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Kosovo's difficult road |
By Hans Binnendijk
International Herald Tribune
MONDAY, OCTOBER 3,
2005
| PRISTINA, Kosovo Kosovo will probably
receive some form of independence next year as a product of United
Nations-led shuttle diplomacy between Belgrade and Pristina. But
those in the United States looking for an exit strategy from Kosovo
will have a long wait. Negotiations will be difficult, the exact
outcome remains uncertain and a significant international presence
will need to remain in Kosovo to guarantee whatever final status can
be achieved.
The UN envoy Kai Eide's
report on political and economic standards in Kosovo, to be issued
soon, will probably present a mixed picture of progress. The
international community has introduced democratic reform and
economic development, but Kosovo remains a deeply divided territory
with parallel Kosovar and Belgrade-directed structures, weak
political leadership, an unemployment rate of perhaps half the
population, mafia influence in most matters, and heavy reliance on
the West for security.
Despite these problems,
the move to limited independence is under way. The Albanian majority
has run out of patience with the UN Mission in Kosovo, which is
widely if unfairly blamed for Kosovo's misery and has been
threatened with a terror campaign if independence is not granted
soon. Western diplomats have concluded that further delay is not
feasible. Martti Ahtisaari, a former Finnish president, is being
discussed as the likely UN envoy to undertake shuttle diplomacy.
The six-nation contact
group - the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy and
Russia - which will guide Ahtisaari's efforts, agrees on three basic
negotiating principles: no return to Serbian sovereignty, no
partition of Kosovo and no unification of Kosovo with its Albanian
neighbors. There is widespread agreement that Serbia forfeited its
sovereignty over Kosovo with its brutal ethnic cleansing in 1999.
Partition of Kosovo would set an unacceptable precedent for Bosnia
and the rest of the Balkans. Union with Albania is not on the agenda
for most Kosovars.
These principles will be
hard for Belgrade to accept because it will lose not only
sovereignty over Kosovo but also several Serbian minority enclaves
and many sites central to Serbian cultural heritage. Belgrade
remains divided between the forces of President Boris Tadic and a
nationalist coalition led by Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica,
which may make concessions even more difficult. The international
community will need to convince reluctant politicians in Serbia that
they have more to gain from closer ties to the West than they lose
by accepting these three principles.
The rights of Serbian
minorities need special protection, especially after the Albanian
Kosovar rioters destroyed about 30 Serbian churches in March 2004.
Getting this wrong could easily lead to renewed conflict.
Decentralization of power to the local level throughout Kosovo will
help, but special arrangements will be needed in Mitrovica and three
Serbian municipalities north of the Ibar River, where education,
health care, security and finance are all controlled by Belgrade.
The area north of the
Ibar will need to become a protected zone for the Serbian minority,
with Kosovar sovereignty but special international status at least
during an interim period.
Security in the new
independent Kosovo will require continued international attention.
Kosovo has no army and its small Kosovo Protection Corps needs
significant technical and financial help from the West.
International civilian police officers will be needed in strength to
oversee the fledgling Kosovo Police Service.
Most important, however,
the NATO mission, known as KFOR, must stay. These 17,000 troops from
more than 30 countries will still be needed to provide stability for
the young nation. The United States contributes only about 10
percent of the KFOR troops, but that contingent is critical. Any
notion of shifting the Kosovo peacekeeping mission to the European
Union as was done in Bosnia is premature. The U.S. base in
Southeastern Kosovo should remain as part of the new U.S. forward
posture in Europe.
KFOR troops will have to
operate in the new Mitrovica zone, an area they have thus far
avoided, to assure the safety and eventual integration of the
Serbian population. The national units represented in KFOR need to
be reorganized in a task force structure to assure smoother
operations. And cooperation between KFOR and the international
civilian police operation has been poor and will need improvement to
secure this transition. KFOR, the Kosovo Protection Corps and the
Kosovo Police Service must be able to work together effectively as
seamless providers of internal and external security.
As the United Nations
ends its mission, the European Union will need to take up the slack.
The EU already oversees economic reconstruction and development.
That task has just begun.
With the United Nations
engaging in shuttle diplomacy to arrange final status, NATO
continuing to provide security, and the EU accelerating its economic
development activities, a new Kosovo nation will have a reasonable
chance of survival and - eventually - prosperity.
Hans Binnendijk is
director of the Center for Technology and National Security Policy
at the National Defense University. This article does not
necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. government.
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