The Kosovo Trap Todor Kondakov, Ph.D. - 1/10/2006
The visit at the end of November 2005 of the ex-President of Finland, Marti Ahtissari, to Kosovo marked the beginning of the concluding stage of efforts, made by the international community, for the solution of the exceedingly difficult issue of the future of the ex-Serbian province. In his capacity of special representative of the UN Secretary General, the Finn tried to reconcile the irreconcilable - in other words, the claims of Kosovo Albanians for independence and the determination of Belgrade to grant them independence under no circumstances. At the end of 2005 Ahtissari visited Pristina, where he met representatives of the local Orthodox church who requested him to protect the Christian temples in the province from Albanian attacks, and Belgrade, as well as the capitals of the neighboring countries - Podgorica, Tirana and Skopje. Test The shuttle visits of the Finnish ex-President were a logical ending to the six-year "transition" period in the region. In June 1999 after signing the peace agreement, which in essence was a capitulation of Milosevic-led Yugoslavia before NATO, Kosovo went under UN jurisdiction and was ruled by an administration, appointed by the world organization UNMIK. The latter performed frenziedly - printed new passports and ID documents, introduced new car plate numbers and established its own postal services (although all these innovations are validated only by countries which admit the UNMIK mandate). Police forces were formed, in which were enrolled mainly ex-soldiers from the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army. A significant reinforcement to UNMIK were the NATO forces (KFOR), which control the air space above Kosovo. In 2001, 2002 and 2004 UNMIK held elections for Kosovo Assembly, which were solidly boycotted by the Serbs. In the 120-seat Parliament, twenty seats are kept for representatives of various ethnic minorities - 10 of them are for the Serbs, but they still remain vacant. The results of six-year rule of UN-nominated administration are rather controversial. On the one hand, some simulacrum of routine was established indeed - water and energy supply was restored, public transport started functioning again, trade has revived, schools have reestablished classes, etc. on the other hand, though, a number of exceedingly serious issues remain unsolved. The main one concerns the probable returning of Serbian refugees to Kosovo. It is a well-known fact that when Kosovo Albanians took revenge against Belgrade in 1999 for the dozens of years of discrimination and pressure they drove away from the region more than 200 000 Serbs. Assessments, made in 2002, show that the actual number of refugees exceeds 277 000, of which 201 000 live in Serbia, 30 000 in Montenegro, while the remaining 46 000 live in the refugee camps, located in Kosovo itself. The process of driving the local Serbs away was accompanied by destruction of their homes, putting the Orthodox c! hurches and all traces of Serbian culture to fire and meanwhile we should recall the fact that Kosovo is considered to be "the cradle of Serbian civilization" and that in 1389 on the field of Kosovo took place the glorious battle against the Turks, which ended in complete victory over the Serbian army and its allies. On top of that, today's Kosovo has become a key junction of the international illegal traffic of people, from which goes the flow of prostitutes (including children) to Western Europe. It was clear that the explosive situation, which the international community managed to "freeze up" in the summer of 1999, cannot remain unsolved forever. Since the beginning of 2005 various forces inside and outside Kosovo have been exercising growing pressure upon the UN for undertaking the task to define a final version of the region's status, as the latter is no longer controlled by Belgrade. Taking into consideration the fact that the positions of the parties remained absolutely contrary and irreconcilable as they had been before, the UN decided to opt for "shuttle diplomacy" within which the nominated representative (in this particular case - Ahtissari) would be in contact now with Belgrade, now with Pristina. The starting positions are more than clear - Kosovo Albanians insist upon unconditional and internationally recognized independence. In its turn, Serbia is ready to grant them "more autonomy but less independence", emphasizing that it remains keen on the notion of its territorial wholeness. By the way, Serbian formulations are not quite clear. Even Russia, which in practice remains the only ally of Belgrade as regards the future of Kosovo, openly expressed its perplexity. The Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, recommended to Serbian authorities to clarify their intentions and stated that otherwise Moscow will remain unclear as to what positions to support before the West. If we judge by the reactions of Belgrade press, a number of Serbian politicians considered Lavrov's statement as a straightforward hint that Russia does not intend to imperil its relations with the West because of Serbian interests. This is why one of probable the reasons for the November visit of Serbian President Boris Tadic to Moscow was the intention to clarify the position of Belgrade on Kosovo matters. During his meeting with Tadic, the Russian President Putin underlined that the application of double standards in this particular case is inadmissible and stated that "when 200 000 Serbs were forcibly driven away from Kosovo, the world preferred to remain silent in spite of the fact that when 30 000 Albanians were likewise driven away from the same region this action was pronounced humanitarian catastrophe". In his turn, Tadic pacified the Russian leader by assuring him that the possible EU membership of Serbia is not directed against Moscow in any possible way. According to him, the relations with Russia will continue to be "among the fundamental directions" of Serbian foreign policy. The truth, though, is that Russians are not in the position to provide any actual support to Belgrade as regards the Kosovo issue. The chances of Moscow to influence the decisions of NATO and the EU are quite limited. Meanwhile, during personal talks and in commentaries many official representatives of the USA and the EU fully admit the possibility for an independent Kosovo. According to them, if the opposite option takes place it would be hardly likely to avoid a new wave of violence