UNMIK/PR/1456
Thursday, 1 December 2005
SRSG Addresses DCAF Roundtable in Geneva
PRISTINA – SRSG Søren Jessen-Petersen today addressed a roundtable at the
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). Following is
the text of his address:
“Ladies and Gentlemen, thank you.
It is a great pleasure to be back again at DCAF – an organisation with which I
personally have had a long and fruitful co-operation over the years. Since
taking on the role of Special Representative of the Secretary General in Kosovo
that co-operation has intensified and continued to bear fruit, as I hope will
be made clear in the course of my comments.
The title of my address is “Kosovo – where are we now?” and I will of course be
saying something about that. But I may sometimes stray away from the present
and address some questions related to the past, like “how did we get here?” and
some related to the future, like “where are we going now?” and “where will we
be in two years’ time?”
STATUS – WHY IT’S NECESSARY AND HOW WE GOT HERE
But returning to the question in hand – where are we now? We are at the point
of beginning finally to resolve the root cause of the political problem of
Kosovo – its status.
Following up on the international community’s military intervention in Kosovo,
the Spring and Summer of 1999 was in retrospect the logical moment to have
addressed this fundamental issue. But for a variety of reasons – understandable
at the time and to some extent now – that opportunity was not grasped.
For five years thereafter we, in the international community, made the error of
confusing quietude with contentment and sullen acceptance of the status quo
with sustainability. This is not to underestimate the huge achievements of the
international community in general, and UNMIK in particular, during this
period; the building up from nothing of democratically-controlled institutions
and, perhaps more significantly, of a democratic ethos – as witnessed by a
string of successfully managed elections – is, for instance, an accomplishment
of which we can be justifiably proud.
But it is nonetheless true, in my view, that for too long – because of the
“holding” nature of UNMIK’s mandate under SCR 1244 – we failed to provide a
sense, a perception, of momentum; of forward movement. Something that could
give everyone a belief that the fundamental problems would, in the end, be
addressed and solved.
As has been said so often as to become a cliché, March 2004 was for all of us a
“wake up call”. I was, at the time, EU Special Representative in Macedonia, and
I remember the shock of those events from our vantage point in Skopje. But the
contrast set me thinking. Why was Macedonia so stable and peaceful in
comparison to Kosovo? Was it only that the conflict there in the summer of 2001
had been so short and mild compared with the more bitter experiences to the
North? I was, and am, convinced that this was not the only explanation. What
struck me was the fact that the Ohrid Framework Agreement in Macedonia directly
addressed the core reasons for the conflict there, without rewarding any side
disproportionately. In Kosovo, UN Security Council Resolution 1244 did not.
What we did have, though, was the Standards policy. Formally rolled out in
December 2003, this offered a forward looking developmental agenda which
provided the framework that could move Kosovo forward. Unfortunately the
Standards policy was not seen this way locally. Instead it was regarded as a
series of insurmountable obstacles thrown up by the international community
specifically in order to maintain its holding operation and avoid the issue of
status. As such it was in need of two things: prioritisation and repackaging.
The first was necessary to make the implementation of standards feasible, and
the second in order to send the message that they were a positive factor in
Kosovo politics, aimed at improving the lives of all its citizens – and not a
deliberate barrier imposed by the international community on the road to a
status settlement.
THE STATUS PROCESS
Whatever the reason – and I think that the shock of international condemnation
of the March events among the political leadership in Kosovo was one major
factor, and the appointment of Ramush Haradinaj as Prime Minister in November
2004 another – the pace of political developments, and of standards
implementation, picked up noticeably at the end of last year and the beginning
of this one. This improvement in standards implementation was what lay behind
our positive review and report to the Security Council in May of this year and
the subsequent appointment by the Secretary General of the United Nations of
Ambassador Eide to undertake his comprehensive review. His report, as you are
all aware, led to the recommendation of the Secretary General of the opening of
the status process. It was followed by the appointment of Martti Ahtisaari as
Special Envoy only a couple of weeks ago.
And so to the present. The status process is now underway, having been
kicked-off in earnest by the Special Envoy’s visit last week to Kosovo and to
Belgrade, Podgorica, Tirana and Skopje thereafter. There is no fixed timeframe
for the process. On the other hand, an indefinitely protracted process – or in
my words a continuation of the status quo – is, as has also been made clear by
the Contact Group in its guiding principles, intolerable. These principles have
been repeatedly referred to by Martti Ahtisaari as forming the fundamental
basis for the process which he now has the difficult task of leading, supported
by his able deputy, the Austrian diplomat Albert Rohan.
LOOKING AHEAD ON STATUS
But what of the outcome? It is not in my mandate to comment on this. But it
seems to me self-evident that the strong, almost unanimous, view of the
majority of the people in Kosovo must form the basis for any sustainable status
settlement. Their preference is clear.
