BRIDGING KOSOVO'S MITROVICA DIVIDE - ICG Report BRIDGING KOSOVO'S MITROVICA DIVIDE
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS The international community has properly decreed that Kosovo's final status must not involve division of its territory. But this declaration has not been followed by sufficient action. Belgrade's policy of pursuing some form of partition is far advanced in the restive northern city of Mitrovica and its hinterland, and a major security, political and financial effort is required to save the situation. Capacity should be built immediately, and its implementation should begin once the Contact Group has declared its support for Kosovo's future as a functional, conditionally independent state within its present borders. Territorial integrity is the correct policy because partition could provoke further population exchanges inside Kosovo and instability elsewhere in the Balkans, especially in neighbouring Macedonia. But division remains a live issue, not least because in Mitrovica, where Kosovo is increasingly divided at the Ibar River, the UN mission (UNMIK) and NATO-led security forces (KFOR) have failed to carry out their mandates. In north Mitrovica and the neighbouring communities up to the border, an area that contains perhaps a third of all Kosovo's remaining Serbs, Belgrade exerts its influence through parallel government structures, including a police presence that contravenes UN Security Council Resolution 1244. Settling Mitrovica early in the final status process presupposes foreknowledge of Kosovo's overall destination. But it is time for Contact Group member states to stop talking of final status as a process open to a wide range of results. In fact, behind closed doors international consensus is taking shape. Making that manifest near the outset, and cementing it in Mitrovica, would contribute to a virtuous circle of stability and predictability. Letting Mitrovica drift would risk making realisation of that consensus unlikely. Despite the six-year standoff, Mitrovica is not impenetrable to transformation that would increase the chances for a unified Kosovo. The international community should put more resources and energy behind a clear, articulated program of compromise between each side's maximum demands. A first step should be the appointment of a Special Commissioner for Mitrovica for the status determination period, with the rank of Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and power to coordinate the effort. UNMIK and KFOR must quickly regain the security initiative north of the Ibar by increasing force levels and assertiveness, under the Special Commissioner's direction. KFOR should explicitly make Mitrovica and the north its primary operational focus and restructure accordingly. Belgrade's illegal police stations should be removed from north Kosovo, and the Special Commissioner should negotiate the replacement of the obstructive hardliners who head the regional hospital and university there. Plans for devolving the brittle, ethnically divided Mitrovica regional police command to local control should be delayed until the Special Commissioner can secure a viable Albanian-Serb security consensus for the north that squares territorial integrity with Serb fears of being overwhelmed. With the security situation under better control, the framework of a solution that needs to be pursued with greater commitment and sense of urgency could include creation of a new municipal authority for north Mitrovica, which should furnish both the security and accountability for addressing Albanian returns, and creation of a central administrative district shared between the current Mitrovica municipality and the new north Mitrovica unit that could house a common city board to receive donor funding for the city's development. The strategic need is to encourage the Serbs of north Kosovo -- and Belgrade -- to think increasingly of north Mitrovica becoming the hub of an effort to provide services for all Kosovo's Serbs. The central district's broader uniting purpose could be reflected by hosting two or three ministries relocated from the capital; the similarly relocated Supreme Court; possibly a Kosovowide Serbian-language television station; and some elements of Kosovo central government that would accommodate an autonomous, Kosovo-wide system of education, healthcare, and other social services for Serbs. Both the international community and Kosovo's government should aim to incorporate Belgrade's parallel structures into this system within a specified Bridging Kosovo's Mitrovica Divide Crisis Group Europe Report N?165, 13 September 2005 Page ii time frame by offering matching funds and a guaranteed cooperative role for the Serbian government. Without conceding it formal entity status on the Bosnia- Herzegovina model, the Serb north should be offered the substance of autonomy, including devolved powers for municipalities, freedom for municipalities to associate on a voluntary basis, and the coordination and resource role made possible through the proposed Serb units of Kosovo's government ministries. Albanians should be persuaded that support for participation in these initiatives by viable new Serb-majority municipalities elsewhere in Kosovo would dampen pressure for division on the Ibar line. In short, if facts on the ground in Mitrovica and even new violence are not to destroy the prospect of a stable final status settlement for Kosovo, the international community needs to work harder and creatively to change Serb strategic thinking and get Albanians to recognise the need to participate in a constructive offer. The no-partition dictum is, unfortunately, not self-executing. RECOMMENDATIONS Preliminary steps, by end October 2005 To the Contact Group and its Member States and the UN Secretary-General: 1. Appoint a Special Commissioner for Mitrovica, with the rank of Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, preferably someone with a military background and experience of civilian implementation, to hold office until at least the end of 2006. 2. Reinforce and reconfigure international security forces in Mitrovica and north Kosovo by replacing KFOR's French-commanded Multinational Brigade North-East with a force designed to closely support the Special Commissioner, and by introducing a special international paramilitary police unit such as the new European Gendarmerie Force, under the Special Commissioner's direct control. 3. Set the stage for a Mitrovica settlement by stating clearly and publicly that the Contact Group's preferred outcome for Kosovo is as a functional, conditionally independent state. 4. Invite Belgrade to participate in Kosovo Albanian- Kosovo Serb negotiations on decentralisation under the aegis of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, conditional on its acceptance of the foregoing Contact Group statement. 