By Marko Attila Hoare

The Ustasha genocide of Serbs, Jews and Gypsies in the territory of the
so-called 'Independent State of Croatia' in the period 1941-1945 is a
subject about which historians in the West have to date had little to say.
English-language accounts by journalists and others have often been as empty
of serious analysis as they are full of gory descriptions of atrocities.
There exists a large body of scholarly literature written by historians in
the former Yugoslavia about the Ustashas and their genocidal policy, as well
as compilations of documents, eyewitness accounts and other data, yet we
still lack a satisfactory analysis in any language of why the genocide
occurred and how it was implemented - of the kind which, for example, exists
for the Nazi Holocaust. This deficit can only be made good when monographic
studies by competent historians unhindered by ideological preconceptions
begin to be published in greater number. In this text, we seek merely to
outline some parameters that might contribute to a better general

The Axis invasion of Yugoslavia, that began on 6 April 1941 and was
completed eleven days later, created an entirely new political order in the
occupied Yugoslav lands. The 'Independent State of Croatia' (NDH) was
proclaimed on 10 April by Slavko Kvaternik, acting on the orders of SS
Colonel Edmund Veesenmayer, and in the name of Ustasha leader Ante Pavelic
as Poglavnik (Fuhrer). Hitler had supported a unified Yugoslavia as his
favoured partner in the western Balkans up until March 1941, and had coerced
the Yugoslav government into joining his Tripartite Pact. Yet the military
coup of that month, by a group of Serbian army officers acting in concert
with British intelligence, was wrongly interpreted by Hitler as directed
against the German-Yugoslav alliance, despite the coup leaders' stated
willingness to maintain collaboration with Germany.  Hitler thereupon
reversed his policy and established a Croatian puppet-state under the
Ustashas, a fascist-terrorist group with virtually no popular support among
the Croatian people, bypassing both the popular Croat politicians of the
Croat Peasant Party (HSS) as well as the representatives of the Serbs,
Muslims and other non-Croats. This radical, arbitrary move was equivalent to
placing the Ku Klux Klan in power in the USA. Still more arbitrary, if that
were possible, was the outcome of the German-Italian negotiations at the
Vienna Conference of 21-22 April, which placed Bosnia-Hercegovina entirely
within the NDH, whose eastern border would coincide with the historic
Bosnian border.  The division of Yugoslavia into German and Italian zones of
occupation was finalised on 23 April and established a border that ran right
through the NDH. Following the Rome Agreement of 18 May between Italy and
the NDH, the territories incorporated within the latter were most of Croatia
proper (including East Srijem which was under German military control),
southern and north-eastern Dalmatia with the islands of Brac and Hvar, and
all Bosnia-Hercegovina. The population of the puppet state was calculated by
the Germany Ministry of Foreign Affairs at this time to be approximately
6,285,000 of which 3,300,000 were Croats, 1,925,000 were Serbs, 700,000 were
Muslims, 150,000 Germans, 65,000 Czechs and Slovaks, 40,000 Jews and 30,000
Slovenes.  This meant that Croats comprised just slightly over half the
NDH's population; even if the Muslims were treated as Croats the Croat share
of the population was less than two-thirds. The Ustashas were thus a
minority faction with minimal popular support among a nationality that
itself comprised only a bare majority of the multinational population of the
'state'. This was incompatible with the Ustashas' belief in Croatia as an
exclusively Croat land and was at one level the basic cause of the Ustasha
genocide against the Serb, Jewish and Gypsy inhabitants of the NDH.