What is equally clear is that Kosovo’s government and political class cannot
treat the status process as the only political game in town. Its pace, progress
and outcome are – as Kosovo’s leaders should not now be in any doubt –
critically dependent on the way Kosovo is perceived by the outside world. This
means that the implementation of standards must continue – and indeed be
speeded up – if Kosovo is to be seen as deserving the settlement its people so
clearly desire. What the majority wants for itself – peace, stability, and
prosperity – it must also want for all other citizens – in other words, the
minorities – in Kosovo.
Indeed it is clear that the substance of the settlement of Kosovo’s status must
take into account the views of its people. The majority has a duty toward the
minority that is not merely a matter of standards implementation for its own
sake. It extends to the status process and beyond. The political leadership in
Kosovo is now waking up to this reality. The recently-announced formation of a
“Council of Communities” to advise the status negotiation team is a welcome
first step – the next being to ensure that this Council has real influence and,
ideally, that it takes into account the views of Kosovo’s largest minority
group; the Kosovo Serbs.
BELGRADE AND THE KOSOVO SERBS
The position of the Kosovo Serbs in relation to the status process has been
ambivalent. None of the main Kosovo Serb political figures has engaged with
President Rugova’s negotiating team – an extension of their existing boycott,
under Belgrade’s insistence, of Kosovo’s governmental and legislative
institutions. At the same time there has been no coherent effort to form a
purely Kosovo Serb team; one that would be in a position to influence the
positions of both Belgrade and Pristina equally. Instead, two Kosovo Serb
leaders, Marko Jaksic and Goran Bogdanovic, have been invited to join the
Belgrade negotiating team.
Hitherto, the position of Belgrade in relation to Kosovo has been about
territory and authority. Whose land is it and who rules it? It has been much
less focused, in practical terms, on the position and interests of those Serbs
who continue to live in Kosovo. To give an example, the boycott of Kosovo’s
legislature and government by Kosovo’s Serbs may be seen in Belgrade as a
success, because it underlines their claim that these institutions are
illegitimate. But it has brought no benefit at all for Kosovo’s Serbs, who are
excluded from the institutions which have the greatest impact on their lives
and who receive nothing new to compensate for this exclusion.
The status process is, of course, ultimately about those big issues of
sovereignty and authority. But beneath this it will be largely about the
practical aspects of life in Kosovo – and in particular about the conditions of
minority groups. A Belgrade negotiating strategy that is focused on the first
issue may not achieve, or even seek, the best outcome for Kosovo’s Serbs in
respect of the second issue. If they are to have the life that we all want for
them in Kosovo, it is in my view essential that this process be seen as being
one primarily about people, and not just about territory – let alone history.
TWO YEARS’ HENCE
But, putting aside the vexed issue of sovereignty, and assuming that the
process goes in the direction I have outlined, what can we say about what will
Kosovo look like in twelve months or two years’ time?
Our best guide is the Guiding Principles stated by the Contact Group which will
serve as a framework for the status process. I, of course, take it for granted
that these principles will be respected fully throughout the process by all
parties and by the international community. The last ten to fifteen years in
the Balkans have been a period of broken promises by the international
community – carrying with them a loss of credibility. This we can no longer
afford.
So, looking at the Contact Group’s stated principles, we can be sure that
Kosovo’s frontiers will be as they are now and the territory will be undivided
as a result of the status process. We can also be sure that Kosovo will not
have formed any new union with a neighbouring state. And finally we can be sure
that Kosovo will not be returning to the situation before March 1999.
So much, so obvious. Beyond this, we can say with some certainty that Kosovo’s
institutions will closely resemble those that currently exist. That is to say
there will be a government, an Assembly and a police and judicial system free
of undue political control. The fact that these institutions are in one form or
another likely to live on beyond the end of the status process is significant,
because it highlights the continuing and urgent need for capacity building in
those institutions now.
We can also say with confidence that Kosovo’s institutions will, in their
staffing and mandates, have strong safeguards for minority communities within
Kosovo. The exact nature of such safeguards will, as I have said already, be
the subject of negotiation in the talks themselves, but they could include some
kind of Badinter-style arrangements for minority groups in the Assembly;
extensive language rights; and some form of positive discrimination in
recruitment in order to ensure minority representation in public institutions.
We can also predict that Kosovo will have a significantly more decentralised
form of government than it currently enjoys. This decentralisation must be of
benefit to all communities in Kosovo, bringing the business of government
closer to the electorate. But decentralisation is likely, as at the central
level, to involve the development of significant safeguards for minority
communities – and here I am talking not just of the Kosovo Serbs – without, of
course, going beyond the guidelines set out by the Contact Group on the
non-partition of Kosovo.
Another key area which is bound to be built into a final status resolution is
the continued protection of cultural sites, in particular those of the Serbian
Orthodox Church. The twin cultural legacies of Orthodox church architecture and
decoration, and also of Ottoman Islamic and secular design, will continue to
grace Kosovo in the years to come. Just as they are testaments to its past they
may also be keys to its future. The Decani Monastery may be the first –
deserved – UNESCO World Heritage Site in Kosovo, but I hope it will not be the
last, and I do not find it fanciful to foresee tourism blossoming as a
significant employer around such sites.
