BBC Monitoring European
Friday, March 31, 2006
Friday, March 31, 2006
Source: Politika, Belgrade, in Serbian 30 Mar 06
Text of commentary by Aleksandar Mitic entitled "Strange coincidences"
published by the Serbian newspaper Politika on 30 March; ellipses
as published
The start of the negotiating process on the future status of
Kosovo-Metohija has been characterized by strong pressure on Belgrade
and on the Serbian negotiating team. There is no doubt that one part of
the international community is giving off signals that are going in the
direction of some kind of independence of Kosmet [Kosovo-Metohija]. True,
there had never been any talk of "full independence" but a distinction is
being made between "Kosovo's independence" and "Kosovo's independence from
Serbia". The first option is very uncertain and in reality very difficult
to achieve, but the second option is a subject of widespread speculation,
even in official international circles. Burying the policy of "Standards
before status" (which today even European diplomatic sources admit was a
bluff), the relatively biased principles of the Contact Group (there can
be no return to the situation before 1999, there can be no division...),
a selective approach to the element of "history" in determining status
(as if nothing had existed before and after 1999), insisting on the
will of the majority (the majority on the level of Kosovo, not Serbia), an
attempt to create a "Kosovo exception" in the system of international law,
an attempt to trade "Standards for status" - all of these signals point
to the creation of an atmosphere in the negotiations in which the formal
links between Kosmet and Serbia would be severed.
Signals in the direction of "independence" are being given to Belgrade
in the form of 10 Kosovo "sticks".
1. The timing of the "package of pressure" on Serbia. Montenegro has been
demanding independence for more than five years, but they will hold the
independence referendum to coincide with the Kosovo status talks. Bosnia
filed a lawsuit against Belgrade with the International Court of Justice
[ICJ] in 1993, but the decision will be made at the time of the Kosovo
status talks. The Dayton Agreement on Bosnia has been in force since
1995, but the main pressure on the [Bosnian] Serb Republic to accept
constitutional changes is expected during the Kosovo status talks. Former
Bosnian Serb wartime commander Ratko Mladic was accused of war crimes
in 1995, but Belgrade has been given a deadline to capture him or
face problems with negotiations during the Kosovo status talks. Is this
a coincidence?
2. Weakening Serbia's negotiating position. The demands made by Belgrade
and Pristina are not treated equally. Even though decentralization
is the key to the survival of the Kosovo Serbs, Belgrade's proposal
on decentralization was evaluates as "untenable" in the internal EU
documents. On the other hand, there is tolerance for the mobilization of
Albanians in the region of Presevo [southern Serbia], who are demanding
"independence" and asking for the same "concessions" as the Kosovo Serbs -
even though the situations between these two communities cannot be
compared.
3. Tolerating threats of violence. Regardless of the fact that an
atmosphere of threats of violence on Kosovo is being maintained, with
sporadic low-intensity violence against Serbs (beating, throwing stones),
and threats of violence against international representatives by
"frustrated" Albanians (such as the movement of Albin Kurti or the
Albanian National Army [ANA - AKSH in Albanian]), the international
community has still not raised its voice. What is more, the threats
are used as an argument for stepping up the process in the direction
demanded by those who are making those threats, and the international
community is simply following them.
4. Informal "carrots". In order to persuade Belgrade to accept the
loss of Kosovo, informal offers are being made, such as: "you will
lose Kosovo anyway, so it is better for you to make a good agreement,
get Euro -Atlantic integration, investments, and reduction of debts."
5. Insisting on participation of Serbs in Kosovo institutions. The
Kosmet Serbs have rejected participation in Kosovo institutions as
a sign of protest against permanent discrimination and attempts to be
exploited as "multiethnic decoration". It seems very unlikely that they
would do that now, only so they could "fulfil the Standards of multiethnic
institutions". The Kosovo Serbs do not see their place in a Kosovo
Assembly that passes a resolution in which "independence is the only
option" and which elects Agim Ceku, a general accused of war crimes,
as prime minister. However, international pressure for the Serbs to
enter the Kosovo institutions has not stopped.