The Ustasha extermination of the Jews and Gypsies was part and parcel of the
Nazi Holocaust that took place across German-occupied Europe with the
assistance of native collaborators. On 30 April the Jews were deprived of
citizenship of the NDH; subsequent legislation deprived them of freedom of
movement and residency. From 23 May all Jews were forced to wear yellow
identification tags. These moves were based on the Nazi Nuremberg Laws and
other Nazi legislation and practice. Jews were arrested on an individual
basis along with other undesirables from the first days of the NDH's
existence, but their mass arrest began following the German attack on the
USSR. On 26 June Pavelic issued a decree placing collective responsibility
on the Jews for anti-state activities and ordering their internment in
concentration camps. In Sarajevo, already on the day after their arrival in
the city (16 April), the Germans looted and destroyed the four synagogues.
However, the mass arrest of Jews began in Bosnia-Hercegovina somewhat later
than in Croatia proper. In August those living in small towns were arrested
first, followed by the Sarajevo Jews at the end of the month in an operation
that was effectively completed in November. By early 1942, of Sarajevo's
pre-war Jewish population of 10,000 only a few hundred remained. Of the
36-40,000 Jewish inhabitants of the NDH at least 30,000 or over 80% were
exterminated, principally by the Nazis and Ustashas (smaller numbers were
victims of the Chetniks, Muslim SS troops, Italian forces and others). Of
14,000 Bosnian Jews almost 12,000 were exterminated, nearly 11,000 in
concentration camps within the NDH. In this way the fourth-largest Bosnian
ethnic group was effectively removed from the Bosnian political landscape
within the first year of the War and virtually annihilated.  The Jews who
survived the Nazi-Ustasha roundup became one of the most staunchly
pro-Partisan groups in Yugoslavia: 4,572 Jews fought as Partisans of whom
1,318 were killed. Most of these were natives of the NDH.  As with the Jews,
the NDH's Gypsy population, numbering 25-40,000 in 1941, was almost wholly
exterminated by the Nazis and Ustashas, in particular during 1942, with the
Ustashas even more merciless in their persecution than the Nazis. 

The Ustasha genocide of the Croatian and Bosnian Serbs, in contrast to the
genocide of the Jews and Gypsies, was a project whose origins were primarily
domestic. The Ustashas were a fringe movement of extremists with whom the
mainstream Croat national movement under Vlatko Macek and the HSS cannot be
equated. The Ustasha attempt to exterminate, expel or forcibly assimilate
all Serbs on Croatian territory was a reversal of the policy pursued by
Stjepan Radic and Macek from 1927 to 1941, of maintaining a firm alliance
with the Independent Democratic Party as representative of Croatian Serbs
loyal to Croatia. The Ustasha genocide of the Serbs was not the
ideologically predetermined outcome of Croat national aspirations, nor the
accidental by-product of Axis rule; rather the increasingly bitter political
conflicts of interwar Yugoslavia, both at the national and at the local
level and particularly in its final years, created the conditions that made
genocide possible in the exceptional circumstances created by the Axis
invasion. It is open to question whether the Ustasha leaders intended from
the outset to carry out genocide, or whether their system of rule on the one
hand, and Serb resistance to it on the other, gave rise to a dynamic that
led inexorably to genocide. Nevertheless, the abnormality of an
extreme-nationalist but militarily weak regime attempting to establish its
rule over a disparate collection of territories populated by a nationally
mixed and generally hostile population was one that was bound to generate
massive violence and bloodshed. So far as longer term causality is
concerned, it appears that the genocide was ideologically motivated; that in
the two principal areas where the Ustasha movement enjoyed a degree of
popular support (Lika and Western Hercegovina) and to a lesser extent
elsewhere, popular participation in the genocide fed off the bitterness
generated among the Croat population by the oppression it had experienced in
the interwar Yugoslav state; and that the Ustashas' genocidal proclivities
were greatly encouraged by the resistance among Serbs to the establishment
of the new 'state'. A somewhat different dynamic was at work in
Bosnia-Hercegovina, where conditions continued to be dominated by the
traditional Serb-Muslim dichotomy. Here the new conflict created by the
establishment of the NDH superimposed itself on the older, lingering
conflict over land that dated back to Ottoman times and whose supposed
resolution after 1921 had merely generated further mutual resentment.

