Political "Interests" Saved Kosovo's Thugs: Interview with Detective Stu Kellock
Posted on Friday, January 13 @ 04:00:00 EST by CDeliso
In this exclusive interview with one of Canadas most experienced police
detectives, Stu Kellock, readers get the inside story of how UN investigators in
Kosovo sought to crack down on criminals and terrorists but were
systematically stopped, because of the perceived need to safeguard the interests
of the Western political elite and their local protégés.
Stu Kellock, the former head of UNMIKs Regional Serious Crime Unit in Pristina,
provides an extraordinary insiders perspective on the difficult and oftentimes
dangerous work of investigating organized crime in Kosovo. This article, which
contains several minor bombshells regarding the interlinked topics of organized
crime, drug smuggling and the Macedonian conflict of 2001, is a must-read for
anyone interested in what really happened in the Balkans since NATOs arrival in
June of 1999.
Profile of a Professional
A 28-year veteran of the Toronto Police Service, Stu Kellock has practically
done it all- his job portfolio includes intelligence work, close protection,
police training, Major Crime Unit, as well as undercover missions and public
order duties. Kellock, who holds the rank of Captain in the Canadian Forces
(Army) Reserve, graduated from Torontos Humber College in 1986, with a degree
in Police Advanced Sciences specializing in International Terrorism.
This focus turned out to be quite relevant 15 years later, when in the wake of
9/11 Detective Kellock was re-assigned to the intelligence unit and put in
charge of the mayor of Torontos security detail. Subsequently, Kellock received
the honor of becoming the first (and only) international officer to be embedded
with the NYPD Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism Divisions, for the period of
one year.
Although these are all fascinating topics in their own right, todays exclusive
interview with Detective Kellock concentrates on a slightly earlier mission- his
assignment as chief of UNMIKs Regional Serious Crime Unit in Pristina, Kosovo,
from September 2000-June 2001. During this pivotal period, the security
situation in Kosovo grew increasingly fluid as local crime lords challenged the
international authorities claims to power, while ethnic Albanian insurrections
spread into neighboring South Serbia and Macedonia. Detective Kellock and his
staff found themselves caught up in a web of political intrigue and blunt local
realities that all too often hampered their ability to investigate serious
criminal activity in the province.
Although Detective Kellock has provided testimony in the past regarding specific
incidents, such as the Podujevo bus bombing, todays interview for
Balkanalysis.com marks the first time he has gone in to such detail regarding
what he saw and experienced as a leading crime fighter in post-Milosevic Kosovo.
First of all, why would a police detective from the great city of Toronto be
drawn to work in God-forsaken, depleted uranium-filled Kosovo, anyway? For
Kellock, aside from the obvious adventure travel, which I enjoy there was
the challenge, the opportunity to serve the country and the ability to effect
positive change in a difficult environment.
The detective adds that it was an incredibly humbling experience to be able to
participate in the reconstruction and redevelopment of Kosovo, something I
thought I may never have the opportunity to experience again.
The Situation on the Ground: Non-Stop Action
As one might expect, the average work day was demanding for Detective Kellock -
I was on call 24 hours, he attests. We worked for 30 days consecutive
followed by six days off. As the chief of the unit, the workload was something I
have never, nor ever will experience again.
A lack of proper communications made the job more difficult for UNMIK
investigators. According to Kellock, telephones were unreliable or non-existent,
and his staff was forced to carry their radios with them at all times. And,
despite his attempts to complete an hourly diary of events, Detective Kellock
quickly found that it was virtually impossible: there simply was not the time
between events to capture the information- time moved so fast. As he recalls,
fighting crime in Kosovo was a tiring and never-ending battle, a series of
shootings, bombings, kidnappings, explosions, rapes and other serious crimes
including human trafficking and terrorism, all of which kept him and his staff
busy at all hours of the day.
