Saskatoon
24.3.2006

To: CBC Radio Sunday Edition

Dear Michael Enright and staff, 

Your last Sunday's programme on Slobodan Milosevic’s death revealed a biased
and propagandist approach to the whole tragedy of the systematic dismantling
of Yugoslavia, You blame one man and one man alone, and label him  “The
Butcher of Balkans”,  "a tyrant”,  “a mass murderer”, and throw in the
suggestion that he “murdered millions,” all this in the brief introduction
to the interview of your equally biased interviewee, Mr. William Schabas.
You make no attempt to offer proof; yours is a guilt-by-accusation approach.

Six years after the bombing of illegal, immoral and unjust US instigated and
NATO conducted war on Yugoslavia you should have had plenty of time for
second thoughts, particularly as the evidence is out there, easy to locate,
that both Mr. Milosevic and the Serbs have been and continue to be falsely
accused.

Back in ’99 I wrote a piece, "The Media and the demonization of Serbs,"
which I urge you to read with fresh and open eyes.  (See below.)

Michael Parenti’s article of 2003, "The demonization of Slobodan Milosevic,"
adds more to the contarary evidence of Milosevic's  and Serbs' "guilt" that
you and your programme so completely ignore. (See below.)

To bring the point home about the absurdity of the claims against Milosevic,
I am sending Swiftian piece by Jan Oberg from Sweden, " The real story: How
Milosevic was more evil than you ever knew," which I hope will tickle your
funny bone, and waken your (dormant) sense of honesty and truth in
broadcasting. (See below.)

I will end with the hope, which is fast fading, that the CBC  in general and
your programme in particular, would pull away from the NATO/US dominant
perspective on all matters regarding international affairs, ands start
speaking truth to power, at last. Canadians have the right to expect more
from our public broadcasting!

After William Schabas’ morally and intellectually lazy justification of the
victor’s courts  such as the one that has provided “judicial lynching” (in
Edward L. Greenspan’s words)  to Slobodan Milosevic, I would hope that you
would soon do an in-depth interview with Professor Michael Mandel from York
University’s Osgoode Hall, whose book, How America Gets Away with Murder:
Illegal Wars, Collateral Damage and Crimes Against Humanity, tells all, from
the perspective of international law. (You can find a review of it by Edward
Herman  at  http://zmagsite.zmag.org/JulAug2004/herman0804.html )

Sincerely

Marjaleena Repo
201 Elm Street
Saskatoon, SK
S7J 0G8
[EMAIL PROTECTED]



THE MEDIA AND THE DEMONIZATION OF THE SERBS


by Marjaleena Repo 

Tuesday, March 30, 1999 

  

________________________________

The Yugoslavian government has just expelled some journalists from NATO
countries from its territory. This is deplored by the media as “censorship,”
but in some of us it has created a strange sense of relief: perhaps now
there will be a ceasefire in the 10-year disinformation campaign about the
Yugoslavian conflict in general and the Serbs in particular. Or at least the
“journalists” (few actually deserve the name) have to declare that what they
are talking about is unverified rumour and hearsay since they are nowhere
near the scene. Up to this point they have been able to create the false
impression that they have witnessed the events they report on. 

The Western media's relentless demonization of the Serbs of Yugoslavia has,
however, produced a very predictable (and no doubt, wished-for) result: a
truly genocidal assault on the Serbian people by Western military might,
Canada to its eternal shame participating, breaking every relevant
international covenant and treaty. 

The pack-journalism over the last ten years has also succeeded in
hoodwinking many Canadians into thinking that what is at stake is the
good-riddance of a Serbian Hitler who has attempted a "final solution" of
sorts on assorted ethnic groups in Yugoslavia. A lot of well-intentioned
people are cheering the bombing of yet another pariah nation into the Stone
Age. With the accumulated effects of media rumour-mongering and willful
disinformation, who can blame these folks for their barely controlled blood
thirst? After all, because Hitler wasn't stopped in time, millions perished
in concentration camps, goes the heart-felt argument. 

Yet the labelling of Yugoslavia's Serb leaders as Hitlers — and the Serbs
themselves as brutal, subhuman monsters — is a familiar trick from recent
history. It has been perpetuated by the various hired hands, PR firms, who
have worked overtime for the various ethnic groups pushing for secession
which would utterly destroy the once well-functioning, multi-ethnic
Yugoslavian federation and replace it with small nation-states which
ethnically cleansed themselves (Croatia, for instance, expelled between
500,000 and a million Serbs from its territory.) The media has merely
carried the message of these "hidden hands" of the Balkan conflict. 

