Kosovo Since 1999
By Am Johal
02 March, 2006
1. What would you describe as the major themes in Kosovo since 1999?
After the NATO intervention in Kosovo and the withdrawal of Serbia paramilitary and military troops, the main big issue was establishing a temporary peace framework basis that would lead to long-term stabilization prospects. The establishment of UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo) through the 1244 UNSC resolution was the social and political answer of the international community to meet the after-war challenges whereas peace and security was meant to be preserved by KFOR (Kosovo Force). Demilitarization of the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) and its transformation into a civilian organization and it also its involvement of its political wing in Kosovo politics is another segment that arose from the outcome of post-99 constellation. The detachment from Belgrade politics imposed the need of establishing interim administrative institutions that would organize the political, economical and social spheres of life in Kosovo together with the International Community until the resolution of the status of Kosovo. The establishment of the provisional governmental institutions through fair and democratic elections in 2001 marked the beginning of a new political era in Kosovo. However, social discontent, economical backwardness and political instability has caused from time to time tensions which have managed to be used by radicals to attain an ethnical dimension. Above all, the issue on the final status of Kosovo significantly has reflected the post-99 political life in Kosovo.
2. How is the Serb minority in Kosovo being treated today? What is the Kosovar view of the leadership in Belgrade?
In the institutional governance practice, minority rights have taken a very specific part and it is the matter of specific ethnic groups that these rights haven't been collectively attained and exercised within their communities. The interim constitutional framework has positively discriminated all the minorities, whereas they received extra seats in the Kosovo assembly as well. However, the events of the 17 march of 2004, inflicted mainly by the social discontent and the status-quo have shadowed some of the positive developments in this respect. I must also say that the Serb minority throughout the time was instrumentalized (used as a tool) and used by Belgrade for the latter to hinder the efforts of the international community and the provisional governmental institutions of Kosovo to provide for a functional multi-ethnical society and in this way to "prove the inability of the later to achieve it". The boycott and non-participation in the assembly of Kosovo is one the barriers for the Serb community in Kosovo to have had the voice being heard so far. Anyway, in the sense of the ethnical political composition of the assembly it would have been rather hard for them to have had the cooperation approach from the big parties, however at least their concerns and demands would have taken the legitimate path. The leadership in Belgrade was of course seen as an obstacle to arrange for a multi-ethnical society in Kosovo, just for the reason I have made above. However, in the internal and external political and economical matters there was no cohesion whatsoever of Prishtina and Belgrade in the post 99.
3. What is current relationship between Kosovo and the international community?
The international community has been of a major incentive to the overall late developments in Kosovo. It has provided for security, humanitarian, economical, technical, capacity building assistance to the Kosovo people and Kosovo institutions. In this context, I would say that the Kosovars and the Kosovo institutions praise the good cooperation they have with the International Community. However, there have been from time to time critiques addressed especially to UNMIK from the Kosovo politicians to attain more responsibilities as only in that way they would confirm to the world that they are able to govern themselves and for all the people of Kosovo.
4. How would you describe the political leadership in Kosovo today? Has the Kosovo Liberation Army successfully moved into the political mainstream and renounced violence?
I think the political scene in Kosovo has been well established and it has provided for some elements of seriousness and moderate running of the political life in Kosovo, especially if we take into account the problems Kosovo faced after 1999. Though, the political scene is constructed mainly out of the peaceful resistance movement of the 90-ies and the former KLA mainstream, the background policy orientation doesn't differ as much, also taking the specific political climate in Kosovo, where we have a twofold chain of responsibility conductance, with UNMIK and the local governmental institutions. However, this twofold chain of responsibilities had enabled more space for deference of what they should in reality were supposed to do. Therefore still one can recognize that the political leadership lacks on quality, persistence to terminate successfully their obligations towards the citizens of Kosovo and also from time to time it is overshadowed by corruption and illicit uses of power. Nevertheless, taking the very short existence of the political scene being run in somewhat peaceful and more democratic circumstances then before, I judge that it has been functional and provided for solid results, although there is an immediate need for inner party reformation. The former KLA has managed to produce the transformation of both of its wings quite successfully. After the transformation of the KLA, the political wing did pursue the chance to get involved in the political life in Kosovo, and now it is represented by the PDK of former KLA leader, Hashim Thaci and AAK of the former KLA commander, Ramush Haradinaj. The two aforementioned parties and the major party of the late president of Kosovo, Ibrahim Rugova, LDK, were cohabiting within the same governing coalition in the last term, whereas this term it's a power share between the LDK and AAK. I think they tent to be very moderate and violence is not their agenda to propel politically and this also if we take into account the "command and control" method of the international community.