Despite the oftentimes critical view of cooperation between UNMIKs disparate
foreign employees and the locals, Detective Kellock found that in his era of
involvement, at least, there was much to be commended about the poise and
team-first attitude of his colleagues working under pressure and restricted by
numerous intrinsic disadvantages. At the unit level, he confirms, the quality of
cooperation was absolutely overwhelming. Kellocks unit consisted of 24
international investigators, 15 local staff and 7 KPS (Kosovo Police Service)
officers. He found that the professionalism, dedication and commitment of the
officers to assisting all the people of Kosovo was incredibly humbling and
reaffirmed our very reason for being there.
The Ominous Ramifications of Success
However, Detective Kellock goes on to say that gaining the trust of the local
community something paramount to the success of our mission and indeed the
entire mandate as stated in UN Resolution 1244 was hampered severely by what
he calls the agendas at play. These involved both those of the local
political/paramilitary groupings and of the international power brokers present
in Kosovo. National, clan and supranational interests were inextricably
interwoven in complex and murky ways, out of all proportion to the size of the
territory in question.
Kellock had decided that it was best to deal, not with the emotive issues of
perceived historical injustices and claims, but only with the investigations
notwithstanding the ethnic or cultural differences of opinion on where to look
for clues. We had to follow them wherever they might lead.
However, it soon became clear that the Serious Crimes Unit staff members, in
their zeal for professionalism and lucid, facts-oriented investigations, were
headed for a train wreck with the established interests of Kosovos rich and
powerful elite.
For the detective, this realization hit home with one of the biggest victories
of his tenure- the arrest and prosecution of Sabit Geci. It was a watershed
moment for the UN Mission in Kosovo, avows Kellock, and I take great pride in
that particular investigation. However, this audacious arrest of a leading KLA
founder got Kellocks superiors sweating, and may have restricted the reach of
further investigations. Most ominously, says Kellock, I certainly did feel
threatened after the arrest and detention of Sabit Geci.
Dubbed at the time
a kingpin in Pristina´s underworld with highly placed
political allies in the PDK [of Hasim Thaci] by AFP, Geci was arrested in
October 2000 following
a shooting incident at one of Pristina´s most notorious
nightclubs -- The Miami Beach Club
one week later, in a dawn sweep on 13
properties, including Geci´s home, they arrested 25 more suspects.
Geci was tried in April 2001, and sentenced to 5 years and 6 months in jail. In
January 2002, his sentence was upheld by a UN judge. Detective Kellock
emphasizes how astonished some of his peers were by his vigorous action against
the crime lord: after all, Geci and Hasim Thaci were Skenderaj incarnate- how
dare I arrest a modern war hero!
For this very reason, there was apparently a high degree of uncertainty and
distrust among the UN top brass regarding the action. Kellock recalls a very
interesting statement made to me by a very senior police officer after [Gecis]
conviction - along the lines of we did not know whether or not to allow you to
continue your investigation we were pleased that you did and the result that
was obtained. That was 8 months after Gecis arrest.
Secret Meetings and Innuendo: UNMIKs Political Priorities
However, says Kellock, it was at that point when things changed for me. Secret
meetings, innuendo and comments made to me made it very clear that some were not
pleased with this situation. The investigation had cemented for him something
that had been apparent at least since January 2000, when UNMIK Chief
Administrator Bernard Kouchner ordered police that his explicit permission would
be required if they sought to raid the premises of any of Kosovos leading
families.
It became very clear, avers Kellock, that despite its purported stance of
moral, ethical and legal compliance with UN Resolution 1244, the top civilian
leaders of UNMIK would do so only if it served their interests in Kosovo.
According to Kellock, there was a real reluctance to prosecute [former] KLA
members
of course I understand the complex nature of the mission and the very
reason that NATO and UNMIK were there was to protect human rights
particularly Kosovar Albanian rights. To therefore prosecute them for criminal
acts and war crimes would not have been politically palatable.