The world was shocked to find out that a PR firm, Hill and Knowlton, had
manufactured the "incubator babies" incident in Kuwait which precipitated
the Gulf War: Iraqi soldiers ripping Kuwaiti babies out of incubators in a
genocidal fashion. Phony eywitnesses to this atrocity tearfully testified in
front of U.S. politicians and the media, adding to public support for the
subsequent bombing of Iraq and contributing hugely to the demonization of
the Iraqis, leaders and citizens alike. Even Amnesty International was taken
in by the falsehood, which was later exposed as such, but only after the
military damage was done. 

Yet the shock of being duped soon wore off and gullibility returned. In no
time another American PR firm, Ruder Finn, working for the Croatian and
Bosnian separatists, publicly bragged that it had been able to turn world
opinion against the Serbs. In April 1993 on French television, James Harff,
the director of Ruder Finn, described his proudest public relations effort
as having "managed to put Jewish opinion on our [Croatian and Bosnian]
side." This was a "sensitive matter," he added, as "the Croatian and Bosnian
past was marked by real and cruel anti-semitism. Tens of thousands of Jews
perished in Croatian camps... Our challenge was to reverse this attitude and
we succeeded masterfully. At the beginning of July 1992, New York Newsday
came out with the article on Serb camps. We jumped at the opportunity
immediately. We outwitted three big Jewish organizations.... That was a
tremendous coup. When the Jewish organizations entered the game on the side
of the [Muslim] Bosnians we could promptly equate the Serbs with the Nazis
in the public mind. Nobody understood what was happening in Yugoslavia....
By a single move, we were able to present a simple story of good guys and
bad guys which would hereafter play itself. We won by targeting the Jewish
audience. Almost immediately there was a clear change of language in the
press, with the use of words with high emotional content such as ethnic
cleansing, concentration camps, etc, which evoke images of Nazi Germany and
the gas chambers of Auschwitz. " 

The PR firm was piling hoax upon hoax. The famous story of Serb
concentration camps was built on a photo of a gaunt man surrounded by
others, staring at the viewer from behind barbed wire; surely an image to
chill one to the bones. It took years before a German journalist Thomas
Deichman, in an article titled "The picture that fooled the world,"
described how the famous photo was staged by its takers, British
journalists, who were photographing the inhabitants from inside barbed wire
which was protecting agricultural products and machinery from theft in a
refugee and transit camp; the men stood outside of it; and at no time was
there a barbed-wire fence surrounding the camp. But by that time the image
had done its deed, terminally slamming the Serbs as genocidal mass
murderers. 

There are countless other stories, all deliberately maligning the Serbs to
further the ends of military intervention. These stories and photos of
"genocide" and "ethnic cleansing" (a la Hitler) in a civil war, in which
Serbs are guilty as sin and others are their innocent victims, are repeated
ad nauseam by western reporters without the slightest evidence, and have
provided the ground for the public's (hopefully only temporary) acceptance
of the illegal and brutal war against the sovereign nation of Yugoslavia.
They continue after NATO's bombing began, unabated, with new absurdities
such as the suggestion that the Serbs are really bombing themselves! Perhaps
in the war crimes court there will soon be a place for journalists and PR
firms who with their inflammatory reporting and fraudulent actions cause
wars to begin. THE END 

http://www.counterpunch.org/disinfo.html 


The Demonization of Slobodan Milosevic  by Michael Parenti
December 2003

U.S. leaders profess a dedication to democracy. Yet over the past five
decades, democratically elected governments---guilty of introducing
redistributive economic programs or otherwise pursuing independent courses
that do not properly fit into the U.S.-sponsored global free market
system---have found themselves targeted by the U.S. national security state.
Thus democratic governments in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Cyprus,
the Dominican Republic, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Syria, Uruguay,
and numerous other nations were overthrown by their respective military
forces, funded and advised by the United States. The newly installed
military rulers then rolled back the egalitarian reforms and opened their
countries all the wider to foreign corporate investors.

The U.S. national security state also has participated in destabilizing
covert actions, proxy mercenary wars, or direct military attacks against
revolutionary or nationalist governments in Afghanistan (in the 1980s),
Angola, Cambodia, Cuba, East Timor, Egypt, Ethiopia, the Fiji Islands,
Grenada, Haiti, Indonesia (under Sukarno), Iran, Jamaica, Lebanon, Libya,
Mozambique, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Portugal, Syria, South Yemen, Venezuela
(under Hugo Chavez), Western Sahara, and Iraq (under the CIA-sponsored
autocratic Saddam Hussein, after he emerged as an economic nationalist and
tried to cut a better deal on oil prices).