The persecution of the Serbs began immediately following the Ustasha seizure
of power and on 25 April the Cyrillic script was banned in the NDH. The
Ustashas massacred 184 Serb peasants at Gudovac near Bjelovar on 27-28 April
and 250 at Blagaj in Kordun. On 11-12 May the Ustashas massacred 300 Serbs
at Glina; in early June 140 Serbs at Ljubinje in Hercegovina and 180 at
Korita near Gacko. On 15 June 60 Serbs were rounded up at Knin and
subsequently massacred. This pattern of massacres was repeated across the
NDH, in particular in the Serb-inhabited territories of Croatia proper and
in Hercegovina, areas from which the Ustashas drew their strongest support.
On 20 June a group of prominent Serbs from the NDH, in expectation of an
imminent massacre, petitioned the quisling Serbian government in Belgrade to
seek German intervention on behalf of the NDH's Serb population.  The
Ustashas killed their victims in a bestial manner. Thus, the 173 Serbs
rounded up in the Hercegovinian town of Nevesinje and its surroundings
during late May and June were horribly tortured before being killed: they
were set upon with hammers, picks, rifle butts and knives; the had their
ears, noses, sexual organs and fingers cut off; their eyes gouged out; their
hair, beards and eyebrows ripped out and stuffed in their mouths. While in
an Ustasha prison, Durda Golijanin was forced to watch her son and husband
being tortured. After her husband had been killed, her son, a young child,
gasped and choked and begged for water, whereupon an Ustasha shot him in the
head.  A group of Ustashas arrested a Serb innkeeper and his wife, Vaso and
Magdalena Lambic, and their two young sons in the Hercegovinian town of
Konjic in late July or early August. The headless corpse of Magdalena Lambic
was found in the River Neretva several days later; her husband and sons were
likewise murdered.  The Ustashas raped and murdered the women of the Serb
villages of Dabro and Tukbobija in Bosanska Krajina; according to two
eyewitnesses: "They cut open the breasts of women and girls and thrust their
hands inside. They burned the hair on women's heads and impaled young
children on stakes." 

The genocide of the Serbs escalated during the summer for a number of
reasons related to international developments. Pavelic's surrender of
northern Dalmatia to Italy in May acted as a catalyst to the Ustashas'
anti-Serb policies in Bosnia-Hercegovina. According to Eugen Dido Kvaternik,
former Ustasha secret police chief and himself one of the architects of the
genocide, the loss of Dalmatia led Pavelic, as an Axis puppet, to channel
Croat nationalism in an anti-Serb direction to prevent it being directed
against the Italians.  The Nazis, meanwhile, began their own genocidal
programme against the Slovene population of German-annexed Slovenia,
involving mass expulsions. They consequently put pressure on the Ustasha
regime to accept the settlement of Slovene refugees in the NDH, something
that provided an additional impetus to Ustasha efforts to expel the Serb
population of the NDH en masse to Serbia. On 7 June Hitler met with Pavelic
at Berchtesgaden and advised him to pursue a policy of "national
intolerance" for the subsequent fifty years. The deportation of the Slovenes
and the deportation of the Serbs were to be coordinated. By the start of the
Serb uprising in the NDH in late July over 10,000 Slovenes had been deported
to the NDH, just under half to Bosnia-Hercegovina, while a much larger
number of Serbs (approximately 180,000) was expelled from the NDH to Serbia.
Finally, the Axis attack on the USSR on 22 June brought an escalation of
Ustasha terror against all perceived enemies of the state - Communists,
Jews, Serbs and others. On 22 July Hitler received Slavko Kvaternik and
advised him to use the most brutal methods in dealing with the NDH's
internal enemies. On 24-25 July the Ustashas massacred 1,200 people at
Grabovac near Petrinja and at the end of the month perhaps as many as 2,000
at Glina. In Bosnia-Hercegovina the largest massacres occurred following the
outbreak of the full-scale uprising on 27 July, following which tens of
thousands were massacred in the western part of Bosanska Krajina.  In
mid-July use of the term 'Serb Orthodox religion' was banned and replaced by
'Greek Eastern religion'.