As has been repeated again and again by internationals working in Kosovo and the
independent media, prosecuting the warlords would cause a backlash against KFOR
and UNMIK- meaning that for the past six and a half years, the UN has been
living as a virtual hostage to the decommissioned leaders of the KLA- who
were, in many cases, merely transformed into the ranks of the KPC or the
political structures. Their status, which gave them a combination of respect and
fear among the local population, meant that they were (and are) practically
untouchable. After all, cracks Kellock, they were war heroes, not war
criminals, werent they?
According to the detective, it was made abundantly clear that his team was to
take a hands-off approach with respect to members of the KLA/KPC, for pragmatic
and existential reasons. The general theory was that by their size and
influence they would de facto be the next governors of Kosovo, he says. The UN
or KFOR could little afford to have internal discord or violence perpetrated
against each other by the very people they were there to protect a lesson that
could serve the UN well in other missions.
On the other hand, there were others in UNMIK, such as the senior police
official, who made it clear that they were happy to see mafia figures actually
face prosecution. Yet the all too real difference in treatment was political and
driven by other exigencies. Geci and his colleagues were either the great
saviors of Kosovo or nothing more than a bunch of criminal thugs, says Kellock,
whose experiences led him to be inclined towards the latter interpretation.
Gecis conviction and the statement rendered by the Court more than validated
my opinion.
Kosovos First Elections: America Defeated by Great Britain?
The first post-Milosevic elections in Kosovo occurred in late October 2000, and
transpired largely without incident. However, their outcome the unexpected
success of relatively peace-oriented veteran politician Dr. Ibrahim Rugova
interrupted the expected smooth transition of power from the KLA in combat
fatigues to the KLA in suits.
In the run-up to the elections, it became painfully clear to me that there was
influence being exerted on the Kosovars, testifies Kellock. It was my feeling
that the LDK, led by Dr. Rugova, was being influenced more by the UK and that
Hasim Thaci and his PDK were being touted by the US.
Why? The detective surmises that the two candidates could deliver, or at least
begin to deliver, on the underlying foreign policy goals of these two great
powers. For the British, who in Kellocks view were in no mood for another
extended peacekeeping mission in the Balkans, the professor, Rugova was seen as
a more workable candidate with a vision of making Kosovo European in
orientation.
However, for the US, whose long-term plans for a strong military presence had
been demonstrated with the quick creation of the enormous Camp Bondsteel, the
former KLA leader from that western hotbed of unrest, the Drenica Valley, could
serve a different. He was regarded as the proverbial cowboy riding in and
saving the day, says Kellock, albeit one with a completely different personal
agenda: that of increasing his personal wealth and cozying up to the United
States for economic and military support
it was clear that the US wanted that
[long-term military] presence, and the person to ensure it was Hasim Thaci.
Therefore, securing his the election was of critical importance to the American
plan for Kosovo.
However, Thaci did not win and Kellock finds it noteworthy that for two weeks
after the elections, Thaci was not seen or heard from- something to think
about, but perhaps not too much. After all, its the Balkans, and not much seems
to make much sense.
Confirming the tendency of high-level foreign diplomatic meetings to be held in
neighboring Macedonia, where the situation has usually been less violence-prone,
Kellock bucks the official line when he states that Colin Powells planned visit
to Kosovo in April 2000 was curtailed due to security reasons. The official US
explanation for why Powells trip was changed to Skopje was that poor weather
prevented him from making the 30-minute chopper ride over the border. However,
the fact that war was going on intermittently in Macedonia at the time with
assistance from the Kosovo side probably had more to do with it.
The Podujevo Bus Bombing: A Police Failure Worsened by Conspiracy
The all-time low in prosecuting terrorists and murderers in Kosovo dawned on
February 17, 2001, when a bus carrying Serbs of all ages to visit a cemetery in
Kosovo was blown up by Albanian terrorists as it passed along a road supposedly
cleared by UN troops. The Sunday Times would later reveal that a simple British
troop mistake of failing to check all the culverts and drainpipes along the
route led to the tragic deaths.