The propaganda method used to discredit many of these governments is not
particularly original, indeed by now it is quite transparently predictable.
Their leaders are denounced as bombastic, hostile, and psychologically
flawed. They are labeled power hungry demagogues, mercurial strongmen, and
the worst sort of dictators likened to Hitler himself. The countries in
question are designated as "terrorist" or "rogue" states, guilty of being
"anti-American" and "anti-West." Some choice few are even condemned as
members of an "evil axis." When targeting a country and demonizing its
leadership, U.S. leaders are assisted by ideologically attuned publicists,
pundits, academics, and former government officials. Together they create a
climate of opinion that enables Washington to do whatever is necessary to
inflict serious damage upon the designated nation's infrastructure and
population, all in the name of human rights, anti-terrorism, and national
security.

There is no better example of this than the tireless demonization of
democratically-elected President Slobodan Milosevic and the U.S.-supported
wars against Yugoslavia. Louis Sell, a former U.S. Foreign Service officer,
has authored a book (Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia,
Duke University Press, 2002) that is a hit piece on Milosevic, loaded with
all the usual prefabricated images and policy presumptions of the U.S.
national security state. Sell's Milosevic is a caricature, a cunning power
seeker and maddened fool, who turns on trusted comrades and plays upon
divisions within the party.

This Milosevic is both an "orthodox socialist" and an "opportunistic Serbian
nationalist," a demagogic power-hungry "second Tito" who simultaneously
wants dictatorial power over all of Yugoslavia while eagerly pursuing
polices that "destroy the state that Tito created." The author does not
demonstrate by reference to specific policies and programs that Milosevic is
responsible for the dismemberment of Yugoslavia, he just tells us so again
and again. One would think that the Slovenian, Croatian, Bosnian Muslim,
Macedonian, and Kosovo Albanian secessionists and U.S./NATO interventionists
might have had something to do with it.

In my opinion, Milosevic's real sin was that he resisted the dismemberment
of Yugoslavia and opposed a U.S. imposed hegemony. He also attempted to
spare Yugoslavia the worst of the merciless privatizations and rollbacks
that have afflicted other former communist countries. Yugoslavia was the
only nation in Europe that did not apply for entry into the European Union
or NATO or OSCE.

For some left intellectuals, the former Yugoslavia did not qualify as a
socialist state because it had allowed too much penetration by private
corporations and the IMF. But U.S. policymakers are notorious for not seeing
the world the way purist left intellectuals do. For them Yugoslavia was
socialist enough with its developed human services sector and an economy
that was over 75 percent publicly owned. Sell makes it clear that
Yugoslavia's public ownership and Milosevic's defense of that economy were a
central consideration in Washington's war against Yugoslavia. Milosevic,
Sell complains, had a "commitment to orthodox socialism." He "portrayed
public ownership of the means of production and a continued emphasis on
[state] commodity production as the best guarantees for prosperity." He had
to go.

To make his case against Milosevic, Sell repeatedly falls back on the usual
ad hominem labeling. Thus we read that in his childhood Milosevic was
"something of a prig" and of course "by nature a loner," a weird kind of kid
because he was "uninterested in sports or other physical activities," and he
"spurned childhood pranks in favor of his books." The author quotes an
anonymous former classmate who reports that Slobodan's mother "dressed him
funny and kept him soft." Worse still, Slobodan would never join in when
other boys stole from orchards---no doubt a sure sign of childhood
pathology.

Sell further describes Milosevic as "moody," "reclusive," and given to
"mulish fatalism." But Sell's own data---when he pauses in his negative
labeling and gets down to specifics---contradicts the maladjusted "moody
loner" stereotype. He acknowledges that young Slobodan worked well with
other youth when it came to political activities. Far from being unable to
form close relations, Slobodan met a girl, his future wife, and they enjoyed
an enduring lifelong attachment. In his early career when heading the
Beogradska Banka, Milosevic was reportedly "communicative, caring about
people at the bank, and popular with his staff." Other friends describe him
as getting on well with people, "communal and relaxed," a faithful husband
to his wife, and a proud and devoted father to his children. And Sell allows
that Milosevic was at times "confident," "outgoing," and "charismatic." But
the negative stereotype is so firmly established by repetitious
pronouncement (and by years of propagation by Western media and officialdom)
that Sell can simply slide over contradictory evidence---even when such
evidence is provided by himself.