The total number of Serb victims of the Ustasha genocide is, unlike the
number of Jewish victims, the subject of fierce debate, particularly between
Serb and Croat nationalists. Available figures are not entirely satisfactory
from a scholarly perspective but may serve as an indication of the extent of
the tragedy. The Atlas of Ustasha Genocide published by the Serbian Academy
of Arts and Sciences in 1994 gives a figure of 246,025, of which 145,490
were in Bosnia-Hercegovina and 100,535 in Croatia, which seems to include
the victims of German massacres but not those killed in the Jasenovac and
Stara Gradiska concentration camps.  246,025 may therefore be taken as the
maximum number of Serb victims outside of Jasenovac and Stara Gradiska.
Concerning the latter, the oft-cited figure of 600,000 Serb deaths at
Jasenovac must be discounted as wholly unrealistic. Such a figure would
suggest that every third Bosnian and Croatian Serb was killed at Jasenovac,
implying an orderly and systematic programme of deportation to the camp by
the Ustashas that would have affected every Serb family in the NDH. There is
simply no evidence for such systematic deportations among the copious body
of published eyewitness accounts of Ustasha crimes, which suggest instead
that a much greater number of Serbs was killed either in on-site massacres
by Ustasha bands or in prisons in their respective native localities or
areas. This would be in keeping with the lawless and disorganised character
of the Ustasha state. Titoist Yugoslavia's two leading experts on Jasenovac,
Antun Miletic and Milan Bulajic, uphold the conclusion of the official
investigation into Ustasha crimes at Jasenovac and Stara Gradiska,
undertaken under the Communist regime immediately after the war, which put
the number of dead at these camps at 5-600,000. More recently, the Serb
historian Gojko Skoro, writing under the pseudonym Gojo Riste Dakina, has
broadly upheld this figure. Yet none of these historians offers any
statistical breakdown to explain how this figure was arrived at; nor do the
authors of the original investigation. 

The Bosniak Institute in Zurich published in 1998 a list of all registered
victims of the two concentration camps on the basis of data drawn from the
Office for Statistics in Belgrade. This gives a figure of 59,188 known
deaths at Jasenovac and Stara Gradiska, of which 33,944 were Serbs, 9,044
Jews, 6,546 Croats, 1,471 Gypsies, 949 Muslims and the rest mostly
nationally undetermined.  Given that this figure includes only the known and
registered victims, it should be taken as a minimum: the Croatian
demographer Vladimir Zerjavic also speaks of 59,000 known victims but says
the real figure is probably 25-30% higher.  Taken together, these sources
suggest that the total number of Serb victims of Ustasha genocide may have
been approximately 290,000 (approximately 246,000 outside Jasenovac and
Stara Gradiska and 44,000 inside). This is similar to an estimate made by
the German Embassy in Zagreb, in a letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
in Berlin on 21 February 1942, of approximately 300,000 Serb dead at Ustasha
hands.  Partisan resistance, German and Italian pressure on the Ustashas and
the consequent moderation of Ustasha policy meant that the genocide was of a
lower intensity after the spring of 1942, although there were some extremely
bloody episodes, in particular the German-Ustasha offensive at Kozara of
June-July 1942 which claimed the lives of 24,480 Serbs. Unlike in the
massacres of 1941, the greater part of these were exterminated in
concentration camps.  The above figures may be compared to the two most
recent demographic studies of Yugoslav losses during World War II by the
Serb Bogoljub Kocovic and the Croat Zerjavic, which place the total number
of Croatian and Bosnian Serb war-losses (including battlefield deaths and
civilian victims of the Chetniks, Partisans, Germans, Italians and others)
at 307,000 according to Zerjavic or 334,000 according to Kocovic (of these
170,000 Bosnian and 137,000 Croatian Serb dead according to Zerjavic or
209,000 and 125,000 respectively according to Kocovic).  The 1948 census
gives a figure of 1,678,942 for the Serb population of Croatia and
Bosnia-Hercegovina combined in that year as against a Serb population of
about 1,900,000 for the NDH in 1941.