In the immediate aftermath of the bombing, Kellock recommended that a special
task force be assigned immediately to the investigation. I expressed this desire
to every senior official to attend the scene.
However, the chief detectives request was not granted, and even more sinister
was the fact that evidence from the scene was suppressed and destroyed even
before the commencement of the official investigation. It was this lack of
co-operation and direction that subsequently proved my intuition [regarding
whitewashing KLA crimes] was correct.
Indeed, as the Washington Post reported in July of that year, after the bus
bombing, NATO paved over the crater on the Nis highway within hours, an act that
several police officers said destroyed potential evidence. Furthermore, NATO
did not share intelligence with the UN police, phone logs of suspects calls
were hidden in Monaco, where Kosovos main mobile operator is based, and the
main suspect miraculously escaped from the most secure location in all of
Kosovo- the American Camp Bondsteel.
Referring to the dramatic jailbreak of Florim Ejupi, a 23 year-old Kosovo
Albanian whose DNA was traced to the crime scene, Detective Kellock said at the
time that in his opinion, Ejupi did not escape
in my opinion he was taken
elsewhere for questioning or something and I still do not understand why we, the
police in the investigation who held jurisdiction, were not involved.
Five years later, the detective still feels the same way- though he has
confirmed for us that he was not the anonymous police source quoted by the Times
as claiming Ejupi was on the CIA payroll.
However, it could be possible, agrees Kellock, in light of all the strange
coincidences and sordid miracles of this ugly, unsolved incident. There seemed
to be a certain paranoia in dealing with the KPC, and I was often delayed in
making arrests or conducting operations until clearing them with higher
authority, he states.
Several other UN officials quoted at the time in relation to the bus bombing
confirmed Kellocks suspicions. One was Christer Karphammar, a Swedish
prosecutor and then Kosovo's first Western judge. He told the paper that
U.N.
and KFOR senior officials opposed or blocked prosecution of former Kosovo
Liberation Army members, including some now in the KPC. That means some of the
former [KLA] had an immunity. The investigations were stopped on a high level.
American covert influence was again detected with the failure to arrest another
suspect, Sami Lushtaku. The newspaper fingered one Jock Covey,
a U.S. diplomat
serving as deputy head of the U.N. mission in Kosovo as having been
instrumental in blocking Lushtaku's arrest on at least two occasions
he told
colleagues that if Lushtaku, who is popular in Kosovo, were jailed, it could
destabilize the province on the eve of municipal elections and bolster
hard-liners in Serbian parliamentary elections in December. Covey, who has left
the United Nations for private industry, declined to comment.
Detective Kellock agrees that the arrest of Sami Lushtaku was derailed, but he
cannot state absolutely that it was [done so] by Jock Covey. Covey (make your
FOIA requests here) is a one-time aide to Henry Kissinger who served in a
variety of diplomatic missions, including in Bosnia in the mid-1990s. Upon
leaving the Kosovo mission, Covey was hired by the Bechtel Corporation, where he
went on to outdo himself in the calculated art of damage control.
In the end, Kellock notes sadly that the inferences, nuances and experiences of
the investigation of a high-ranking UCK commander in the Geci case, would turn
out to be a sign of things to come in the investigation of the Nis Express bus
bombing.
Reading the Macedonian War: A Surprising Handicap
Just as the Podujevo bus bombing tragedy unfolded, war was intensifying in
Macedonia to the south between the self-styled freedom fighters of the NLA and
the Macedonian government. Although it is relatively speaking a minor one,
Detective Kellocks revelation regarding his units limited knowledge of the
conflict going on nearby is astonishing. Considering the ultra-modern
technology, manpower and other tangible assets available to UNMIK, one would
assume that they had a handle on the situation- especially considering that much
of the war was being dictated by the NLAs leaders in Kosovo.