6. "Undemocratic" Serbia versus "democratic" Albanians. An impression
is being created about how Serbia is fighting for a medieval past while
the Albanians are struggling for a European future. According to this
impression, Serbia will have a successful future only if it lets Kosmet
go, and the Kosovo Albanians will achieve their full democratic potential
only if Kosovo becomes independent. The Kosovo Albanians are being praised
for their "political maturity" at a time when all reports indicate that
the Standards are far from being fulfilled. At the same time, [former
Kosovo President] Ibrahim Rugova has been called the "Balkan Gandhi" even
though he never once condemned the anti-Serb violence. Rugova's "pacifist"
policy has been praised as a model for Kosovo, but one month later a man
suspected of having committed war crimes was elected prime minister.
7. Hypocrisy regarding war crimes. Even though Serbia has extradited
to the Hague Tribunal [International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia - ICTY] all its persons indicted for committing war crimes
in Kosovo, Albanians keep getting preferential treatment: Fatmir Limaj
has been cleared of all charges, Ramush Haradinaj has been released
pending the start of his trial and has been allowed to take active part
in political life, while Agim Ceku, whom Serbia has accused of mass crimes
against humanity in Croatia and in Kosovo, has been elected prime minister
of Kosovo with the full support of the international community.
8. Spreading defeatism in Serbia. Statements in which Serbs are urged
to accept "reality" and the "independence" of Kosovo are being made
on all sides and their aim is to confuse Serbia's public opinion,
to mentally disarm the people and make them indifferent to the fate
of Kosovo.
9. Media pressure. There is an ongoing wide, synchronized international
campaign launched by the pro-Albanian lobby, with the aim of "following"
a certain media agenda, a context of negotiations and interpretations of the principles of the Contact Group, which are used to suggest that Albanian independence is inevitable.
10. Pressure on neighbouring countries. Even though some of the countries
in the region are concerned about the possibility of changes of borders
(such as Macedonia, Romania and Bosnia-Hercegovina), their views are
not being fully acknowledged and they are expected to relativize
their positions. At the same time, Tirana is openly lobbying without
any limitations or warnings in favour of an independent Kosovo and is
providing logistical support to the Kosovo Albanians in international
circles.
In view of Belgrade's rejection of Kosovo's independence and the
impossibility of finding an acceptable "carrot", there is no doubt that
the pressure on Serbia will strengthen. The united resistance of Belgrade
and the Kosovo Serbs will be crucial, but without a strong diplomatic,
media and lobbying campaign, mainly directed towards the European Union,
it is not very likely that this will be enough.
published by the Serbian newspaper Politika on 30 March; ellipses
as published
The start of the negotiating process on the future status of
Kosovo-Metohija has been characterized by strong pressure on Belgrade
and on the Serbian negotiating team. There is no doubt that one part of
the international community is giving off signals that are going in the
direction of some kind of independence of Kosmet [Kosovo-Metohija]. True,
there had never been any talk of "full independence" but a distinction is
being made between "Kosovo's independence" and "Kosovo's independence from
Serbia". The first option is very uncertain and in reality very difficult
to achieve, but the second option is a subject of widespread speculation,
even in official international circles. Burying the policy of "Standards
before status" (which today even European diplomatic sources admit was a
bluff), the relatively biased principles of the Contact Group (there can
be no return to the situation before 1999, there can be no division...),
a selective approach to the element of "history" in determining status
(as if nothing had existed before and after 1999), insisting on the
will of the majority (the majority on the level of Kosovo, not Serbia), an
attempt to create a "Kosovo exception" in the system of international law,
an attempt to trade "Standards for status" - all of these signals point
to the creation of an atmosphere in the negotiations in which the formal
links between Kosmet and Serbia would be severed.
Signals in the direction of "independence" are being given to Belgrade
in the form of 10 Kosovo "sticks".
1. The timing of the "package of pressure" on Serbia. Montenegro has been
demanding independence for more than five years, but they will hold the
independence referendum to coincide with the Kosovo status talks. Bosnia
filed a lawsuit against Belgrade with the International Court of Justice
[ICJ] in 1993, but the decision will be made at the time of the Kosovo
status talks. The Dayton Agreement on Bosnia has been in force since
1995, but the main pressure on the [Bosnian] Serb Republic to accept
constitutional changes is expected during the Kosovo status talks. Former
Bosnian Serb wartime commander Ratko Mladic was accused of war crimes
in 1995, but Belgrade has been given a deadline to capture him or
face problems with negotiations during the Kosovo status talks. Is this
a coincidence?