5. What do you view as the implications of upcoming decision on Kosovo?
Well, the negotiation talks started just last week in Vienna, under mediation of the UN envoy Marti Ahtisari, and it is generally assumed that they will end by the end of 2006. However, in the late diplomatic encounters that dealt with the future status of Kosovo, presumably it is considered that Kosovo will attain "conditional" independence, meaning that some sovereignty will be "owned" by the international community that will oversee the protection of the minorities, especially of the Serb minority in Kosovo. The position of the Kosovar delegation is that it accepts nothing less then independence, though with some guarantees that the "conditional" independence in a certain short time period will resolve in what they are aiming at, it will accept it. Belgrade stand-point is very vague in front of what is brought forward in the latest meetings and opinions on the future status of Kosovo. But, I believe that just as in Bosnia, the stick and carrot will do the job for Serbia again.
6. What are the stakes if Kosovo doesn't achieve independence?
In this worst case scenario for the Kosovars, I think there is much at stake. There is great fear that extreme voices in Kosovo can gain political ground and make their platforms approachable and popular for the citizens of Kosovo whereas this can have a regional effect as well, especially in Macedonia; the relationship with the International Community can receive a blow, endangering here all the positive development achieved jointly and also creation of antagonist views towards the International Community, and also the further friction between the communities in Kosovo, especially the Albanian majority and the Serb minority. However, I don't believe that whatever other solution would resolve more stability and would be seen as more pragmatic then the conditional independence with short-term prospect for full independence.
7. How do you view Kosovo's relationship to Albania and Macedonia in the coming years?
Of course, there are fears of greater Albania, but it's not the real picture that one can withdraw from the situation. The "hardliners" or those who promote the idea of the great Albania, are not the ruling political party mainstream in neither of the three places, and they represent a very small minority. The political mainstream, especially in Kosovo and the Albanian political parties, was subject to international pressure on not using nationalistic agenda and pursue illegitimate means to advance politically. The standpoint of Macedonia on the issue of Kosovo has been pragmatic during the last seven years. Having been traditionally "aligned" with Serbia's position, recently they "have taken the coat and they started wearing it on the other side". Macedonian officials now say that it will accept whatever solution on Kosovo that Prishtina and Belgrade agree upon. The latter view signals that Macedonia is starting to approach Kosovo realistically.
Kosovo politicians view Macedonia and Albania as two good neighbors with whom they want to generate friendly and serious cooperation, and I think the prospects of regional cooperation and EU integrative processes will promote the kind of relationship that would prevent any sort of tensions between Kosovo and the other countries of the region.