In fact, says Kellock, the truth was somewhat different: at the time, we
learned of significant turmoil within the Macedonian Armed Forces [because] it
was described by the BBC - which was the source of most of our information about
that particular situation.
However, it was not only this one case that Kellock recalls; in general, he
says, we relied on the BBC for the most part for their news updates on the war
in Macedonia. However, he also does say that we knew by our own means what was
happening and who had left town during this time, but does not provide details.
What, then, of the common rumor that British spies were posing as journalists
during the early stages of the 2001 war, when several quickly found oddly
convenient places behind enemy lines in remote mountain villages? While he will
not go into details, Kellock affirms that these observations [regarding] the
press are accurate.
Beyond this, perhaps most interesting is Kellocks contention that his team was
deliberately kept in the dark regarding the unfolding war- despite, or perhaps
because of, the fact that all the same characters being investigated by them
were involved in orchestrating it behind the scenes.
Oftentimes at meetings we were excused so higher commanders could discuss
this situation, recalls Kellock. However strange this was that the chiefs of
various units were excluded it was commonly accepted.
Drug Routes, Customs Intimidation, Dual Use Procurement, Islamic Charities
Kosovo has always been a center of organized crime, but especially after the
UNs arrival business proceeded apace. Lax control of borders and a new
domestic market of wealthy foreigners with sundry appetites to please meant a
golden age for the mafia- just another reason why prosecutions were slow to be
handed down. The province was and is used as a hub for trafficking in illicit
material including drugs and humans, gasoline and guns, Kellock states.
Heroin was being smuggled through Kosovo, he adds. It originated in
Afghanistan, passed through Iran, Turkey and Bulgaria, and then made its way
through the [Albanian-majority] Presevo Valley of south Serbia, arriving in
Kosovo.
Once inside the country, the drugs would be transported from across to northern
Albania through the KLA stronghold of the Drenica valley, to places like
Tropoje for distribution, either north by land or across the Adriatic to Italy.
The multi-national network relied on interlinked ethnic mafias, whose members
care not about the cultural background of those they do business with.
Kellock and his colleagues found that the long arm of the lawless had a firm
reach on Kosovo society and law enforcement, even on those officers who werent
connected with one of the crime families.
Although I was not involved in border enforcement, on several occasions the
connection with the notorious Sabit Geci was evident, attests Kellock. In
fact, I specifically investigated a case where the Customs officer was
threatened with death and the killing of his family- apparently he had had the
bad luck of not knowing who a certain convoy of vehicles belonged to. He
charged them a duty, but was forced at gunpoint not to inspect the vehicles;
after a visit to his house later on, the officer was forced to repay the duty
to those he had collected it from.
Given the post-9/11 focus on weapons of mass destruction and dual use
technological items, one would expect a trouble spot like Kosovo to come up in
this context. However, in Kellocks time admittedly, before 9/11 changed the
focus of the mission in some ways it seems little attention was given to the
issue.
Nevertheless, he does add some interesting relevant details. Aside from the
locals perhaps natural interest in technology and consumer electronics, which
they sought to acquire from the KFOR bases, terrorists took a keen interest in
getting their hands on a common electronic device normally believed to be
harmless pagers. According to Kellock, UNMIK police seized numerous pagers
during his tenure, because of their demonstrated use as detonation devices for
IEDs.
Well before the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the foreign Islamic interests were on
the move in Kosovo. One of the first priorities of their charities in Kosovo
following the war, says Kellock, was the rebuilding of mosques not wells,
electrical stations, schools, hospitals, bridges or other infrastructure. I
believe at one point there were hundreds of charities in Kosovo many not
recognizable or accredited.
However, Kellock maintains that as for his team, we did not investigate any
charities working in the theater. The OSCE and UNMIK itself were responsible for
the accreditation of IO and NGOs. We had enough problems to deal with without
that one too!
