http://www.chroniclesmagazine.org/cgi-bin/newsviews.cgi/Policy/Comrade_Kim_s
_Nukes.html?seemore=y



Chronicles Online: News & Views by Srdja TRIFKOVIC Monday, October 09, 2006

COMRADE KIM'S NUKES, UNCLE SAM'S OPPORTUNITY

  North Korea's nuclear test, which caused indignation and alarm around the
world, is good news for the United States for seven
reasons:

    1. It places China in the uncomfortable position of condemning Kim Jong
Il verbally, but continuing to uphold his regime politically and
economically.

    2. It therefore presents perfect justification for the United States to
condone and even encourage Japan's rapid and large-scale rearmament, up to
and possibly including the acquisition of nuclear arms.

    3. It may deflect China's pressure on Taiwan, thus facilitating the
extension of a stable status quo that is in the interest of the United
States.

    4. It increases America's regional leverage at no cost and little risk
to Washington.

    5. It provides a strong argument for the United States to exert pressure
on South Korea to increase its defense spending and to expand its military
capabilities.

    6. It gives a timely reminder that the withdrawal of all American forces
from the Korean peninsula is long overdue.

    7. It generally complicates the situation in northeast Asia for the key
Oriental "tigers" (China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan), all four of which are
America's economic competitors, and one (China) a potential global rival.

As per 1, China's objective of long standing has been to be accepted as a
dependable great power, a "responsible stakeholder." As such it is supposed
to resist nuclear proliferation in general, and expected to prevent it in
the case of a client as unpredictable, paranoid, and universally disliked as
Kim Jong Il. But while China has warned Kim on numerous occasions over the
past few years against his nuclear program, and Peking condemned his latest
exploit as "brazen," the People's Republic does not want multilateral
sanctions against North Korea and cannot afford to risk Kim's survival.

For ideological reasons Peking would be loath to see the downfall of a
fellow-Communist government (the only other two being a not-too- friendly
Vietnam to the south and an irrelevant basket-case Cuba on the other side of
the world). The cost to China of saving that regime with the lives of two
hundred thousand "People's Volunteers" in 1950-
51 still resonates among the CP cadres. Old loyalties apart, letting Kim
slide could bring millions of unwanted, starving Nort Korean refugees across
the Yalu into Manchuria.

Furthermore, China prefers to have North Korea as a buffer between herself
and the U.S.-patrolled South Korean border on the 38th parallel (the
misnamed "DMZ"). She therefore resists the imposition of sanctions and
continues to supply North Korea with energy and foodstuffs without which
this impoverished and starving Stalinist hell-on-Earth would either collapse
or become even more unpredictable than it is now. It's a classic no-win
situation in which China will either lose face, or influence and power, and
may end up losing some of both. 

As per 2, the discrepancy between Japan's economic might and her relative
military insignificance is an anomaly harking back to 1945 that could hardly
be justified even before the North Korean nuclear test, and which is now
unsustainable. Japan has reached the point where economic power can no
longer be a workable substitute for the non-existant defense force of a
million soldiers -- commensurate with a country of 130 million -- or for a
decent military budget that should account for at least 3 percent of the
GDP, instead of that miserly one percent in 2005. 

Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who took his post two weeks ago, is
routinely described as a "nationalist" by the Western media, which means
that he is a decent sort. (You call me "nationalistic," he told a journalist
last year, "but I say that the person who is not patriotic cannot be the
leader of his country.") He has been in favor of developing a stronger and
more assertive military for years, and now it is time for the U.S. to let
him get on with it. Abe could start with changing the obsolete MacArthur
Constitution of 1947. If he ends up with an independent Japanese nuclear
deterrent the United States should not stand in his way. That would help
keep Kim in check and at the same time it would concentrate a few minds in
Peking wonderfully -- especially among those who have sought to transform
China's growing economic power into the position of a regional hegemon. That
tendency inevitably has the potential to place America on the collision
course with China. Other countries should be allowed, encouraged even, to
help curtail such ambitions; and China's little Catch 22 with Kim Jong Il
provides them with a perfect opportunity.

China will complain if Japan rearms, of course, and she will scream blue
murder if there is a nuclear test in northern Hokkaido; but in view of
Peking's evident inability to keep Kim under control the United States will
be justified to reply that it America no intention to fight a nuclear war in
defense of a threatened foreign power and that therefore she has no right to
prevent that foreign power from providing for her own defense. Comrade Kim's
nuclear test provides the opportunity for Uncle Sam to justify doing what
needed to be done anyway.

In addition the United States should withdraw all American troops from the
Korean Peninsula rather than keep them as a tripwire that shouldn't do any
tripping and therefore should not be kept in harm's way. But getting Seoul
to upgrade its military capabilities may entail some arm twisting, as many
South Koreans still hope that appeasing Kim can work and that the American
defense shield -- maintained ever since the signing of the 1953 Mutual
Defence Treaty --  may be kept indefinitely.

The policy of American constructive disengagement from the Korean Peninsula
should include a green light to the South to develop its own nuclear
deterrent. Hardly any American technical assistance would be needed: South
Korea has a strong civilian nuclear program with a host of dual-use elements
already in place, a sophisticated infrastructure, and technical capabilities
that may produce a credible deterrent as soon as the end of 2007.

If China and North Korea have nuclear weapons, and Japan and South Korea
develop them in order to establish and maintain regional balance comparable
to that in the Indian Subcontinent (i.e. devoid of an American security
guarantee to any potentially warring party), Taiwan would complain that it
should not be the only key regional player prevented from joining the club
to which it has long aspired. 

The limits of China's endurance could be dangerously close by that point,
however, and the United States would be well advised to offer a simple and
attractive deal to Peking: we'll make sure that Taiwan does not get the bomb
-- and for good measure we'll discourage any high-profile move towards
independence in Taipei -- if you are willing to take the issue of
reunification off the table, and keep it so for, say, ten years. That would
be an offer that an overstretched China with so many fresh headaches in her
back yard could ill afford to refuse.

Thank you, Comrade Kim . . . 



Dr. S. Trifkovic, Foreign Affairs Editor CHRONICLES, 928 N Main Street,
Rockford, IL 61103, USA voice (815) 964-5054 fax (815) 964-9403 cell (312)
375-4044 http://www.chroniclesmagazine.org/cgi-bin/newsviews.cgi





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