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Pravda
Kosovo: a land of plenty or a wasteland? |
| 01.03.2006 |
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Before the start of the current talks, the political director of the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that a contact group intended to give independence to Kosovo. Europe will stand by its decision and it only remains to make sure that Kosovo does not set a precedent for other dependent regions. UN Special Envoy Marti Ahtisaari recently denounced independence of the Albanian autonomy during talks on the status of Kosovo. According to observers Serbia has accepted the loss of authority and is now engaged in resolving the problems of the Serbian minority in independent Kosovo. They are also striving to maintain links with the territory. The region is considered the "spiritual heart" of the nation. Serbians brought Christianity to the region in the 5-6 th century and there are now more than 2000 orthodox churches and monasteries in the region which is 10 000 square metres in size. However, the economic implications are no less important: what resources and assets does Kosovo have? Is it worth fighting over these? How will self-governance work? Various assessments have been made. Kosovo is characterized as Serbia 's main area of resources, but also as an impoverished and depressed province. At first glance it becomes clear that these views are not without basis. However, each of these opinions gives rises to political powers with sordid motives and creates legends. The topic of Kosovo's "magical riches" was first raised ten years ago when Kosovo-Albanians decided to separate from Yugoslavia. At the time information about the region's resources was revealed; its huge quantity of chromium (20% of the world's), nickel, zinc, magnesium, copper, mercury, silver, gold, bismuth and other rare metals. It has been estimated that Kosovo's coal, natural gas and metals are worth in total $500 billion. Thus the Serbians do not wish to lose Kosovo and dreams of exploiting the natural riches of this "native Albanian" land. In recounting tales of its wealth, Kosovo-Albanians have an ulterior motive which is to attract international interest. Kosovo is about to realize this aim since it is separating from Serbia . Paradoxically Belgrade at this stage has begun to support talk of Kosovo's wealth in its political interests. Serbia claimed in 1999 that the West's desire to acquire Kosovo's resources was the reason behind NATO's aggression. Now this idea has resurfaced and they want Serbia to give up their resources and force them instead to buy them abroad. Is there actually anything of worth in Kosovo? First of all, there is practically no chromium there and in actual fact over 90% of the world's stock of this metal is found in South Africa , Kazakhstan and Zimbabwe . The largest reserve in the Balkans is in Albania where 0.19% of the world's chromium is to be found. In Serbia the figure is yet lower. There is of course some chromium in Kosovo, but they have been extracting it for over a hundred years and so the reserves have almost run out. The same is the case for nickel and magnesium. There are supplies of coal, lead and zinc supplies and there is also a small quantity of cadmium, copper, silver or gold. It is, however, of poor quality. The mining company Trepcha, which has existed for over 70 years, has in recent years lowered production due to lack of raw materials. There is only enough coal to power one power plant. On the other hand, Serbian experts point out that the natural resources have not yet run out. In their opinion the potential resources in the region are far from used up. They are sure that there are still large deposits of coal, lead and zinc, chromium, gold, silver and nickel. According to Serbian calculations, there is 70-100 millions tonnes of lead and 7-12 billion tonnes of coal. Only the political instability of the autonomy does not allow them to explore and obtain the natural resources. Out of the 16 lead and zinc mines only two are in use and out of the numerous coal pits only one is still working. The majority of exploration work was carried out in Kosovo a few decades ago. In the 1960s people looked for oil and it was found in three out of four boreholes. However, this information was not sufficient for the drawing up of proposed oil reserves. All this documentation has been lost somewhere. . . Thus today the quantity of Kosovo's natural resources remains a mystery. The resources that are still left in the country are of definite worth and this does not take into account the $500million that Yugoslavia invested in Kosovo. This explains Serbia 's current enthusiasm to fight to keep this region. As concerns self-governance, it may not turn out to be not such a bad thing. Having become independent, Kosovo could sell her resources to Serbia . This would be essential for the development of her infrastructure. At the current time the region's economy is in a poor state: the majority of mines, industrial plants and major businesses are not in use, farming industry is in decline and 50% of the population is unemployed (70% amongst young people). This has given rise to illegal weapons dealing, drug trafficking and people trading. The remainder of the regions' industry is controlled by mafia groups. It is doubtful that if Kosovo suddenly becomes an independent state that there will be mass foreign investment into the region. It is questionable whether the region would be able to make use of its economic potential. Moreover, Kosovo could become the new Palestine , an unstable region which will rely on foreign aid. Special Envoy to the UN Marti Ahtisaari, after a trip to the region last year, said that the outlook for Kosovo was bleak. He considered that independence would threaten the whole region and could have disastrous consequences as regards the region's safety. In the first instance Bosnia and Herzegovina would be under threat, a country which has a very diverse population with Serbians being one the nationalities living there. High-ranking EU Minster Xavier Solana has already voiced his concerns. The opinions and assessments of the situation by international diplomats have greatly changed in recent times. Perhaps Kosovo within two months will have changed for the better. Although it is unlikely, someone may find the "magical riches." |