UNMIK Corruption- And a Deadly Cover-Up
On the weighty and controversial subject of UN corruption and cover-ups, Kellock
points to two specific cases which he felt were not handled correctly. First,
stating that if not whole groups of UNMIK staff, at least certain individuals
were involved in corrupt dealings with local mafia, especially with the
trafficking of women. Kellock testifies that I attempted to have several UNMIK
members arrested but was not allowed to do so they were repatriated instead.
An equally serious case Kellock was involved with was the tragic death of AP
journalist Kerem Lawton, killed by a mortar during a battle on the Kosovo border
between Albanian and Macedonian forces. The Albanian side was quick to blame it
on the Macedonians, who vehemently denied it. There was not the remotest
possibility that Macedonian soldiers had fired the shells, The Guardian quoted
government spokesman Gjorgji Trendafilov as saying.
Regardless of what really happened, the journalists death intensified Western
pressure on the Macedonians to give a proportionate response to NLA violence.
According to the paper, KFOR warned that
the lives of our soldiers were
endangered in an area that is clearly inside Kosovo territory. And the
then-UNMIK head, Hans Haekkerup, blustered, I will be raising the urgent need
for restraint by the Macedonian forces and for dialogue to replace shooting when
I visit Skopje tomorrow.
However, what the UN power bosses didnt see fit to question was how their
allegedly well-protected border zone could have become a safe haven for
terrorists. Indeed, why would the Macedonians need to take the battle to the
border, unless they were taking fire from the other direction? Stu Kellock
provides an extraordinary detail regarding what really happened with the death
of Kerem Lawton:
It was one of the most intense days of my entire tour in Kosovo
I was
intimately involved in attempting to decide if the body was legally required to
have a post mortem conducted in Pristina. This was significant as the Brits
demanded that no PM be conducted, but others, including US officials, were of
the opinion that a PM must be completed prior to the body being sent back to the
UK. An international judge subsequently ruled that it did not have to be done
the body was sealed several times and immediately sent to the UK on a jet that
was sitting running on the tarmac at Pristina airport.
The issue at hand was whether or not the shrapnel that caused his unfortunate
demise was that of an American mortar. If it was removed from the body in
Pristina then potentially it might no longer be available as evidence. If it
in fact WAS American then it would prove that American weapons were still in
fact being used by radical Albanian guerillas. A letter was sent to me from the
company who employed the deceased but I never received it.
Conclusions
Now, though almost five years have passed since he left Kosovo, the memories and
lessons of that peacekeeping experience have stayed with Kellock. I have been
attempting to keep abreast of the situation in Kosovo as it is never far from
my thoughts, he says.
The bravery of those Kosovars on both sides of the ethnic fence is truly
humbling. Those individuals who came forward to provide statements and evidence
against criminals trusted us to do the right thing. I can only hope that we had
some positive impact on the quality of life of the people of Kosovo.
As Kellock concedes, Kosovo is hardly on the world stage as it was in 1999.
However, he is quick to add that with the rise of Islamic radicalism it would
be foolhardy and naïve to suspect that there are not those there who would
exploit the situation.
Despite his measured criticism of American policy and American protection of the
most notorious criminals in the province, Kellock takes a pragmatic view. The
continuing unrest in the Balkans justifies a strong US military presence in the
region. I dont believe that they truly will ever be finished in the Balkans-
there has been conflict there for over 600 years and I think it would be
foolhardy to think that [merely] a division of the US Army is going to put and
end to it.
Nevertheless, despite all he witnessed and experienced Detective Kellock remains
optimistic. My feeling though is that all is not lost with the education and
integration of the children and the development of a new sense of pride, one
based not on ethnicity but on unified nationalism, there is hope. As in most
conflicts, respect is the key to success. If the good people of Kosovo can rise
above their ethnocentric beliefs, and work towards a common goal of [creating] a
respectful and tolerant society for all, then their future will be very bright
indeed.
http://www.balkanalysis.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=615
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