But preservation of church buildings themselves is not enough. It must be
accompanied by preservation of the ecclesiastical and cultural life that the
buildings represent. One way or another the Serbian Orthodox Church will be a
custodian of this future, and this will need to be written into a status deal.
Keeping Kosovo’s churches alive means not only protecting the buildings and
their custodians, but also ensuring that congregations remain. I have mentioned
already the necessary guarantees on minority rights that will be required to
ensure the quality of life of those Serbs now living in Kosovo. But integral to
a final agreement will also need to be assurances and facilitation for Serbs
and other minorities wishing to return to Kosovo having fled over the past six
years. Efforts to promote return have so far been disappointing, due to a
combination of factors, including, I am bound to say, a policy from Belgrade
which often amounted to the active discouragement.
Putting this aside though, my own years of experience with refugee return
issues convinces me that a large part of the reason for the low rate of returns
in Kosovo is its unresolved status. This is not to say that I anticipate a
flood of returnees as soon as the process is complete, but the return cannot
but increase from its low level once the uncertainties inherent in Kosovo’s
unresolved status are dealt with.
INTERNATIONAL ROLE
One final, predictable, outcome of the status process will be a role for the
international community continuing well into the future. We have started
discussions on the nature of this presence at the working level in Pristina,
and at the policy level in Brussels and elsewhere as well – without in any way
prejudging the status outcome.
Clearly a continuing international presence will in many ways mirror what we do
today – especially in terms of monitoring down to the field level. But in
addition to this, there has been a great deal of discussion about the potential
need for the international community to retain some executive functions – and
to have this built into a status settlement with the agreement of the parties.
The first question here is, what functions do we think need to be retained?
Opinions differ on this issue from those who advocate the retention of
significant powers – a Bosnian OHR-type model – to those who feel that the
retained powers should be limited. My personal feeling on this matter, for what
it’s worth, is that any powers retained by the international community should
be relatively circumscribed and should also be challengeable and reviewable. In
any case they should not, of course, reverse the significant transfers of
authority which have already been made to local institutions.
Where there does seem to be general agreement is that a degree of international
presence and authority should be retained in the fields of the policing and
prosecution of serious and organised crime and war crimes– an area which today
is under international authority and should remain so, of course with a
capacity-building element built in.
The second question with regard to a continuing international presence is who
should do it? What is clear is that it will not be in the form of the UN
presence we have had through UNMIK. A status settlement will supersede Security
Council Resolution 1244 and with it our interim administrative mandate.
But who will be the primary actors in this continued international presence, if
it is decided that there will be one? In my view the answer to this must be the
EU. Kosovo is in Europe – and in keeping with the rest of the Balkans was the
subject of a promise at Thessaloniki in 2003 that it’s future would be in
Europe – so it is the obvious institutional candidate to take a lead role in a
post-status Kosovo. We are all clear that any EU mission would not be an
“EUMIK” - a carbon copy of the current international structures. It also goes
without saying that an EU-led mission would need to act in the closest possible
co-operation with other key international actors; the Contact Group, of course,
especially the US; the OSCE, with its strong field presence, and other
international organisations such as the Council of Europe; and, of course,
NATO, which has firmly committed to maintaining KFOR at around its current
strength after a status settlement is reached – a comm!
itment that is as welcome as it is essential.
SECURITY
But what of Kosovo’s own security architecture? This is currently the subject
of intensive discussion across a wide variety of interest groups in Kosovo
thanks to the Internal Security Sector Review – a process in which DCAF is
heavily – and invaluably – involved, and for which I would like to thank you
now.
Whatever the outcome of the status process, and of the ISSR, the future
security architecture of Kosovo will need to underpin a status settlement that
will, by its nature, not satisfy everyone. These institutions will need to be
effective, impartial and multi-ethnic. Given Kosovo’s economic situation they
will also need to be affordable. It is therefore essential that we start
investing in capacity building now both in those structures that already exist,
like the Kosovo Police Service, but also in the institutions that will oversee
them, like the Prime Minister’s Office and the Assembly. DCAF is doing
essential work here, for which I thank you again, but a great deal more needs
to be done if we are to be able to rely on local institutions in Kosovo to
deliver a sustainable status settlement in the medium term.
I have spent only a short time on security issues, as I know that these are to
be the focus of discussions here tomorrow. I have also, I fear, spent very
little time on where we are on a great deal of time on where we might be going.
I hope you will forgive me for this. Managing a place with such formidable,
difficult and complex problems – many of them linked to the lack of clarity on
status – must of necessity be forward-looking, so that people know that the
future will be better than the past. So we are dealing with today’s issues to
move Kosovo toward tomorrow and never return to the past.
Thank you, ladies and gentlemen, for your attention – and I would like now to
give way to our discussion.”
Serbian News Network - SNN
[email protected]
http://www.antic.org/