5. Allocate, together with the EU, funds for a multifaceted Mitrovica investment program. To UNMIK: 6. Take a more cautious approach to devolving police commands to the Kosovo Police Service in the Mitrovica region pending the final status settlement, deploy international police and customs officers to the Leposavic and Zubin Potok boundary crossings, and develop a modified chain of command, giving the Special Commissioner control over new international paramilitary police forces to be deployed into the Mitrovica region. 7. Energise the Kosovo Albanian cross-party final status working groups to begin developing a framework for resolving the problem of Mitrovica and the north within parameters that rule out partition, stipulate substantial decentralisation and encourage secure returns of former residents to their homes on both sides of the Ibar, and do the same in parallel with the Serbs through the mayors of the three northern municipalities, the leadership of the Serb List for Kosovo and Metohija, and (perhaps indirectly) the Serbian National Council. 8. Make a more determined effort to educate Serbs and Albanians in Mitrovica about developments and conditions on the other side of the Ibar divide by supporting new public information programs and encouraging relevant news about the other in their respective media. To the Provisional Institutions of Government (PISG) in Pristina: 9. Using the final status working groups, explore and prepare public opinion in Mitrovica and throughout Kosovo for various options of reorganising Mitrovica and giving it a constructive mission. 10. Enable creation of more Serb-majority municipal units south of the Ibar, in particular a greater Gracanica municipality, to act as counterweights to Serbian pressures for partition. To Belgrade: 11. Cooperate with the Special Commissioner in identifying credible candidates to lead Mitrovica's university and regional hospital. 12. Prepare to close down parallel police stations and courts in north Kosovo, including by negotiating with the Special Commissioner for credible security provision to fill gaps their removal may leave. Bridging Kosovo's Mitrovica Divide Crisis Group Europe Report N?165, 13 September 2005 Page iii 13. Begin designing an outreach structure to assume joint responsibility with the PISG for supporting a non-territorial scheme of autonomous healthcare, education, and social services for all Kosovo Serbs. Negotiation steps, from November 2005 To the PISG/Kosovo Final Status Working Groups: 14. Make a generous offer to Serbs, including: (a) willingness to negotiate mechanisms for demilitarisation and joint security oversight with the Serbs of the Mitrovica region and acceptance that Serb municipalities will have the final say in appointment of their police chiefs; (b) willingness to accept a Serb municipality in Mitrovica that subscribes to a common city coordinating board and a unifying role for the city in Kosovo, and works to accommodate the rights of Albanian Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs); (c) willingness to give Serbs space in central government and institutions, such as by relocating some of them to Mitrovica (and Gracanica), and offering Serbs a deputy prime minister post; and (d) guarantees such as dual citizenship, an open border with Serbia, and national-rate telephone connections to Serbia. To the Special Commissioner: 15. Consult widely in Mitrovica on models for the city's future administration and role and decide by the end of 2005: (a) whether north Mitrovica should be a standalone municipality or combined with Zvecan; (b) the territory of any central inter-municipal district; and (c) the electoral rights of its inhabitants, and the shape of any common city board. 16. Found a joint Serb-Albanian-international security coordination body, seated in central Mitrovica, to seek consensus on a security concept for the Mitrovica region and eventually oversee its demilitarisation. 17. Oversee and, if necessary, determine and (with KFOR assistance) enforce the selection by November 2005 of new heads for the regional hospital and university. Implementation steps, from early to late 2006 To the Special Commissioner: 18. Design the new Serb-majority municipality in north Mitrovica, the central inter-municipal district and the city coordinating board; establish automatic funding for administration and projects of the common board in the budgets of the north and south Mitrovica municipalities; and decide whether initially to appoint councillors or go straight to a municipal election in the north. 19. Oversee Albanian returns to north Mitrovica. 20. Oversee establishment of revolving funds for Mitrovica-based service institutions, including the regional hospital, university, a new Serbianlanguage public television channel (RTK-2), and a new shared Coordination Centre/Kosovo Ministry of Economy and Finance unit for regularising Serb parallel structures throughout Kosovo as a non-territorial autonomous system to provide education, healthcare, and social services for Serbs. 21. Lay the groundwork for a Kosovo Albanian- Kosovo Serb agreement on security management of the north by overseeing the obligatory disbandment of Belgrade's police (MUP) stations in north Kosovo and implementation of any decision reached by the joint security coordination body on the regional Kosovo Protection Corps command in south Mitrovica. 22. Oversee introduction and enforcement of Kosovo car licence plates north of the Ibar. To the PISG/Kosovo Final Status Working Groups: 23. Seek Serb partners in Mitrovica and north Kosovo with whom to agree on security management of the north, and consider such mechanisms and techniques as joint oversight bodies, regular rotation schedules, and sub-contracting some responsibilities to international personnel so that Kosovo's sovereignty can be exercised consistent with its Serbs' concerns about Albanian domination. 24. Establish new, largely Serb-staffed units of ministries -- in Mitrovica, Gracanica and Pristina -- to administer the new autonomous system of education, healthcare and social services for Serbs throughout Kosovo and offer the Serbian government opportunities to cooperate in this service system. 25. Transfer some Kosovo central institutions to Mitrovica's central district, such as two or three Bridging Kosovo's Mitrovica Divide Crisis Group Europe Report N?165, 13 September 2005 Page iv ministries and the Supreme Court, and support establishment of a Serbian-language television channel (RTK-2) there and facilitate its Kosovowide transmission. 26. Offer constitutional provisions that, without conceding formal entity status, would allow Serb areas to construct de facto autonomy, including significant devolution of powers to municipalities; freedom for municipalities to associate on a voluntary basis; and the coordination and resource role offered by the new Serb units of government ministries established to administer education, healthcare and social services. Pristina/Belgrade/Brussels, 13 September 2005 http://kosovareport.blogspot.com/2005/09/bridging-kosovos-mitrovica-divide-i cg.html Serbian News Network - SNN [email protected] http://www.antic.org/
