SUC Position on Kosovo and Metohija http://news.serbianunity.net/bydate/2006/February_16/files/1140105045_angt0h9zbnc_Position_Paper-KiM_Pre-Talks.pdf
SOC Position on Kosovo and Metohija http://news.serbianunity.net/bydate/2006/February_16/35.html?w=p ------------------ http://www.kosovo.com/news/archive/2006/February_17/2.html KiM Info Newsletter 17-02-06 Statement by President Tadic at the UN Security Council Meeting STATEMENT by His Excellency Boris Tadic President of the Republic of Serbia Security Council, New York, 14 February 2006 (Text provided by Media and Communications Department, Belgrade ) Mr. President, Excellencies, It is my honour to present here, on behalf of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, our view of the situation in Kosovo and Metohija, especially in light of the recent Report by the Secretary General. I am also glad to see a legitimate representative of the Albanian people from Kosovo and Metohija in the delegation of Mr.Petersen but I have to warn that it would be very dangerous if his todayâs presence were seen in the light of prejudging the status process which is to begin soon. More than two and a half months ago, talks on the future status of Kosovo and Metohija formally began under the auspices of the United Nations. At that time, the Security Council and other relevant members of the international community clearly stated that, in parallel with the future status talks, the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government and UNMIK had to work on fulfilling the standards in Kosovo and Metohija much more rapidly and effectively than they had before. If the standards are not fulfilled, there can be no institutional guarantees of individual rights and freedoms, no economic recovery, and no European perspective for the inhabitants of Kosovo and Metohija. Similarly, if the standards are not fulfilled, the possibility of achieving a negotiated solution on future status becomes far less likely. Serbia and Montenegro accepted the position of the Security Council that the talks on the future status of the province should begin, despite the fact that the standards were obviously far from being achieved; we thus demonstrated our readiness to seek a negotiated solution to the problem of Kosovo and Metohija. In seeking a political compromise, however, we remain firmly committed to the fundamental principles and norms of international law; in particular those concerning the sovereignty and territorial integrity of internationally recognized states. Moreover, the position of my country is not only in full accord with the principles and the existing practices in international relations today; it is also fully consistent with all the United Nations documents relating to Kosovo and Metohija, in particular UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999). The Secretary-Generalâs Report for the second half of last year explicitly states that, in spite of certain positive results, the fulfilment of the standards in Kosovo and Metohija has been far too slow, that there have been âdelays or setbacks in most areasâ in the implementation of standards. This situation is harmful for all the inhabitants of the province, but its negative consequences are far more serious for Serbs than for the rest of the population. It is not only that they are more frequently the victims of the worst kinds of persecution and discrimination. The heart of the problem is that great injustices have been committed against them after June 1999, and that most of these have yet to be rectified. About sixty percent of the Serbian population has been expelled from Kosovo and Metohija during this period; they still live as internally displaced persons in central Serbia, waiting for the chance to return to their homes. This has not yet been made possible. All of the provinceâs cities, with the exception of the northern part of Kosovska Mitrovica, were ethnically cleansed of Serbs in 1999, and remain so today. Yet it is hard to imagine a multiethnic Kosovo without Serbs living in cities such as PriĹĄtina, Prizren or PeÄ. Thus, even though there might be some progress in the implementation of standards, if it does not affect the crucial issue of internally displaced persons returns, such progress is not decisive. The Serbs that, despite everything, have remained in Kosovo and Metohija live either in the northernmost part of the province in several Serb-majority municipalities, or south of the Ibar River, in variously-sized enclaves, where they face constant pressure and discrimination by the Albanian majority. The situation in these enclaves with respect to personal security and freedom of movement is still precarious and with rampant unemployment and poverty, the living standards in general remain far below the average in the region. The enclaves are discriminated at the hands of the PriĹĄtina authorities with regard to the distribution of electricity, and have as of recently been cut off from the rest of the world by being denied normal access to means of communication and sources of information. PriĹĄtina has blocked their access to the fixed and mobile telephone networks of Telekom Srbija, which operates legally in Kosovo and Metohija. They have also blocked the transmission of a Serbian-language television station that operates out of the north of the province. Allow me therefore to say once again: even though there might be some progress in the implementation of standards, if it does not affect the crucial issue of the Serbian enclaves - such progress is not decisive. The situation in the province being what it is, Serbia, including the Serbs of Kosovo and Metohija, looks forward the future status process both with hope and with concern. We hope that the future status talks will lead to a lasting, stable and just solutionâ"for the present circumstances satisfy neither the Serbs, nor the Albanians, nor the international community. But at the same time, we are concerned that the negotiations might be undermined by an imposed independence of Kosovo and Metohijaâ"a solution that would both contravene international law and destabilize the political situation in the Balkans. I therefore wish to present here the position of Serbia and Montenegro on the two possible outcomes of the future status process. I want to emphasise the advantages of a negotiated, compromise solution, and also at the dangers of a unilateral, imposed solution. It was recently pointed out, from within the Contact Group itself, that the Kosovo question must be resolved by applying universal principles of international law, for otherwise a dangerous precedent would be established not only for the Balkans, but for other parts of the world as well. The legal and political foundations of the international order cannot be upheld in the case of some nations and states, and disregarded in the case of others. This is the lesson Serbia learnt from its troubled legacy of the 1990s, but it applies elsewhere as well. The Serbian people demonstrated this when, guided by the ideals of democracy, they peacefully overthrew the regime of