Sell refers to anonymous "U.S. psychiatrists, who have studied Milosevic
closely." By "closely" he must mean from afar, since no U.S. psychiatrist
has ever treated or even interviewed Milosevic. These uncited and unnamed
psychiatrists supposedly diagnosed the Yugoslav leader as a "malignant
narcissistic" personality. Sell tells us that such malignant narcissism
fills Milosevic with self-deception and leaves him with a "chore
personality" that is a "sham." "People with Milosevic's type of personality
frequently either cannot or will not recognize the reality of facts that
diverge from their own perception of the way the world is or should be." How
does Dr. Sigmund Sell know all this? He seems to find proof in the fact that
Milosevic dared to have charted a course that differed from the one
emanating from Washington. Surely only personal pathology can explain such
"anti-West" obstinacy. Furthermore, we are told that Milosevic suffered from
a "blind spot" in that he was never comfortable with the notion of private
property. If this isn't evidence of malignant narcissism, what is? Sell
never considers the possibility that he himself, and the global
interventionists who think like him, cannot or will not "recognize the
reality of facts that diverge from their own perception of the way the world
is or should be."

Milosevic, we are repeatedly told, fell under the growing influence of his
wife, Mirjana Markovic, "the real power behind the throne." Sell actually
calls her "Lady Macbeth" on one occasion. He portrays Markovic as a complete
wacko, given to uncontrollable anger; her eyes "vibrated like a scared
animal"; "she suffers from severe schizophrenia" with "a tenuous grasp on
reality," and is a hopeless "hypochondriac." In addition, she has a "mousy"
appearance and a "dreamy" and "traumatized" personality. And like her
husband, with whom she shares a "very abnormal relationship," she has "an
autistic relation with the world." Worse still, she holds "hardline marxist
views." We are left to wonder how the autistic dysfunctional Markovic was
able to work as a popular university professor, organize and lead a new
political party, and play an active role in the popular resistance against
Western interventionism.

In this book, whenever Milosevic or others in his camp are quoted as saying
something, they "snarl," "gush," "hiss," and "crow." In contrast, political
players who win Sell's approval, "observe," "state," "note," and "conclude."
When one of Milosevic's superiors voices his discomfort about "noisy Kosovo
Serbs" (as Sell calls them) who were demonstrating against the mistreatment
they suffered at the hands of Kosovo Albanian secessionists, Milosevic
"hisses," "Why are you so afraid of the street and the people?" Some of us
might think this is a pretty good question to hiss at a government leader,
but Sell treats it as proof of Milosevic's demagoguery.

Whenever Milosevic did anything that aided the common citizenry, as when he
taxed the interest earned on foreign currency accounts---a policy that was
unpopular with Serbian elites but appreciated by the poorer strata---he is
dismissed as manipulatively currying popular favor. Thus we must accept
Sell's word that Milosevic never wanted the power to prevent hunger but only
hungered for power. The author operates from a nonfalsefiable paradigm. If
the targeted leader is unresponsive to the people, this is proof of his
dictatorial proclivity. If he is responsive to them, this demonstrates his
demagogic opportunism.

In keeping with U.S. officialdom's view of the world, Sell labels "Milosevic
and his minions" as "hardliners," "conservatives," and "ideologues"; they
are "anti-West," and bound up in "socialist dogma." In contrast, Croatian,
Bosnian, and Kosovo Albanian secessionists who worked hard to dismember
Yugoslavia and deliver their respective republics to the tender mercies of
neoliberal rollback are identified as "economic reformers," "the liberal
leadership," and "pro-West" (read, pro-transnational corporate capitalist).
Sell treats "Western-style democracy" and "a modern market economy" as
necessary correlates. He has nothing to say about the dismal plight of the
Eastern European countries that abandoned their deficient but endurable
planned economies for the merciless exactions of laissez-faire capitalism.

Sell's sensitivity to demagoguery does not extend to Franjo Tudjman, the
crypto-fascist anti-Semite Croat who had nice things to say about Hitler,
and who imposed his harsh autocratic rule on the newly independent Croatia.
Tudjman dismissed the Holocaust as an exaggeration, and openly hailed the
Croatian Ustashe Nazi collaborators of World War II. He even employed a few
aging Ustashe leaders in his government. Sell says not a word about all
this, and treats Tudjman as just a good old Croatian nationalist. Likewise,
he has not a critical word about the Bosnian Muslim leader Alija
Izetbegovic. He comments laconically that Izetbegovic "was sentenced to
three years imprisonment in 1946 for belonging to a group called the Young
Muslims." One is left with the impression that the Yugoslav communist
government had suppressed a devout Muslim. What Sell leaves unmentioned is
that the Young Muslims actively recruited Muslim units for the Nazi SS
during World War II; these units perpetrated horrid atrocities against the
resistance movement and the Jewish population in Yugoslavia. Izetbegovic got
off rather lightly with a three-year sentence.