The Ustasha genocide is often compared to the Holocaust, and indeed there
are structural connections between the two, given Hitler's initial
encouragement of Pavelic's anti-Serb policy and Pavelic's role in the
extermination of the NDH's Jews. Ustasha persecution of the Serbs resembled
in some respects Nazi persecution of the Jews. The Ustasha authorities in
Pozega issued an order on 12 May decreeing that all Orthodox inhabitants of
the municipality were to wear a white band bearing the letter 'P' for
pravoslavac (Orthodox) - clearly reminiscent of the Nazis' use of the yellow
star to label Jews.  The Ustasha authorities issued various orders to deport
Jews and Serbs to concentration camps, treating both groups as a single
category for the practical purposes of the administration of genocide.
Nevertheless, it is not the case, as Jonathan Steinberg suggests, that the
Ustasha genocide was essentially similar to the Holocaust, differing only in
its "emotional" motivation. Steinberg claims that the "sole distinction"
between the Ustasha genocide and the Holocaust was that "Croatians hated
Serbs and so they killed them", while it is "the absence of hatred which
makes Nazi genocide stand out in the long annals of human bestiality".  In
fact, there are several other important distinctions.

The Ustashas defined Serbs on a national rather than a racial basis and were
therefore ready to accept that a proportion of the NDH's Serb population
remain in the state, provided that it be forcibly assimilated and become
'Croat'. This initially involved forced conversions of the Serbs to
Catholicism and subsequently the establishment of a 'Croatian Orthodox
Church'. The Ustashas' 'Legal Decree on Racial Belonging' and 'Legal decree
on the defence of the Aryan blood and honour of the Croat nation' of 30
April were directed against Jews and Gypsies and made no mention of Serbs,
who were potentially considered assimilable.  Throughout the NDH's short
history, ethnic Serbs served in its bureaucracy, army and even in the
Ustasha militia itself. The Ustasha militia in the Bosanska Gradiska region
recruited both Serbs and Communists.  The NDH's Department of Public
Security complained in August 1942 that the Italians and Chetniks were
obstructing the enrolment of Orthodox youth in the Domobrans.  The NDH's
District Superintendent for Bileca in the winter of 1942-43 was an ethnic
Serb.  The NDH's 'parliament', which ceased meeting in December 1942, had
two ethnic Serb members, Savo Besarovic and Svetislav Sumanovic. Besarovic,
a personal friend of Pavelic's, was subsequently named minister without
portfolio. Some Serbs who had served as officers in the Austro-Hungarian
Army were allowed to serve as officers in the NDH's armed forces.  Serbs who
'became Croat' or converted to Catholicism were still frequently murdered,
but not always: the Ustashas had no intention of killing all Serbs. The
Ustasha commander in Jajce in November 1941 suggested to his superiors the
recognition of "complete civic equality in the villages and municipalities
with an Orthodox majority" and "protection for Orthodox property", and
informed them that "I have already taken measures to ensure the protection
of that part of the Orthodox population that is not encompassed by the rebel
detachments, as well as of their property";  an SS commander would never
have conceived of such an offer to the Jews, even insincerely. In this
context, it is worth citing Mile Budak's infamous statement of 22 July 1941:
"We shall kill one part of the Serbs, we shall transport another, and the
rest of them will be forced to embrace the Roman Catholic religion. This
last part will be absorbed by the Croatian elements."  Such a statement
would have been unthinkable for Hitler with regard to the Jews; the Final
Solution aimed at their total extermination, not at their expulsion and
certainly not at their assimilation.