Slobodan Milosevic in 2000. To argue that secession from an internationally recognized state is an unacceptable principle, but to claim at the same time that the very same demand should be acknowledged in the case of the Kosovo Albanians because they suffered so much under the MiloĹĄeviÄ regime, is to ignore not only international law but also the political consequences of such a unilateral decision being imposed upon Serbia and Montenegro. That is why most countries in the region look at the possible secession of Kosovo and Metohija with grave concern, or even openly oppose such an outcome. The independence of Kosovo and Metohija would lead to a unilateral change of internationally recognized borders in the Balkans. This would politically destabilize the region, and would open the possibility of renewing past conflicts. Only Albania supports the demand of its ethnic kin in Kosovo and Metohija to secede from Serbia and Serbia/Montenegro. To view Kosovo as an exception and a unique case is, therefore, dangerous and politically unwise, however numerous may be the supporters of that idea. If the claim to independence were recognized in the case of the Kosovo Albanians, why should ethnic groups in other countries that demand independence just as vocally and passionately be treated any differently? In this sense, it is true the âKosovo caseâ is more important than Kosovo itself: the solution of the Kosovo and Metohija issue will be of enormous significance not only for the Balkans but for European security in general. The system of democratic values embraced by the world today has no way of accommodating the political aspirations of the Kosovo Albanians, while at the same time rejecting demands for unilateral secession as a matter of principle. If, notwithstanding this, Kosovo and Metohija should become independent, secessionist movements in many other parts of the world would unfortunately be encouraged and provided with a strong argument in favour of their cause. The negative consequences of the sympathy which is often shown to the Albanian demand for the independence of Kosovo are already becoming clear. Instead of seeing the plight of the Kosovo Serbs as a proof that the political elite of the Kosovo Albanians is not truly committed to a multiethnic society, it is becoming increasingly common to argue that Serbia should accept the independence of Kosovo and Metohija in exchange for an improvement of the situation of the Serbian community. The Serbs are, in effect, asked to accept the independence of Kosovo and Metohija in order to be given recognition of their basic human rights and freedoms. I personally find this way of thinking deeply alien - it is also alien to Serbian democracy, and I firmly believe that it is inconsistent with the democratic values of the contemporary world. Serbs in Kosovo and Metohijaâ"as people elsewhere in the worldâ"have the right to individual freedom and security; the right to protect their national and cultural identity; the right to exercise freedom of expression, religious freedom, and freedom of political association as well as the property rights. These rights of Kosovo and Metohija Serbs must be recognizedâ"the international administration in the province, and ultimately the United Nations, has accepted this as an obligation of their own, as is perfectly clear from the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999). These rights therefore are not, and must never be, part of political horse-trading between Belgrade and PriĹĄtina. Freedom, right to justice, and democracy belong to every man: it must not be made a chip of political bargaining. Mr. President, The first round of talks on the future status of Kosovo and Metohija is to begin in less than a weekâs time. On the agenda of the meeting in Vienna will be decentralization, which the political leadership in Belgradeâ"as well as the Kosovo and Metohija Serbsâ"see as a realistic mean to restore normal living conditions to the Serb community in the province and to facilitate the return of internally displaced persons. The Belgrade decentralization plan was made public more than a month ago. The provisions it contains represent minimal institutional requirements for the survival of the Serbian community in Kosovo and Metohija. The attitude of the Albanian side to the plan will, I think, give a good indication what can be expected in the next phase of negotiationsâ"the phase that will address the issue of the future status itself. In our view, that phase should be carried out through direct talks between the two sides, with the assistance of the international community. It should be devoted to reaching a political compromise between the two seemingly irreconcilable options. This is not an easy task, but it is one which should also be a test of the political maturity and democratic commitment of those who will find themselves at the negotiating table. The general outline of Belgradeâs political platform on the future status of Kosovo and Metohija is well known, and it is unnecessary for me to repeat it here. But I wish nevertheless to emphasize several points that are essential to the common future of the Western Balkans and to its European perspective. First, the political compromise offered by Belgrade opens the way for a negotiated settlement of the last great conflict in the former Yugoslavia, a way which avoids a unilateral change of internationally recognized borders and the political instability that inevitably follows. Second, the Albanians of Kosovo and Metohija would politically enjoy very wide autonomy, an autonomy that in most matters of everyday life would make them totally self-governing in relation to Belgradeâ"on condition that they accept the same autonomy in relation to PriĹĄtina for the Serbian entity in the province. Third, the resulting negotiated settlement would be internationally guaranteed and, after an agreed period of time (say, twenty years), may be subject to renegotiation. Fourth, the process of EU integration of Serbia and Montenegro, including Kosovo and Metohija, would continue in accordance with appropriate accession mechanisms. The specific elements of such a solutionâ"the particulars that would make it viable, and thus establish a suitable foundation for the rule of law and multiethnic coexistence in Kosovo and Metohijaâ"can only be found through direct talks between the two sides. A democratic Serbia is ready to engage in these talks. We shall do everything we can to make them succeed, defending our own legitimate interests while at the same time respecting the legitimate interests of others. If we all act in this manner, I am convinced that the talks will succeed and that we will be in a position to open a new chapter in the long, conflict-ridden history of relations between Serbs and Albanians. This new chapter would be an important step toward the political, economic and cultural integration of the Balkans into Europeâ"a goal that contemporary Serbia shares with other countries in our part of the world. Thank you Serbian News Network - SNN [email protected] http://www.antic.org/
