaves,
and that they should be exchanged for territories in Central Bosnia.
Madeleine Albright suggested this exchange on numerous occasions to
Izetbegovic, based on the proposals of the Contact Group.
As early as 1993, at the time of the first crisis of the enclave,
Karadzic had proposed to Izetbgovic to exchange Srebrenica for the suburb of
Vogosca. This exchange included the movement of populations in both
directions. This was the purpose of secret negotiations in order to avoid
undesirable publicity. This implied that the western countries accepted and
encouraged ethnic separation.
The truth is that both the Americans and President Izetbegovic had
tacitly agreed that it made no sense to insist in maintaining these isolated
enclaves in a divided Bosnia. In 1995 nobody believed any longer in the
inevitability of ethnic division of the territory. In the month of June
1995, before the military operation in Srebrenica, Alexander Vershbow,
Special Assistant to President Clinton stated that "America should encourage
the Bosnians to think in terms of territories with greater territorial
coherence and compactness." In other words this meant that the enclaves
should be forgotten. The attack on Srebrenica, with no help from Belgrade,
was completely unnecessary and proved to be one of the most significant
examples of the political failure of the Serbian leadership.
Meanwhile the western media exacerbated the situation by
transforming the enclaves into a powerful mass-media icon; a situation which
Izetbegovic was quick to explore. CNN had daily broadcasts of the images of
mass graves for thousands of corpses, obtained from spy satellites. Despite
the microscopic precision in the localization of these graves, it is certain
that no discovery to date has confirmed such suspicions. Since there are no
longer restrictions on movement, we inevitably speculate on why they have
still not been shown to the world.
If there had been a premeditated plan of genocide, instead of
attacking in only one direction, from the south to the north - which left
the hypothesis to escape to the north and west, the Serbs would have
established a siege in order to ensure that no one escaped. The UN
observation posts to the north of the enclave were never disturbed and
remained in activity after the end of the military operations. There are
obviously mass graves in the outskirts of Srebrenica as in the rest of
ex-Yugoslavia where combat has occurred, but there are no grounds for the
campaign which was mounted, nor the numbers advanced by CNN.
The mass graves are filled by a limited number of corpses from both
sides, the consequence of heated battle and combat and not the result of a
premeditated plan of genocide, as occurred against the Serbian populations
in Krajina, in the Summer of 1995, when the Croatian army implemented the
mass murder of all Serbians found there. In this instance, the media
maintained an absolute silence, despite the fact that the genocide occurred
over a three month period. The objective of Srebrenica was ethnic cleansing
and not genocide, unlike what happened in Krajina, in which although there
was no military action, the Croatian army decimated villages.
Despite knowledge of the fact that the enclaves were already a lost
cause, Sarajevo insisted in drawing political dividends from the fact. The
receptivity which had been created in the eyes of public opinion made it
easier to sell the thesis of genocide.
But of even greater importance than the genocide thesis and the
political isolation of the Serbs, was blackmailing of the UN: either the UN
joined forces with the Sarajevo government in the conflict (which
subsequently happened) or the UN would be completely discredited in the eyes
of the public, leading in turn to support for Bosnia. Srebrenica was the
last straw which led western governments to reach agreement on the need to
cease their neutrality and commence a military action against one side in
the conflict. It was the last straw which united the West in their desire to
break "Serbian bestiality". Sarajevo was conscious of the fact that it
lacked the military capacity to defeat the Serbs. It was necessary to create
conditions via which the international community could do this for them.
Srebrenica played a vital role in this process.
Srebrenica represents one of a series of acts by the Serbian leaders
intended to provoke the UN, in order to demonstrate their impotence. This
was a serious strategic error which would cost them dear. The side which had
everything to win by demonstrating the impotence of the UN was the Sarajevo
leadership and not that of Pale. In 1995 it was clear that the change in the
status quo required a powerful intervention which would overthrow the
Serbian military power. Srebrenica was one of the pretexts, resulting from
the short-sightedness of the Bosnian Serbian leaders.
The besieged forces could have easily defended the enclave, at least
for much longer, if they had been well led. It proved convenient to let the
enclave fall in this manner. Since the enclave was doomed to fall, it was
preferable to let this happen in the most beneficial manner possible. But
this would only have been viable if Sarajevo had political initiative and
freedom of movement, which would never occur at the negotiating table. The
deliberate fall of the enclave might appear to be an act of terrible
machiavellian orchestration, but the truth is that the Sarajevo government
had much to gain, as proved to be the case. Srebrenica was not a zero-sum
game. The Serbians won a military victory but with highly negative political
side-effects, which helped result in their definitive ostracization.
We might add a final curious note. As the UN observation posts were
attacked, and proved impossible to maintain, the forces withdrew. The
barricades set up by the Muslim army did not let the troops past. These
troops were not treated as soldiers fleeing from the front line, but rather
with a sordid differentiation.
The Muslims not only refused to fight to defend themselves, they
forced others to fight on their behalf. In one instance, the commander of a
Dutch vehicle decided after conversations with ABiH to pass the barrier. A
Muslim soldier threw a hand grenade whose fragments mortally wounded him.
The only UN soldier to die in the Srebrenica offensive, was killed by the
Muslims.
Carlos Martins Branco teaches at the European University Institute,
Department of Social and Political Sciences, Badia Fiesolana, Italy
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