January 23, 2006
3 DAYS BEFORE RACAK: OSCE/KVM PERSONNEL REPORTED
THAT THE KLA WAS PLANNING TO FABRICATE "SERBIAN CRIMES" IN THE
AREA
www.slobodan-milosevic.org
January 23, 2006
Written by: Andy
Wilcoxson
The trial of Slobodan Milosevic resumed after a 5-week recess
in Courtroom 3 of The Hague Tribunal on Monday.
Col. Milan Kotur took
the witness stand on behalf of the defense. He served as head of the Yugoslav
Army (VJ) team for cooperation with the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM)
during 1998 and 1999.
Col. Kotur began his testimony by describing the
structure of the OSCE/KVM and describing the agreement that the KVM had with the
Yugoslav government.
He testified that most of the KVM staff behaved in a
professional manner. However, he said that there were exceptions to this rule.
He described several incidents where KVM verifiers acted outside of their
mandate. Most of these incidents had to do with unauthorized KVM intrusions into
the border belt and army barracks.
While Col. Kotur testified favorably
about much of the KVMs lower level staff, he did offer some serious criticisms
of the KVMs leadership.
He described the KVM leadership as unfair and
nonobjective in its reporting. He explained that the KVMs reports were always
benevolent towards the KLA and overly critical of the Yugoslav side. The KLAs
version of events was believed without question, while the Yugoslav side always
had to provide proof and evidence to substantiate claims about what it did or
did not do.
Col. Kotur testified that the presence of the KVM had a
destabilizing effect on Kosovo. Prior to the KVMs arrival the KLA was
disorganized and weak, but by the time the KVM withdrew the KLA was well
organized and much stronger.
Col. Kotur, based on his experience as an
active duty officer in Kosovo, testified that most of the KLAs weapons came
from Albania. He said that the KLA managed to loot weapons from the depots of
the Albanian army when civil unrest broke-out in Albania during 1997. He said
that the KLAs primary victims were disloyal Albanian civilians, non-Albanian
civilians, and finally Yugoslav state security forces.
As the man in
charge of cooperation with the KVM, Col. Kotur testified that the verification
mission was kept fully informed about the activities of Yugoslav security
forces. To bear this point out the witness exhibited a complete record of daily
and weekly reports that he had submitted to the verification mission. These
reports included details on all troop movements, incidents of fighting as well
as general observations.
These reports showed the development of a
pattern of fighting in Kosovo. The KLA would always attack first, and then the
state security forces would be forced to respond. Col. Kotur testified that the
response was always proportionate, and that the state security forces always
treated Albanian civilians humanely.
Col. Kotur said that the most severe
dispute with the KVM surrounded the events at Racak. The Yugoslav Government and
the KVM had an agreement that neither side would talk to the media until a
proper investigation was carried out and the facts were
established.
However, KVM head William Walker held a press conference
where he accused Serbian troops of carrying out mass-executions in Racak.
Subsequent investigation has proven that there was no massacre in Racak.
Forensic science has shown that the people who died in Racak were definitely
killed while participating in armed combat not massacred.
Col. Kotur
testified that the KVM commander Gen. Drewienkiewicz called him late on the
night of January 15th (the day of the Racak anti-terrorist operation). During
that conversation Gen. Drewienkiewicz said that the verifiers -- who had
witnessed the anti-terrorist operation first hand -- reported that 5 or 6 people
had been killed in combat.
The very next morning Gen. Drewienkiewicz
contacted the witness again. During this conversation Gen. Drewienkiewicz
accused the Serbian police of massacring women and 8-year-old children in
Racak. In reality, no 8-year-old children were killed and the only woman to lose
her life was a known member of the KLA.
During the second conversation
Gen. Drewienkiewicz threatened to tell the media about the alleged deeds of the
Serb police. The witness urged him to wait until an investigation could be
carried out in order to determine the facts. He even offered that the KVM should
participate in every step of the investigation.
Gen. Drewienkiewicz
refused to wait for an investigation and told Col. Kotur that William Walker was
already on his way to Racak with a group of journalists.
According to a
January 12, 1999 report compiled by OSCE/KVM verifiers in Stimlje, the KLA was
planning to fabricate Serbian crimes in order to falsely place blame on the
army and police. It is worth noting that Racak is in the Stimlje municipality,
and that January 12th was just three days before the Racak operation.
Ironically, this document was given to Milosevic by the
prosecution.
These internal KVM documents also showed that William Walker
tried to suppress reports that the KLA had kidnapped MUP and VJ personnel
serving in the Racak area. The documents showed that Walker was furious at the
KVM staff when word reached Washington that the kidnappings had occurred.
In addition to Racak, the witness gave testimony about his dealings with
senior KVM staff. He described Gen. Drewienkiewiczs behavior as arrogant. On
one occasion Drewienkiewicz accused the Yugoslav Army of shooting at KVM
verifiers even though the KVM officers who were targeted in the shooting
insisted that the KLA were the ones who had shot at them.
When
Drewienkiewicz testified as a prosecution witness he boasted of how he
selflessly slept on the floor of his office for three nights by the telephone in
order to arrange the release of Serbian police that were being held hostage by
the KLA.
Col. Kotur explained that Drewienkiewicz did no such thing. The
hostages were released when the Serbian authorities agreed to exchange captured
KLA terrorists for them.
Another KVM official, the Canadian Gen.
Maisonneuve, also testified for the prosecution. He testified that Gen. Krsman
Jelic had refused to meet with him after the events in Racak.
Col. Kotur
explained that Jelic and Maisonneuve met without any problem. In fact, as the
man in charge of cooperation between the VJ and the KVM, Col. Kotur personally
arranged the meeting himself. He even attended the meeting and contrary to the
testimony of Maisonneuve, both Gen. Jelic and Col. Petrovic insisted that the VJ
had not taken part in the operation at Racak.
Another KVM official, Col.
Richard Ciaglinski, also testified for the prosecution. During a closed-session
hearing he told the tribunal that Col. Kotur had shown him a map and told him
that the Yugoslav Army was going to cleanse Kosovo of its entire Albanian
population.
Col. Kotur denied that he said any such thing to Ciaglinski.
He said that the prosecutions witness was a liar and that the state security
forces never had any plan to cleanse Kosovo of its Albanian population. With
that Milosevic ended his examination-in-chief.
Mr. Nice spent the last 15
minutes of the day cross-examining the witness. The cross-examination will
continue when the trial resumes tomorrow.
