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Opinions
Hearts grown cold
William Montgomery
August 4 marked the ten-year anniversary of Operation Storm. The
Croatians celebrate it as the biggest victory in their struggle for
independence and the liberation of territory taken by force by
rebellious Serbs three years earlier. Serbs, on the other hand,
continue to view Operation Storm as a classic example of "ethnic
cleansing" and unanswered war crimes. The recent "battle of the
Presidents" (Tadic and Mesic) outlined these differences distinctly.
The "victors" in the Balkan Wars are the small minority of individuals
on all sides who were determined to make the rupture between the
ethnic groups so severe that relations would be beyond repairing. They
were aided by government-controlled media, which presented distorted,
inflammatory information, which in the initial phase of the breakup of
the former Yugoslavia was instrumental in re-kindling fears,
suspicions, and antagonisms among the ethnic groups, which had laid
dormant for decades. The vast majority of people of all ethnic groups
in all the countries of the former Yugoslavia never wanted the
violence which swept over this region and suffered one way or another
because of it. But the orgy of rape, destruction of houses, murder,
and brutality has traumatized so many of those involved that I just
don't see how they can ever recover. To talk to these victims about
reconciliation is to them an insult. To these victims, there is
"collective guilt" that can neither be forgotten nor forgiven. I have
heard this from all sides. A respected and moderate Serbian journalist
whose solution to Kosovo is to throw out all the Albanians from "our
land" because most of them are terrorists anyway. A prominent citizen
of Dubrovnik whose comment about Montenegro is that "only evil comes
from there" and that the border should be permanently shut. A woman in
Zagreb who asks the court to curtail visiting rights for her child's
father because "he is a Serb." Croats who feel no empathy for any of
the 200,000 or so Serbs who fled the Knin area during Operation Storm
because they viewed them as either active participants or passive
facilitators in the crimes committed against Croats who lived in that
area during and after the establishment of the "Republika Srpska
Krajina."
The most depressing fact is that young people on all sides who were
not old enough to have even actively participated in any of these
events are now some of the most antagonistic towards the other ethnic
groups. In talking with them, it is clear that they have no real
factual knowledge of what went on, only anecdotes handed down from
older generations. Yet, these young people are the ones regularly
involved in virtually all the incidents of ethnic violence or
demonstrations, which now take place. What does this mean for the
future?
The encouraging news is that politicians and media outlets on all
sides are slowly taking the politically difficult steps of looking
more closely - and honestly - at the past. President Tadic's visit to
the commemoration of Srebrenica along with the leadership of the
Bosnian Serbs is one example. So is the broadcasting on Serbian
television of the casual murder of six Bosnian Muslims by members of
the Scorpion paramilitary organization. So are the recent media
revelations and debate about the alleged killing of Serbs in Osijek in
1991. So is the initial step taken by the Montenegrin government to
begin to provide compensation for the damage done to the Konavle area
during the war. It is entirely predictable that as this process
unfolds, there will be a backlash from both extreme nationalists and
those traumatized by the recent wars. In fact all four of the examples
I cite above have led to criticism and protest from virtually all
sides. My first reaction was to think this showed that attitudes were
actually hardening instead of moderating. Upon reflection, however, I
think it is more that the gestures I have described above have simply
brought out the deeply held feelings felt by so many.
It would take a book to adequately cover all aspects of Operation
Storm, including the policies of my government at the time. Certainly,
the viewpoints of the Serbs and Croats about it radically differ. I
want to make just a few points.
First of all, it is ironic how President Milosevic first strongly
supported, funded, and armed the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and
encouraged their "revolts," but then when the going got tough, he left
them dangling in the wind to fend for themselves. For it is clear that
Milosevic decided not to defend the "Republic of Krajina" with all the
forces at his disposal. He also acquiesced in the Erdut Agreement,
which returned Eastern Slavonia to Croatian control. His final legacy
to Serbia is the 600,000 Serbian displaced persons and refugees from
Kosovo, Bosnia, and Croatia still living - existing - in Serbia
proper. With international assistance to them drying up and the State
unable to provide the resources needed to integrate them into society,
they have little hope or prospects for the future and are a fertile
recruiting ground for the Serbian Radical Party.
Secondly, the correct model for dealing with the rebellious areas of
Croatia under Croatian Serb control was the one, which we in the
International Community used in cooperation with the Serbian
government for dealing with the rebellion by ethnic Albanians in the
Ground Safety Zone bordering Kosovo in Southern Serbia in 2000-2001.
We had two fundamental principles. The first was that the territory
absolutely was and would be part of Serbia subject to its full
sovereignty. Second, that the ethnic Albanians living there needed to
be given the same rights and privileges as any other citizen of
Serbia. For our part, the international community contributed - and
still contributes to this day - special funding support to help the
entire area and its full population of Serbs, Albanians, and Roma to
benefit.
If the UN would have had the support and will, this is the approach,
which they should have used in 1992 to resolve the situation in
Croatia. The willingness to use force, if required, at that time by
the international community would have ultimately been far less
painful and the damage far more repairable. But the UN and its
member-countries never thought this way. Instead, it seemed content to
live permanently with the ceasefire lines that had been established in
disregard to the UN's own resolutions. So, just as in Bosnia, the
actions of the UN in Croatia ultimately became counter-productive. Its
unwillingness to engage led directly to the Croatian government
decision to conduct Operations Flash and Storm. In essence it acted
when it became apparent that the UN would not.
Finally, I regret that the commentary about Operation Storm in Croatia
and Serbia has fallen back to much of the same rhetoric of the past.
To put it simplistically, all of the Serbian commentary begins on
August 4, 1995 and looks only ahead at the impact of the operation and
its aftermath on the Croatian Serbs who were living there. The
Croatian commentary begins with events of the preceding several years
when the "Republika Srpska Krajina" was being established through
force and violence and ends with the liberation of Knin. It will be
beneficial to the political stability of the region, the
reconciliation process in general, and the chances for European
integration when both sides are willing and able to take more
comprehensive views of the Operation in its entirety, from 1991 to the
present.
Serbian News Network - SNN
[email protected]
http://www.antic.org/