Little is made in this book of the ethnic cleansing perpetrated against the
Serbs by U.S.-supported leaders like Tudjman and Izetbegovic during and
after the U.S.-sponsored wars. Conversely, no mention is made of the ethnic
tolerance and diversity that existed in President Milosevic's Yugoslavia. By
1999, all that was left of Yugoslavia was Montenegro and Serbia. Readers are
never told that this rump nation was the only remaining multi-ethnic society
among the various former Yugoslav republics, the only place where Serbs,
Albanians, Croats, Gorani, Jews, Egyptians, Hungarians, Roma, and numerous
other ethnic groups could live together with some measure of security and
tolerance.

The relentless demonization of Milosevic spills over onto the Serbian people
in general. In Sell's book, the Serbs are aggrandizing nationalists. Kosovo
Serbs demonstrating against mistreatment by Albanian nationalists are
described as having their "bloodlust up." And Serb workers demonstrating to
defend their rights and hard won gains are dismissed by Sell as "the lowest
instruments of the mob." The Serbs who had lived in Krajina and other parts
of Croatia for centuries are dismissed as colonial occupiers. In contrast,
the Slovenian, Croatian, and Bosnian Muslim nationalist secessionists, and
Kosovo Albanian irredentists are simply seeking "independence,"
"self-determination," and "cultural distinctiveness and sovereignty." In
this book, the Albanian KLA gunmen are not big-time drug dealers,
terrorists, and ethnic cleansers, but guerrilla fighters and patriots.

Military actions allegedly taken by the Serbs, described in the vaguest
terms, are repeatedly labeled "brutal," while assaults and atrocities
delivered upon the Serbs by other national groups are more usually accepted
as retaliatory and defensive, or are dismissed by Sell as "untrue," "highly
exaggerated," and "hyperventilated." Milosevic, Sell says, disseminated
"vicious propaganda" against the Croats, but he does not give us any
specifics. Sell does provide one or two instances of how Serb villages were
pillaged and their inhabitants raped and murdered by Albanian secessionists.
>From this he grudgingly allows that "some of the Serb charges . . . had a
core of truth." But he makes nothing more of it.

The well-timed, well-engineered story about a Serbian massacre of unarmed
Albanians in the village of Racak, hyped by U.S. diplomat and veteran
disinformationist William Walker, is wholeheartedly embraced by Sell, who
ignores all the contrary evidence. An Associated Press TV crew had actually
filmed the battle that took place in Racak the previous day in which Serbian
police killed a number of KLA fighters. A French journalist who went through
Racak later that day found evidence of a battle but no evidence of a
massacre of unarmed civilians, nor did Walker's own Kosovo Verification
Mission monitors. All the forensic reports reveal that almost all of the
forty-four persons killed had previously been using fire arms, and all had
perished in combat. Sell simply ignores this evidence.

The media-hyped story of how the Serbs allegedly killed 7,000 Muslims in
Srebrenica is uncritically accepted by Sell, even though the most thorough
investigations have uncovered not more than 2,000 bodies of undetermined
nationality. The earlier massacres carried out by Muslims, their razing of
some fifty Serbian villages around Srebrenica, as reported by two British
correspondents and others, are ignored. The complete failure of Western
forensic teams to locate the 250,000 or 100,000 or 50,000 or 10,000 bodies
(the numbers kept changing) of Albanians supposedly murdered by the Serbs in
Kosovo also goes unnoticed.

Sell's rendition of what happened at Rambouillet leaves much to be desired.
Under Rambouillet, Kosovo would have been turned into a NATO colony.
Milosevic might have reluctantly agreed to that, so desperate was he to
avoid a full-scale NATO onslaught on the rest of Yugoslavia. To be certain
that war could not be avoided, however, the U.S. delegation added a
remarkable stipulation, demanding that NATO forces and personnel were to
have unrestrained access to all of Yugoslavia, unfettered use of its
airports, rails, ports, telecommunication services, and airwaves, all free
of cost and immune from any jurisdiction by Yugoslav authorities. NATO would
also have the option to modify for its own use all of Yugoslavia's
infrastructure including roads, bridges, tunnels, buildings, and utility
systems. In effect, not just Kosovo but all of Yugoslavia was to be
subjected to an extraterritoriality tantamount to outright colonial
occupation.