in the region. Indeed, the Head of UNMIC, Soren Jessen-Petersen, demonstrated a much more cautious approach by presenting the following principles for the peaceful solution of the problem: - keep the integrity of Kosovo; - refute the possible returning to the status quo, dating back before March 1999] - Kosovo shall not unite with neighboring countries; - guarantees for the protection of the rights of all ethnic minorities in the region. In his turn Marti Ahtissari completely abstained from making any comments. The only thing he firmly opposes is the splitting up of the ex-autonomous republic into two enclaves - Albanian and Serbian (as is the model of Bosnia and Herzegovina). According to him, "it would be wrong if we opt for the Bosnian example when solving the Kosovo problem because Kosovo calls for a specific approach". It is only logical to presuppose that "shuttle diplomacy" will drag on but still the prospect for separation of Kosovo from Serbia is quite realistic. It is obvious as well that neither Belgrade nor Moscow, which is the last ally of the Serbian state (which will soon be abandoned by Montenegro as well), have sufficient means at their disposal to prevent this. What would such a solution of Kosovo issue imply? Undisputedly, it will have significant impact over the subsequent definition of the approaches to be undertaken by the international community as to the solution of the "smoldering" conflicts in the periphery of Europe and the post-Soviet space (Northern Caucasus, Transdnester, Abkhazia, South Ossetia or Nagorno Karabakh). The precedent with a probable granting of independence to Kosovo could serve as a powerful impulse for the forceful resolving of many other regional conflicts. We should not rule out the option under which some older territorial disputes be revived and some new ones be set ablaze both on the Balkans (between Albania and Macedonia, Serbia and Bosnia or Bosnia and Croatia) and outside them. Thus, the Basque, Corsican and Ulster separatists will gain additional trump-cards. The same is true for the Kurds - especially those in North Iraq. It is not by accident that negotiations on the future of Kosovo are closely followed by the present Armenian government. The self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno Karabakh perceives a certain chance for itself in the granting of independence to the Kosovars. After all what is viable for the Albanians can be viable for the Armenians, can't it? The separation of Kosovo from Serbia could play a largely negative role for the evolution of negotiations on unification of Bosnia and Herzegovina (which today is a loose federation of Serbian and Muslim - Croatian republics). Nine years ago the world community undertook armed intervention in order to prevent local Serbs from separating from Bosnia. Now in the case of Kosovo it may turn out that completely different standards are applied. The independence of this region would inevitably lead to reinforcement of the positions, held by radical elements of Kosovar society; legalization of organized crime and the final transformation of Kosovo into a center for drug traffic and arms and white slave trade. Meanwhile, the new and independent quasi-state will draw as a magnet those Islamic extremists and terrorists, which have been forced away from Afghanistan, Chechnya and the Near East in the process of the "war on world terrorism", thus transforming itself into the main base of Al-Qaida in Europe. On the other hand, granting independence to Kosovo would result in the withdrawal of most international institutions, which currently exercise control over the situation. Their place (as well as the already constructed infrastructure) will be taken over by training camps, storage facilities and bases of Islamic extremists. Making use of the critical social-economic situation (unemployment rate in the region is 60% and 30% of the Kosovars live below the poverty line), the latter would easily recruit human power for their actions. Taking into account the large Albanian dispersion in Europe, this would additional extend the zone of future terrorist attacks on the continent. The implementation of the concept for independent Kosovo will result in aggravation of the relations between the new state and Serbia and Macedonia, which in itself would significantly reduce the chances of Belgrade and Pristina for EU accession. It should be noted that at negotiations on the future status o! f the region, Kosovo is represented by people, who are closely connected with various Albanian criminal clans. Today they are united by their aspiration for independence but immediately after its proclamation they would wage a cruel internecine war for power and control over drug traffic and arms trade. Under such circumstances it would be too naïve to expect concrete measures and guarantees for the normal conditions of life for the minorities. In this connection, the implementation of the concept, actively promoted by the Kosovars, for "guarantees for a certain standard of life in parallel with the granting of independence" is rather counterproductive. The establishment of independent Kosovo and the process of its integration into the EU would fortify the positions of closed-in Muslum dispersions in Europe, which in itself will additionally aggravate the problem of "civilization incompatibility", thus eroding the social and political stability of Western society. Indeed, the only power, which would definitely gain by the proclamation of independent Kosovo, would be the USA. Having established in this region the largest military base on the Old Continent - the Bondsteel base - the Americans seized control over a strategically important location, which allows them to rule over the corridor, connecting European plains with the basins of Southern seas, including the Mediterranean sea. This additionally reduces the dependence of Washington on its increasingly faltering European allies, which, as events in Iraq showed, tend to have their own positions on the issues of war and peace. The question, though, remains whether the UN and the international community as a whole would benefit in some way from such extremely dangerous (for us, the Bulgarians, as well) precedent? Todor Kondakov, Ph.D. is secretary of the Bulgarian Geopolitical Society and editor-in-chief of the Bulgarian magazine "GEOPOLITICS http://www.globalpolitician.com/articleshow.asp?ID=1534&cid=3 Serbian News Network - SNN [email protected] http://www.antic.org/
