By Boba Borojevic
From the interview with Dr. Srdja Trifkovic for "Monday's Encounter" on CKCU 93.1 FM in Ottawa.
February 15, 2006 - Milo Djukanovic started talking about the referendum as far back as the late 1990s. After his election victory in 1997 he made a sharp turn. He used to belong to the Milosevic establishments but then turned his back on Milosevic, and finally became a separatist who claimed that the state union had no future regardless of Milosevic.
Many people had expected after the democratic changes in Serbia in October of 2000 that he would change track, but in fact his pro-separatist rhetoric got even more stringent and more implacable after October 5th. It has been an ongoing process, which has now reached a feverish pitch.
Dr. Srdja Trifkovic, the director of the Center for International Affairs at the Rockford Institute, says that the role of the Western powers has been all along to provide covert support to Djukanovic while at the same time pretending that they are either neutral or even supportive of the continuation of the common state. We have ample evidence for this, says Trifkovic.
One is the way in which political pressure has been exerted on the Italian magistrates, on the Italian judiciary and investigators not to pursue the case against Djukanovic. In addition, let it be said that per capita basis Montenegro is not one of the major recipients of US government aid. Last but by no means least, we see the European ambivalence in the Venice Commission recommendations which are worded in such an ambivalent way that each side can pick and choose what it wants. It effectively let Djukanovic free to pursue his referendum champagne by means that are both undemocratic and illegal. Both the government of Montenegro and by implication the Commissions recommendations would allow Montenegrin citizens resident abroad to vote unless they are residents of Serbia! The convoluted logic behind this argument is that by residing in Serbia they are still residents of the common state, and they exercise the voting rights in the other, larger unit of that common state. If you are a Montenegrin citizen and a resident of the US, Canada, Australia etc. yes, you can vote in the referendum; but if you are resident of Serbia, you cannot.
The logic behind Djukanovics shenanigans is that most Montenegrin citizens resident overseas are in fact Albanians. They exceed in numbers the Slavic Montenegrins and constitute a sizable part of the Albanian Diaspora in the North America, most notably in the New York area and Detroit. His assumption is that most of them will support independence, and therefore it would be desirable to have them on the referendum roll. By contrast the Montenegrins in Serbia would not support independence and therefore they have to be excluded.
We spoke more with Dr. Srdja Trifkovic about various aspects of the Montenegros push for independence as well as its implications.
How would independent Montenegro invalidate the Resolution 1244 and pave the way to Kosovos independence?
Under the UN SC Resolution 1244, enacted in June 1999 as means of ending the war, Kosovo is explicitly recognized as an integral part of the sovereign territory of the former Republic of Yugoslavia, the present state of Serbia and Montenegro. The common state, which is the legal heir to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, is also the heir to the title to Kosovo under the Resolution 1244. But if this common state disintegrates, if Serbia and Montenegro become two international recognized entities, then Resolution 1244 loses its legal basis, because Serbia alone cannot be considered the heir to the common state.
The proponents of the Kosovos independence are particularly keen to see Montenegro secede before the final solution. Simply invalidating UNSC 1244 would make it easier for them to overcome this legal hurdle. In that way Chinas or Russias possible resistance could be bypassed.
Contact Group: "Today, Belgrade's leaders bear important responsibilities in shaping what happens now and in the future." What do they intend to say?
The intent is obvious. You sign on the doted line and accept the amputation of your sovereign territory or else. Those who advocate Kosovos independence dont have a decent compensation package in mind for Serbia that would be even remotely tempting. In reality they also no longer have any serious means of punishing Serbia for not doing what it simply cannot accept. Some proponents of Kosovos independence in the US talk about accelerating Serbias accession to the EU, but it is not in their power to force Brussels to open arms to Serbia. In reality there will be no Serbias membership in the EU for a good many years to come, which is a good thing for Serbia but this is a separate topic. Also, some vague compensation packages that my or may not include financial rewards have been mentioned but not specified. The long and short of it is that Serbia is not getting any offers that would be even remotely tempting as quid pro quo, as the reward for giving up a sizable piece of its sovereign territory.
What can they do to Serbia if Serbia says no? Will they impose sanctions?
Most likely not. In fact Serbia has a strong trump card. It can simply refuse to accept and recognize Kosovos independence. It can refuse to accept any documents issued by the self-proclaimed sovereign government in Pristina. Specifically, it can refuse to accept Kosovos travel documents, passports, ID cards, customs declarations, license plates. It can effectively blockade Kosovo, which would then be forced to seek outlets to the outside world through Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro. But, if we look at the map, if we look at the transport network, if we look at the logistics and the geography, it is obvious that Serbia still has a very tangible geopolitical argument on its side in addition to the well-known legal, moral and historical arguments. The Western powers are aware of this and that is why they are trying to convince the Serbs that the game is already up, that UNSC Resolution 1244 has been effectively made defunct and that the inevitable outcome is Kosovos independence. It is really a psychological game in which the Serbs must not lose their nerve. It is not over, and it will still largely be determined by the extent to which Belgrade keeps unified front at the Vienna negotiations.
How is the ICG one of the toxic fumes of the Belgrade political scene?
The representative of the ICG in Belgrade was one James Lyon, a completely discredited man. Even the US Department of State has indicated that much. He had gone too far in trying to earn his daily bread by his imaginative vilification of the Serbian social and political scene. His analysis invariably focused on the hopelessly nationalistic infection of the Serbian body politic, and the need for the firm treatment by the Western powers in order to keep it under control. That is the standard ICG paradigm that all parties in the former Yugoslavia need to be rewarded at the expenses of the Serbs but Lyon went too far in not allowing mere facts to get in the way of his creative sweep. The Belgrade political scene, full of toxic fumes anyway, will be just a little bit less noxious with the departure of Mr. Lyon, an eminently forgettable man.