Sell does not mention these particulars. Instead he assures us that the
request for NATO's unimpeded access to Yugoslavia was just a pro forma
protocol inserted "largely for legal reasons." A similar though less
sweeping agreement was part of the Dayton package, he says. Indeed, and the
Dayton agreement reduced Bosnia to a Western colony. But if there was
nothing wrong with the Rambouillet ultimatum, why then did Milosevic reject
it? Sell ascribes Milosevic's resistance to his perverse "bunker mentality"
and his need to defy the world.

There is not a descriptive word in this book of the 78 days of
around-the-clock massive NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, no mention of how it
caused the loss of thousands of lives, injured and maimed thousands more,
contaminated much of the land and water with depleted uranium, and destroyed
much of the country's public sector industries and infrastructure-while
leaving all the private Western corporate structures perfectly intact.

The sources that Sell relies on share U.S. officialdom's view of the Balkans
struggle. Observers who offer a more independently critical perspective,
such as Sean Gervasi, Diana Johnstone, Gregory Elich, Nicholas Stavrous,
Michel Collon, Raju Thomas, and Michel Chossudovsky are left untouched and
uncited. Important Western sources I reference in my book on Yugoslavia
offer evidence, testimony, and documentation that do not fit Sell's
conclusions, including sources from within the European Union, the European
Community's Commission on Women's Rights, the OSCE and its Kosovo
Verification Mission, the UN War Crimes Commission, and various other UN
commissions, various State Department reports, the German Foreign Office and
German Defense Ministry reports, and the International Red Cross. Sell does
not touch these sources.

Also ignored by him are the testimonies and statements of members of the
U.S. Congress who visited the Balkans, a former State Department official
under the Bush administration, a former deputy commander of the U.S.
European command, several UN and NATO generals and international
negotiators, Spanish air force pilots, forensic teams from various
countries, and UN monitors who offer revelations that contradict the picture
drawn by Sell and other apologists of U.S. officialdom.

In sum, Sell's book is packed with discombobulated insider details,
unsupported charges, unexamined presumptions, and ideologically loaded
labeling. As mainstream disinformation goes, it is a job well done.

MICHAEL PARENTI received his Ph.D. in political science from Yale
University. He is an award winning author and activist who has published
some 250 articles and 19 books, including Superpatriotism (2004), and The
Assassination of Julius Caesar (2003) which won the “Book of the Year Award”
(nonfiction) from Online Review of Books. His most recent book is The
Culture Struggle  (2006). Various works of his have been translated into
some twenty languages. For further information, visit his website:
www.michaelparenti.org




The real story: 
HOW MILOSEVIC WAS MORE EVIL THAN YOU EVER KNEW 

By Jan Oberg, TFF director 

"The media call him a butcher and compare him with Stalin,  Mao and Hitler.
That's right, but too diplomatic. They don't give us the  the broader
picture. At his death I choose to tell you  how I believe Slobodan Milosevic
single-handed caused all the troubles. And I met him and many of his
opponents. 

Here, for the first time, the Milosevic' Master Plan is revealed and
analysed in depth. When you hear that he caused four wars and ruined
millions of lives, THIS tells you how he actually did it. 

Here is the conclusive evidence that every massacre, all ethnic cleansing,
every village that was torched and any woman who was raped all happened
because of his personal cruel Master Plan and on his order. I can no longer
keep silent. My findings substantiate the general media image of the YU
drama. 

History, economy, the activities of other actors in former YU don¹t mean a
thing. He is guilty of it all and we should not be afraid of saying it aloud
just because he has died. Indeed, I've found reasons to believe that he can
be tied to the genocides in Rwanda and Burundi too. 

It doesn't matter what the Hague trial might have concluded. U.S. ambassador
Richard Holbrooke is right that world public opinion have already found the
dictator guilty. That's what counts. 

This path-breaking document concludes that we would all have lived in
Greater Serbia had the U.S., the EU, NATO and the leaders of Slovenia,
Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosova not stood up as one for their deeply held
beliefs in justice, peace, human rights and democracy. Indeed, they saved
Europe from this new dictator who might even have dwarfed Hitler," says the
author. 

The analysis is in 3 parts, begin here: 
http://www.transnational.org/forum/meet/2006/Oberg_Slobo_1.html 










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