2. Weakening Serbia's negotiating position. The demands made by Belgrade
and Pristina are not treated equally. Even though decentralization
is the key to the survival of the Kosovo Serbs, Belgrade's proposal
on decentralization was evaluates as "untenable" in the internal EU
documents. On the other hand, there is tolerance for the mobilization of
Albanians in the region of Presevo [southern Serbia], who are demanding
"independence" and asking for the same "concessions" as the Kosovo Serbs -
even though the situations between these two communities cannot be
compared.
3. Tolerating threats of violence. Regardless of the fact that an
atmosphere of threats of violence on Kosovo is being maintained, with
sporadic low-intensity violence against Serbs (beating, throwing stones),
and threats of violence against international representatives by
"frustrated" Albanians (such as the movement of Albin Kurti or the
Albanian National Army [ANA - AKSH in Albanian]), the international
community has still not raised its voice. What is more, the threats
are used as an argument for stepping up the process in the direction
demanded by those who are making those threats, and the international
community is simply following them.
4. Informal "carrots". In order to persuade Belgrade to accept the
loss of Kosovo, informal offers are being made, such as: "you will
lose Kosovo anyway, so it is better for you to make a good agreement,
get Euro -Atlantic integration, investments, and reduction of debts."
5. Insisting on participation of Serbs in Kosovo institutions. The
Kosmet Serbs have rejected participation in Kosovo institutions as
a sign of protest against permanent discrimination and attempts to be
exploited as "multiethnic decoration". It seems very unlikely that they
would do that now, only so they could "fulfil the Standards of multiethnic
institutions". The Kosovo Serbs do not see their place in a Kosovo
Assembly that passes a resolution in which "independence is the only
option" and which elects Agim Ceku, a general accused of war crimes,
as prime minister. However, international pressure for the Serbs to
enter the Kosovo institutions has not stopped.
6. "Undemocratic" Serbia versus "democratic" Albanians. An impression
is being created about how Serbia is fighting for a medieval past while
the Albanians are struggling for a European future. According to this
impression, Serbia will have a successful future only if it lets Kosmet
go, and the Kosovo Albanians will achieve their full democratic potential
only if Kosovo becomes independent. The Kosovo Albanians are being praised
for their "political maturity" at a time when all reports indicate that
the Standards are far from being fulfilled. At the same time, [former
Kosovo President] Ibrahim Rugova has been called the "Balkan Gandhi" even
though he never once condemned the anti-Serb violence. Rugova's "pacifist"
policy has been praised as a model for Kosovo, but one month later a man
suspected of having committed war crimes was elected prime minister.
7. Hypocrisy regarding war crimes. Even though Serbia has extradited
to the Hague Tribunal [International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia - ICTY] all its persons indicted for committing war crimes
in Kosovo, Albanians keep getting preferential treatment: Fatmir Limaj
has been cleared of all charges, Ramush Haradinaj has been released
pending the start of his trial and has been allowed to take active part
in political life, while Agim Ceku, whom Serbia has accused of mass crimes
against humanity in Croatia and in Kosovo, has been elected prime minister
of Kosovo with the full support of the international community.
8. Spreading defeatism in Serbia. Statements in which Serbs are urged
to accept "reality" and the "independence" of Kosovo are being made
on all sides and their aim is to confuse Serbia's public opinion,
to mentally disarm the people and make them indifferent to the fate
of Kosovo.
9. Media pressure. There is an ongoing wide, synchronized international
campaign launched by the pro-Albanian lobby, with the aim of "following"
a certain media agenda, a context of negotiations and interpretations of the principles of the Contact Group, which are used to suggest that Albanian independence is inevitable.
10. Pressure on neighbouring countries. Even though some of the countries
in the region are concerned about the possibility of changes of borders
(such as Macedonia, Romania and Bosnia-Hercegovina), their views are
not being fully acknowledged and they are expected to relativize
their positions. At the same time, Tirana is openly lobbying without
any limitations or warnings in favour of an independent Kosovo and is
providing logistical support to the Kosovo Albanians in international
circles.
In view of Belgrade's rejection of Kosovo's independence and the
impossibility of finding an acceptable "carrot", there is no doubt that
the pressure on Serbia will strengthen. The united resistance of Belgrade
and the Kosovo Serbs will be crucial, but without a strong diplomatic,
media and lobbying campaign, mainly directed towards the European Union,
it is not very likely that this will be enough.
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