There are other reasons why the Ustasha genocide was not equivalent to the
Holocaust. The NDH was never a totalitarian state equivalent to Nazi
Germany, and there were various instances of the Ustashas at the local level
being forced, under pressure from the Muslim and Croat populace, to abandon
particular anti-Serb actions or release Serbs from captivity. So far as the
NDH's Jews were concerned, the Ustashas allowed some of them to be
recognised as "honorary Aryans", a necessity given that several leading
Ustashas had Jewish or part-Jewish wives, including Pavelif himself and
Slavko Kvaternik, while the latter's son Eugen Dido Kvaternik was himself
part Jewish. As is usually the case with dictatorships in South East Europe,
in the NDH personal connections often counted for more than did ideology.
Arrest by the NDH police was furthermore not necessarily a death sentence
for a Serb, or even for a Jew. The trial in Sarajevo on 22 July 1941 of
eleven suspected Communists resulted in two being immediately sentenced to
death and executed; four being held pending further investigation and five
being released. Drago Sobot, a Serb Communist from Drvar, was among those
released, in his own words, "on account of insufficient evidence" against
him. One of the others who was either acquitted or subsequently released was
the Jewish Communist Estera Tina Romano.  Finally, although it is untrue
that the Serbs 'provoked' the genocide by armed resistance to the NDH,
nevertheless the Ustasha genocide differed from the Holocaust in that it was
the product of a genuine power struggle between two nationalities competing
for control of the same space. The birth of the NDH was one episode in this
power-struggle; armed clashes between the Ustashas on the one hand and
Yugoslav and Serb forces on the other began during the April War, claiming
the life of members of both sides including Slavko Kvaternik's own brother,
and continued thereafter. The Ustasha genocide was thus an extreme solution
to a territorial conflict between rival nationalisms. In all these respects
the position of the Serbs in the NDH and the Ustashas' view of them was
simply not equivalent to the position of the Jews in the Third Reich and the
perception of them by the Nazis; the Ustasha genocide was more similar to
the Armenian genocide of 1915 than to the Holocaust. Put differently: it is
impossible to imagine a Jewish rebellion spearheading a revolutionary
overthrow of the Nazis; the Serbs, unlike the Jews, were never simply
defenceless victims.


 1) Nikola Milovanovic, Vojni puc i 27. mart, Prosveta, Belgrade, 1960, pp.
 2)  Enver Redzic, Bosna i Hercegovina u Drugom svjetskom ratu, Sarajevo,
OKO, 1998, pp. 22-25; Ljubo Boban, Hrvatske granice od 1918. do 1993.
godine, Skolska knjiga, Zagreb, 1995, p. 47.
 3)  Fikreta Jelic-Butic, Ustase i Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska 1941-1945,
Sveucilisna Naklada Liber, Zagreb, 1978, p. 106.
 4) Roy Gutman (ed.) Encyclopedia of the Holocaust, MacMillan, New York,
1990, pp. 323-328; Zdenko Levntal (ed.), Zlocini fasistickih okupatora i
njihovih pomagaca protiv jevreja u Jugoslaviji, Belgrade, 1952, pp. 64, 70;
Narcisa Lengel-Krizman, "A contribution to the study of terror in the
so-called 'Independent State of Croatia': Concentration camps for women in
1941-1942", Yad Vashem Studies, 20, 1990, pp. 1-5.
 5) Jozo Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: Occupation
and Collaboration, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2001, p. 605.
 6) Jelic-Butic, Ustase i NDH, p. 182; Tomasevich, Occupation and
Collaboration, pp. 608-610. Tomasevich estimates that the official figure of
40,000 Gypsies in the NDH in 1941 is too high and that the number was closer
to 25,000. 
 7) Jelic-Butic, Ustase i NDH, pp. 164-167.
 8) Archive of the Military-Historical Institute, Belgrade, Nedic
Collection, box 1, facs. 1, doc. 3 (1942 - 3rd part).
  8) Milan Bulajic (ed.), Ustaski zlocini genocida i sudenje Andriji
Artukovicu 1986. godine, vol. 1, Rad, Belgrade, 1988, p. 457.
  9) Vladimir Dedijer and Antun Miletic, Proterivanje Srba sa ognjista
1941-1944: Svedocanstva, Prosveta, Belgrade, 1990, pp. 274-275.
  10) Ibid., pp. 445-446.
  11) Eugen Dido Kvaternik, Sjecanja: Zapazanja 1925-1945 - Prilozi za
hrvatski povijest, Zagreb, 1995, p. 134.
  12) Rafael Brcic, "O iseljavanju Slovenaca u Bosni 1941. godine", Prilozi,
1973, no. 9/1, pp. 303-309; Philippe Burrin, Hitler and the Jews: the
Genesis of the Holocaust, Edward Arnold, London, 1994, p. 139; Jelic-Butic,
Ustase i NDH, pp. 167-170.
  13) Strahinja Kurdulija, Atlas of the Ustasha genocide of the Serbs
1941-1945, Istorijski institut SANU, Belgrade, 1994, p. 82.
 14) Antun Miletic, Koncentracioni logor Jasenovac 1941-1945, vol. 1,
Narodna knjiga, Belgrade, 1986, pp. 36-38; Bulajic, Ustaski zlocini
genocida, vol. 4, 1989, pp. 868-887; Gojo Riste Dakina, Genocida nad Srbima
u Nezavisnoj Drzavi Hrvatskoj - Budi katolik ili umri, Institut za Savremenu
Istoriju, Belgrade, 1995, pp. 190-193. 
 15) Jasenovac - Zrtve rata prema podacima statistickog zavoda Jugoslavije,
Bosnjacki Institut, Zurich and Sarajevo, 1998, p. iv.
 16) "85,000 Serbs, Jews, Croats and Romanies killed in Jasenovac", Croatia
weekly, Zagreb, 10 June 1999.
  17) The Jasenovac Exhibition, held in Belgrade in April-May 2000.
  18) Branko Bokan, Genocid nad Srbima Bosanske Krajine 1941-1945, Evropsko
slovo, Belgrade, 1996, p. 63.
  19) Vladimir Zerjavic, Gubici stanovnistva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom
ratu, Jugoslavensko viktimolosko drustvo, Zagreb, 1989, pp. 61-63; Bogoljub
Kocovic, Zrtve drugog svetskog rata u Jugoslaviji, Veritas Foundation Press,
London, 1985, pp. 65-70.
  20) Petar Kasavenda and Nikola Zivkovic, Srbi u Nezavisnoj Drzavi
Hrvatskoj: Izabrani dokumenta, Institut za Savremenu Istoriju, Belgrade,
1998, p. 99.
  21) Ibid., pp. 166-167, 235-236.
  22) Jonathan Steinberg, "Types of genocide ? Croatians, Serbs and Jews,
1941-5", in David Cesarani (ed.), The Final Solution: Origins and
implementation, Routledge, London and New York, 1994, pp. 190-191.
  23) Kasavenda and Zivkovic, Srbi u NDH, pp. 87-90.
  24) Archive of Yugoslavia, Belgrade, Collection 516, doc. MG 1415.
  25) Historical Museum of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Sarajevo, Collection 'UNS',
box 2, doc. 466.
  26) Historical Museum of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Collection 'UNS', box 3, doc.
  27) Tomasevich, Occupation and Collaboration, pp. 380-381.
  28) Historical Museum of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Collection 'UNS', box 1, doc.
  29) Edmond Paris, Genocide in satellite Croatia, 1941-1945: A record of
racial and religious persecutions and massacres, American Institute for
Balkan Affairs, Chicago, n.d., p. 100.
  30) Drago Sobot, "Pred ustaskim prijekim sudom", in Sarajevo u Revoluciji,
vol. 2, Istorijski arhiv Sarajevo, Sarajevo, 1977, pp. 187-190; Nisim
Albahari, "Od Aprilskog rata do ustanka", in Sarajevo u Revoluciji, vol. 2,
p. 56.

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